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ABSTRACT 
The recent emphasis on Affirmative Action policies in South African corporations has illuminated 
the issue of cultural diversity in organizations and the difficulties arising from this transition and 
change. One such difficulty is the problem of intercultural communication where 
miscommunication can have life-threatening consequences. This problem.i& particularly critical 
- in the operational environment of the passenger aircraft flight deck where small group factors. 
as \vell as intercultural issues must be taken into account. In this thesis the problem of 
intercultural communication in such contexts. as a consequence of Affirmative Action is 
examined. The data for this thesis comprises the communication of five culturally diverse flight 
crews. A multi-method \vas used for the gathering and analysis of this data. This involved the 
use of video-taped flight simulator sessions. and personal interviews with each crew member. 
The subjects themselves were involved in identifying key communication problems from the video 
and interpretation of the data. Three levels of analysis were used in the interpretation of the 
findings - the individual, the group and the organization. The factors which affected 
communication at each level in the small, culturally diverse group are highlighted. Furthermore, 
factors which influence the climate in which communication takes place are also considered. The 
implications for Affimlative Action are discussed. 
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CH,·\PTER I 
I:\TRODCCfIO"i 
Flying a multi-pilot transport aircraft involves a small group performance situation in which 
social. organizational and personality factors impact significantly on the ultimatt.: safety of the 
flight oper:ltion. Two important t.:lements contribute to cockpit functioning.- Tht.: first is the 
tl't:hnological clement. ""hich. together ""ith internation:ll flying. policies and standards. remains 
relatively slablt.:. The second elt.:ment is the protean intt.:rplay of human factors in the cockpit. 
These have an inevitabk impact on the effective functioning of tht.: cre\\. 
Evidence of the importance of human bctors is shL)\\n in statistics provided by the :\ational 
,\eronautics and Space Administration I ~ASt\). ~i\S(\ has reported that at the heart of SO-9{)'C 
of aviation accidents. lies the "people factor". Seventy pt.:rcent of 2S 000 incident reports to 
:'\ASA between 1976 and 1981 were primarily related to a failure in voice communication 
(Cockpit :\1 anagemt.:nt Training Program. 1987). 
The large percentage of aircraft incidents and accidents linked to pilot error has forced airlines 
to focus increasing attention on the performance characteristics of the flight crew. Flying remains 
the safest form of transport. However. when air disasters have occurred. they have happened too 
often because Captains have not acknowledged the warnings of other crew members (Foushee. 
198-1} Alternatively. crew members ""ho have possessed adequate information. have for some 
reason not provided it to others. A review and analysis of jet transport accidents worldwide from 
1968 to 1976. showed more than CO accidents in which breakdowns of the crew performance 
process played the major role (Foushee. 1984). This suggests a needed increase in emphasis on 
crew performance and the factors which affect crew coordination. 
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The recent shift towards human factors training is in contrast to previous approaches. Hawkins 
(1987) illuminates the emphasis of the pa::-.1: 
Aircrew training and proficiency testing has traditionally been done on an individual basis. 
If each individual crew member were proficient .. then it \'vas assumed that the team consisting 
of these individuals would also be proficient and effective. (p. 54) 
This mindset was reinforced by the image of the pilot which emerged from a time \\ hen aviation 
was dangerous and a\'ve-inspiring. These conditions contributed to a profile ch;rraderised by Tom 
Wolfe (1979) as the "right stuff' (Foushee. 198-1-). 
An indi\idual who typifies the right stuff is generally described as a highly goal-oriented. 
extremely self-reliant. macho. decisive person. Although it is easy to visualizc such indi\'iduals 
functioning effectively as fightcr or test pilots. it is morc difficult to vic\1, them as good team 
players. (p. 891) 
The regulation s governing pilot ljualifica tions still focus on individual pilot proficiency. HO\\cver. 
as Hawkins (19S7) points out. attcmpts arc being made in some training programs to refocus on 
group performance. 
Many airlines are emphasising the management of flight deck resources through formal 
courses in cockpit resource management (CR.'v1). These courses dcal with both attitudes and 
behaviour. Basic personality is a much more difficult question. but a good CR.\! program can 
minimally affect personality traits in some cases. (p. 183) 
\Vith the recent shift towards cultural diversity. additional variables concerning cultural 
differences and intercultural communication on the flight deck are being highlighted. In line with 
the recent emphasis on Affirmative Action policies in South Africa. South African Airways 
(SA-A) has introduced its own policy of Affirmative Action by recruiting a significant number of 
Black pilots to fill new positions. By the year 2000 SAA hopes to have changed the composition 
of the workforce to an 80% Black. 20% \Vhite ratio. Tlle term "Black" is used here as a generic 
term referring to Black and I ndian people. 
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,-\s an organization dealing \-\<ith Affirmative Action for the first time. S,c\A must be prepared to 
confront the specific issues and difficulties \-\<hich arc likely to arise during this period of 
transition and change. One of the important cha}]enges to be faced by SAA is the impact of 
.;:: . 
culturally diverse inwviduals on communication in general. and night dL'i.:k communication in 
particular. 
The concept of cultural diversity in the areas of aviation has recently received increased attention 
because of its innuence over the performance and interaction of the flight cre\\. Several research 
papers have investigated the factors associated with intercultural communication on the !light 
deck IJohnston. 1993: Maurino. 199'2: \lerritt. 1993). One of the limitations of the existing 
research is its overemphasis on differences and similarities bet\-\<ccn cultural groups. and its 
failure to address the process aspect of adaptation and changc required in small-group. 
intercultural contexts. Previous research has focused predominantly on the interface bet\\cen the 
American. Latin American and Eastern cultures. Little attention has been given to tht;Airican 
situation and questions can be raised about the applicability of the research in the local context. 
However. research findings do suggest that cultural differences arc prevalent and significant. 
\<lerritt (1993) reported that different cultures will have different needs in terms of human factors 
training. Ooi I.cited by Johnston. 1992) observed that: 
... because of the different value systems amongst the cultural subgroups. their perception of 
reality are different. their learning styles are different and in the area of performance. their 
decision-making styles are different. (p. 7) 
Furthermore. Peterson and Bond (19891. in Johnston. (1992). pointed out that' transcultural 
dimensions of leader style can indeed be identified. but the skill of executing each style effectively 
varies by cultural setting: (p. 9) 
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Given the need for greater attention to intercultural communication in the cockpit and the 
specific context of SAA Affirmative Action policy. this research has the objective of providing 
a contextual analysis of intercultural communicalion. In this thesis.. while the focus is on 
intercultural comm unication between individuals on the night deck. factors that influence this are 
considered in terms of three levels: the individual. the group and the organization. 
At the individual level. cultural differences mav influence the attitudes of the crew members and 
preferred leadership styles. Ster eotype-casti ng and pr ej uJicescultivated from pr evious experience 
(perhaps outside the aviation environment) might enter the cockpit situation and can either 
facilitate or inhibit group functioning. At the same time. languag.e differences arc likely to 
complicate communication on the night deck. 
\Vith regard to crew interaction. the type and quality of information exchange may be altered due 
to differences in language. experience and education. In an attempt to compensate Jor these 
differences.. a stricter adherence to standard procedures may occur. As a result. the possible de-
emphasis of critical deviant information. is likely to become a crucial factor in crew performance. 
At the group level. differences in status and power may influence the climate in which 
communication takes place. as well as the communication process itself. Furthermore. although 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). provide tightly defined limits for behaviour. there can 
be definitional diversity and varied application by crew members. SOPs themselves may be 
subject to cultural and subcultural variation (Johnston. 1991: Maurino. 1992; Merritt. 1993). 
At the organizational level. accommodation 'Will have to take place on the part of established. as 
well as. new members. This in turn will doubtless affect the atmosphere in which communication 
takes place. 
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Using this structure (the three levels) in understanding communication and cultural differences 
at different levels. data was gathered on intcrcultural communication on the flight deck through 
observations of actual interactions in simulator sessi'ons and interviews with five culturally diverse 
.;:, ". 
crews. This infom1ation provides the empirical basis for coming to an understanding of the 
challenges and problems of intercultural communication that arise from the Affirmative Action 
]X)licy of SAA. 
The conccptual and contextual issues. the results and the di~ussion arc structured according to 
the three levels of analysis. In the chapters concerned \\ith the conceptual frame\\.ork. small 
group communication is cx-plored by focusing on the individual. group and organizational aspects 
\\hich affect communication in the small group, Follo\\ing this. the additional variable of cultural 
diversity· and its impact on communication on individual. group and organizational levels is 
examined. 
Chapter Three provides a detailed description of thc methodology uscd in this thesis. Chapter 
Four includes a presentation of the findings. from both th e interv:iews and the simulator sessions. 
Chapter Five provides a detailed analysis and discussion of the themes extracted from the data. 
Both Chapters Four and Five are structured according to individual. group and organizational 
levels of analysis. Finally. Chapter Six provides a summary of the findings. conclusions and 
recommendations for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTUAL AND CONTEXTUAL ISSUES 
The flight crew may be described as a small group or team. where factors such as cohesion, co-
operation and adherence to norms influence crew coordination (Johnston, 1992; Phelan, 1994). 
Hackman (1987) draws a comparison between the work of the cockpit crew and the performance 
of a ballet: 
Although a ballet is indeed an ensemble performance, each member of the company has his 
or her own part to play, and those parts are carefully choreographed beforehand. If each 
dancer does precisely the right thing at the right time. the performance can unfold beautifully. 
(p 259) 
Although the abilities and characteristics of indiyjdual members are important, research indicates 
that a team-work approach is more significant for the overall performance and safety of the flight 
(Collins & Manning. 19<xJ; Foushee & Helmreich, 1988; Helmreich, Chidester, Foushee, 
Gregorich & Wilhelm. 1989; Johnston & M aurino, 1990). 
Furthermore. the flight crew is a small group which operates within a very structured 
environment: the flight deck. The flight crew involved in this study consists of three crew 
members: the Captain, First Officer and Flight Engineer. The communication between these 
three individuals is vital for the safe completion of the flight. Although the group operates 
ultimately as a triad, situations do occur when communication occurs predominantly between the 
Captain and First Officer. Thus, under these circumstances, dyadic communication occurs. 
Dyadic members seem to use fewer disagreeing or antagonistic messages towards each other than 
larger numbers. Furthermore, the fundamental distinction between dyads and groups Containing 
more than three people. is that there is a demand on the dyad to achieve consensus on pertinent 
issues. Unlike the larger group. the dyad cannot seek the majority support (Mabry & Barnes. 
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1980). The focus of the study. however. is primarily on the triad, the flight crew. Attention to 
dyadic issues will be given where appropriate. 
The recent shift tmvards cultural diversity introduces another variable: the variable of culture. 
The central focus of this thesis is on the ex1ent to which cultural diversity affects communication 
in the cockpit and the climate in which that communication takes place. Figure l. illustrates this 
scenaTlo. The three inner circles (Captain, Copilot and Flight Engineer) represent the 
individuals. These individuals. however, come together to form a small E.IQ.!U2. on the flight deck 
(represented by the circle which encompasses the three indi\iduals). The group processes of 
interaction and communication - the focus of the study - are represented by the arrows between 
the three individuals. The flight deck, however, is positioned within a broader context, namely 
the aviation environment and. in the particular case in point, involves the operating environment 
of SAA and the Affirmative Action programme. This is represented by the broader circle as 
these issues also impact on the flight deck grOlip processes and the individual levels. Finally, 
cutting through all these levels are the cultural issues and diversity. This is represented by the 
lines which move through the circles down to the individual levels. To the extent that there is 
cultural diversity across these three individuals, communication and interaction is likely to be 
influenced by cultural matters. 
The sections to follow attend to a number of aspects: the small group process and 
communication of flight crews. the operating environment and Affirmative Action policy and how 
this may affect group process and communication, and the intercultural issues that impact on 
small group process and communication. These aspects are discussed from the three angles 
previously highlighted: individual. group and organizational. Each of these form the major levels 
for the structure of the discussion. 
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A. = Group processes 
B. = Organizational 
Factors 
C. = Intercultural 
Issues 
( 
\ 
Cult ur:l! Issues 
C 
Avi3lioa environmenl 
X AIlirm3livc A":lion Policy Org:lniz:lIion B\ 
\ 
A ..... -----t-----\- Flighl Deck 
I 
/ 
/ 
/ CUilur3i Issues 
Figure 1: r\ model of the elements and factors \\ hich influence communication on the' flight 
deck. 
Since the night cre\\ may be regarded as a prototype of the small group. it is necessary to 
examine the phenomena of the small group in more depth. 
In this section the characteristics of small groups and the factors \\hich affect small group 
communication are closelv examined. Figure 2. illustrates these three levels and the factors d 
discussed under each heading. 
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Factors Affecting Sn,1a.11 Group Communication 
I ndividual Factors Group Factors Organizational Factors 
-
-Personality and Personal Interdependence The operational 
qualities Cohesion environment 
Participation Affirmative action policy 
Roles and Norms 
Tasks and Goals 
Figure 2. Factors Affecting Small Group Communication. 
2.1.1. The characteristics of the small group. 
The study of small groups is a complex undertaking. which examines a vast selection ofvariables 
and factors impinging upon the d:ynamics. behaviours and communication at play in the small 
group. Barker, Wahlers, Watson and Kibler (1991) provide a definition which encompasses the 
majority of the dimensions usually associated \\1th the term "small group". 
A small group is a collection of individuals.. from three to fifteen in number, who meet 'in face-
to-face interaction over a period of time, generally with an assigned or assumed leader, who 
possess at least one common characteristic. and who meet with a purpose in mind. (p. 8) 
Simple aggregates of individuals will therefore not fit the definition of a group. because of the 
absence of interaction over time (Schein, 1980). 
2.1.2. Individual factors affecting small group communication. 
2.1.2.1. Personality and personal qualities. 
Each member of a group brings a different personality and a different set of values to the group 
scenario. The significance of these factors is aptly described by Paton. Giffin and Paton (1989): 
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It is entirely logical as well as likely that different members of the same group will initially 
disagree on variolls aspects of a problem as they attempt to analyze it. Because of different 
experiences, value systems, and sources of information, they ""ill vary in their degree of 
recognition of the importance (or even existence) of certain impelling and constraining forces. 
Disagreement on the interpretation of r.elevant aspects of a problem is to -be expected, 
tolerated, discussed, and eventually resolved by open and frank consideration of each other's 
viewpoints. (p. 138) 
Even under circllmstances VI/here group members are similar along the lines of ethnic origin. 
culture and physical attributes. the personalities of members will differ to a greater or lesser 
extent. Given the added dimension of cultural diversity. there is the inclusion of sometimes vast 
cultural differences between group members .• vhich may impact further on the communication 
and participation process. 
There are two particular personal qualities .vhich the individual must bring to the group to ensure 
group success and effective group communication. The first is personal credibility. How 
knovvledgeable the individual is and how well he or she articulates that knowledge wiIi determine 
that person's reputation and status in the group. The ability to share information, provide 
support for one's ideas and show fairness to others, will establish credibility to a greater ex1ent 
than age, sex, occupation and ethnicity. Related to credibility are the concepts of trust\\?~thiness 
and competence. When individuals initially participate in a group. very little is known about 
them. Trust will develop as the individual discloses information about him or herself. The 
competent individual will earn credibility by being able to direct and move the group towards 
group goals. 
Secondly. sensitivity is an important personal quality impacting on the group. The sensitive 
individual is responsive to the values and opinions of others. Such individuals will be aware of 
the feelings, frustrations and fears of fellow group members. Sensitivity depends on the ability 
to deliver an appropriate response to other group members (Schultz, 1989). 
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On the flight deck the patterns of individual skills. physical state, attitudes and personality 
characteristics that each member brings to the teaI~. is of significance. The individual skills will 
affect the level of competence and the resources<tliat the group has at its disposal, while physical 
states such as fatigue will influence performance and motivation. Personality and attitudinal 
factors will affect how the group actually works together (Foushee & Helmreich, 1988). 
r - -
I n addition to these aspects. the leadership styles of the Captains on the flight deck influence 
communication and group interaction. Styles of leadership have mostly been categorized 
according to task versus relationship orientation and democratic versus autocratic orientation. 
The task oriented person approacbes the job in an instrumental way, focusing on the task, 
whereas the relationship oriented person will focus on creating and maintaining interpersonal 
relationships. This does not mean that the task orjented person is not concerned with 
relationships, or that the relationship oriented person is not concerned with tasks, but rather that 
they playa secondary role. 
In the cockpit environment, where there are highly structured tasks and powerful leader 
positions; task oriented leaders perform better where there are good interpersonal relatiol!s.hips 
within the group. Where leader-member relations are poor, group-oriented leaders perform 
more effectively. Thus, the type of leadership that is most effective depends on the type of group 
and the task which the group must complete (Foushee & Helmreich, ] 987; Harris & Muir, ] 986). 
Blake and Mouton (1978) suggest that the most effective leader seems to be one who can 
combine. or alternate between the two styles. depeniling on the situational factors. Furthermore, 
Hackman (1987) suggests that Captains should behave in ways that encourage task 
accomplishment and interpersonal harmony, and should avoid domineering or unfaltering 
democratic leadership styles. 
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With regard to sensitivity and credibility, these two factors affect the climate in which 
communication takes place. \Vhere individual members are perceived as competent and 
sufficiently sensitive, communication 'will be more open and effective. 
2.1.3. Group factors affecting small group communication. 
2.1.3.1. Interdependence. 
Regardless of the diversity of groups, one factor remains common to most groups. This is the 
fact that members are interdependent. Brm'liTI (1988) describes this as the event where "one 
person's experiences, actions and outcomes are linked in some way to the experiences, actions 
and outcomes of the others in the group." (p. 27) 
Sherif and Sherif (1969) in Brown (1988) defines group structure as, "an interdependent nemork 
of roles and hierarchical status." (p. 52). Mabry and Barnes (1980) emphasize that "the essence 
of a group is that a collection of individuals have relationships that make them interdependent 
to some significant degree." (p. 180). The group may be likened to a system, where the system 
consists of integrated parts of elements and where these elements interrelate and influ~I.lce one 
another. Thus, when one element changes, all other elements of the system will eventually 
change. 
Several important social processes take place as a consequence of the interdependence that 
occurs in groups. For instance Mann (1988) suggests that: 
Conformity to norms is enforced in order to maintain the group's cohesion and stability. 
Cooperation benveen its members is encouraged in order to ensure that the group moves 
towards its goals. In order to shape the manner and efficiency with which these goals are 
realized, the group becomes differentiated along the dimensions of friendship, leadership, 
communication and responsibility for tasks. (p. 159) 
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It is furthermore recommended that this state of interdependence can be regarded as cohesion 
and is dependent upon the communication an? participation of the group members . 
. ~ . 
2.1.3.2. Cohesion. 
The second group factor affecting small group communication is cohesion'
r 
~lDls and '\lurgatroyd 
(1991) suggest that the when examining th e relationships within a group. special attention sho uld 
be paid to the idea of cohesion. the extent to \",hicl1 there is a bonding of identities in the group 
and the extent to which such bonding may limit the autonomy of individuals within the group. 
Furthermore. cohesiveness refers to the "ability of group members to get along. the feeling of 
loyalty. pride. and cOl1lmittment of members toward the group." (Ellis & Fisher, 199-1-. p. 23). 
A group derives its strength from the ex1ent to \vhich similar goals and \vays of working are 
shared by the group and from the unique qualities which each individual brings to the groups. 
but the bonding of the group can act as an inhibitor action. unless the individual perceives an 
action to be appropriate in the context of the group. (Mills and Murgatroyd, 1991, p. 37) 
Thus. the level of cohesiveness is likely to have an ex1ensive influence over group members. 
Patton. Giffin and Patton point out the following: 
A positive personal consequence of increased cohesiveness seems to be greater acceptance. 
trust, and confidence among members, resulting in a sense of security and personal value. 
People feel free to disagree and even express hostility. A negative consequence of cohesivness 
is seen in a group's need for unanimity. (which) overwhelms a member's realistic appraisal of 
alternative courses of action. (p. 109) 
Cohesiveness is achieved when groups maintain their norms and solidarity through systems of 
rewards and punishments. Rewards are achieved through satisfaction of individual needs and 
punishments occur when members deviate from group expectations. Such punishment may be 
direct or indirect. 
This observation led Minuchin (197-1-) in Mills and Murgatroyd (1991) to suggest that group 
cohesiveness can be regarded as something which is experienced in different \\lays in different 
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groups. He suggests that in looking at cohesiveness there is a continuum bet\veen highly cohesive 
groups which have very weak levels of individual. autonomy 'within the group and at the other 
ex1remc, a high level of autonomy and vcry little cohesion. 
Beween these two ex1remes are ffi'O other moderate relationship patterns, }5;~rding to Olson 
et al (1979) in Mills and Murgatroyd (1991): connected and separate. A conneded group is one 
in which there is a degree of commitment to the group, but where individual autonomy is also 
encouraged. In a separated group individual autonomy is more important than the cohesiveness 
of the group. The group does have some identity, however, which is stronger than that of a 
completely disengaged group. 
Two factors impact on the level of cohesiveness in the group: leadership style and group size. 
Leadership style is essential for building cohesiveness. Each member should be able to 
contribute some degree of leadership to the group and be willing to form an essential part of 
team building. Group size impacts on the variety of skills and abilities available to the group. 
In small groups such as the flight crew, leaders must be able to alternate beween. or combine 
task oriented leadership and group-oriented leadership as discussed previously (Foushee & 
Helmreich. ] 987). Furthermore. we find that the level of cohesion in three person groups is 
higher because of the unlikelihood of subgroups forming and because each member has a better 
opportunity for participating in the group process. 
The optimal level of cohesiveness has been extensively debated. Marvin Shaw, in Wilson and 
Hanna (1990) suggest that high-cohesive groups are more effective than low-cohesive groups in 
achieving their goals. However. Fisher in Wilson and Hanna (1990) argue that a high-cohesive 
group can only be productive up to a point of cohesion. and that ex1remely cohesive groups are 
hkely to be counterproductive. At the same time. highly cohesive groups wiII find that their 
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communication becomes ineffective. 
This is due to two mam reasons. Firstly, the group may begin to focus more on their 
relationships than the task at hand, and secondly, in an effort to preserve and foster their 
relationships, members of the group may be reluctant to challenge each other's ideas. 
-' -
The main problem associated with highly cohesive groups is "group think". This occurs when 
group members conform too readily to group norms (Wilson & Hanna, 1990; Porter, Lawler & 
Hackman, ] 987). Essentially, the theory of "groupthink" suggests that when groups are too 
cohesive, the group as a whole becomes unable to test their decision-making against reality. 
Several conditions might promote the phenomena of groupthink. The first, as already mentioned 
is excessive cohesiveness. The second, occurs when there is insulation from contradictory sources, 
preventing members from receiving information and opinions. The third, is a lack of impartial 
leadership. An impartial leader can use his or her power and position to influence the group to 
approve his or her suggestions. Finally, when groups do not have any norms or rules about the 
methods or procedures they will use, both leaders and members will be free to act 
indiscriminately. On the flight deck the phenomena of "groupthink" is particularly dangerQlJs to 
the safety of the flight because of the importance of alerting members to deviant information. 
Highly cohesive groups may also experience problems related to decision-making. These are 
termed "logical process" problems. Hiroka'wa in Patton, Giffin and Patton (1989) suggests that 
a group's failure can be attributed to an interplay of six factors: 
- The group's misunderstanding of the problematic situation. When members base their 
decisions on inaccurate, or inappropriate premises regarding the problem. poor decisions are 
made. 
- The group's overestimation of the positive benefits of alternative choices. 
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- The nature of values accepted and utilized by the group as decisonal premises. This involves 
making decisions based on value j udgements in~tead of facts. 
- The group's acceptance of inaccurate or invalid information. 
- The group's rejection of accurate or valid information. 
- The persuasive influence of group members. A persuasive member may override other more 
~- -
logical suggestions. 
The logical process problems are particularly important in the contex1 of the flight crew. Crews 
which experiences logical process problems are also likely to jeopardize the safety of the flight. 
particularly under emergency situations. For example, when crew members misunderstand a 
problematic, or critical situation. procedural problems (discussed with regard to roles and norms). 
are also likely to occur. This is because every possible complication or problem can be solved 
by following prescribed procedures. When the problem is initially misunderstood. incorrect 
procedures are likely to be followed. 
Furthermore, the acceptance of inaccurate or invalid information wm lead to incorrect decisions 
and in turn inappropriate actions. Finally, when crew members overestimate the val!l~ of 
alternative courses of action, they may in fact be putting the flight in even more danger. 
Cohesion and interdependence in small groups such as the flight crew. depends significantly upon 
effective participation and communication. Communication in the small group is complicated 
by the presence of other individuals. Each individual has his or her own goals and needs and 
each has a unique way of communicating. 
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2.1.3.3. Participation. 
The third group factor affecting small group communication is participation. Communication 
essentially means participation. For communication to occur, members must participate in the 
group. This involves listening, making statements. asking questions, providing summaries and 
leading discussions (Goodall, 1990). Goodall further recommends that because the group is a 
cooperative endeavour, communication must be shared amongst group members. Each member 
should be able to participate equally, and the group should not be dominated by single 
individuals. Communication is synon)'mous with exchange. Members of small groups exchange 
information. opinions and responsibilities. Through statements and questions and through 
activities that are performed and acted on, it is possible to observe that exchanges are being 
made. 
Effective participation depends on a number of commitments on the part of the individual 
member. Firstly, there must be a commitment to perform at one's best by contributing individual 
skills, abilities and responsibilities. Secondly, there must be a commitment to the good of the 
group. This means that members will subordinate some personal goals in favour of group goals. 
Furthermore, there is the commitment to cooperation, rather than competition. This es.?~ntially 
means that there must be an avoidance of one-up-manship. Finally, individual members must 
be commited to careful listening. This means not only hearing what a person has said, but also 
understanding it. These are the essential commitments which the pilot makes to the flight crew. 
When the pilot enters the flight deck, his or her committment is to perform at a peak and put 
personal goals aside in favour of group goals. In particular, the committment to cooperate must 
take precedence. This constitutes a change in emphasis from previous theories concerning group 
performance in aviation; where the Captain epitomized the autocratic leader (Foushee and 
Helmreich. 1987). 
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Participation and communication may also be understood in terms of the Johari Window 
representation (TIlibault & Kelley, 1986). The lo.hari Window suggests that when individuals 
initially join a group. they will put forward a<p"Ublic persona and are reluctant to disclose 
personal information. However, where there are fewer feelings, behaviours and motivations 
shared by the group, there will be limited participation by that individual and_ co~munication in 
the group will be less effective. 
As time goes by and the participants risk expressions of self-disclosure, the person upholds the 
public persona less rigidly and expresses more of the private self. The individual may also receive 
feedback, thereby decreasing feelings and behaviours which are unconscious to that individual. 
Receiving feedback affects the person's behaviour, self-image and understanding of the otbers' 
perceptions. All these responses will increase the amount of information shared by the group 
and decrease those feelings and behaviors which are deliberately hidden from the group by the 
individual. In groups where feelings, behaviours and motivations are known and shared by the 
group, people will feel comfortable with one another and use their resources and skills freely on 
behalf of the group. 
According to the lohari Window, miscommunication occurs when there is a limited sharing of 
these feelings and motivations. Under these circumstances, groups will continue to engage in 
rituaHzed behaviour which is not related to true feelings and will be unwilling or unable to give 
feedback. Participants will be unlikely to respond to what they hear because they are reluctant 
to reveal private information (Napier & Gershenfeld, 1987). 
Although the majority of communication and participation on the flight deck revolves around the 
sharing of information and the process of decision-making, personal disclosure \-"ill enhance 
interpersonal relationships and increase the cohesion of the group. ""'ben interpersonal 
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relationships are strengthened, members of the group are more likely to verbalize disagreement 
and point out deviant information affecting the flight pattern. 
Finally it may be said that the level of member satisfaction and the quality of interaction in the 
group depends upon three variables. First, there must be perceived freedom to participate. 
Members of groups must feel that they have the option to participate in the group. even though 
they may not actually do so. Wilson and Hanna (1990) describe the climate which promotes such 
participation: 
The most important part of that environment. its climate of trust and acceptance. comes from 
the ways group members talk with one another. They reveal information about themselves 
and their values. They empathize vvith one another. They are straight \vith one another, 
never coloring the truth. never deliberately misrepresenting themselves or their information. 
(p.29) 
Second, there must be perceived progress towards the group goals. Group goals are one of the 
primary reasons individuals join groups and thus the individual derives satisfaction from knowing 
that the group is facilitating the achievement of those goals. Third, the group must agree that 
the roles and relative status of the members of the group are correct. This is known as status 
consensus. 
Effective participation is particularly important on the flight deck. In aviation, one of the most 
significant factors impinging on crew performance and interaction is the flow of information 
within the group. Research by Foushee and Manos (1981) indicates that crews who 
communicated less performed less effectively. However the type and quality of communication 
plays a more salient role as pointed out by Foushee and Helmreich (1988): 
In short, when more information was transferred about aspects of flight status, fewer errors 
appeared which were related to such problems as mishandling of engines, hydraulic, and fuel 
systems, the misreading and missetting of instruments. failure to use ice protection and so 
forth. (p. 209). 
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Information exchange such as described above ensures that all members have access to relevant 
information. Ho\vever, Foushee and Helmreich point out that complete coordination or sharing 
of strategic plans could bave a negative effect if the group.norms do not allow for the processing 
.~ . 
of discrepant information. In other words, critical. conflicting information maybe ignored or de-
emphasized, in an attempt to preserve harmony. In addition to communication styles, the 
precision of communication is important. Intentions and commands need to be stat.edex:plicitly 
to ensme that they are understood by each member in the same way. 
To confirm that the communication has been understood in the same way, cre\v members must 
acknowledge the communication of other crew members. Foushee and Manos (1981) also found 
that acknowledgments served the important purpose of validating that a certain piece of 
information had in fact been transferred. Such communication also served to reinforce the input 
of other crew members (Foushee & Helmreich, 1988). 
2.1.3.4. Norms and roles. 
The fourth factor affecting small group communication involves the norms and roles operating 
in the group. Collier (1986) in Borden (1991) states that in terms of communication competence 
"Persons are ethnically/culturally competent to the ex1ent that they share perceptions as to 
appropriate ways of behaving and prefer the same outcomes from behaviour." (p. 21-+). 
Furthermore, when rules of appropriate beha\;our are not knO\\l1, shared, or are violated, 
meaning is less likely to be shared and the interaction more likely to be dissatisf)ing in terms of 
goal attainment. Thus, mutual acceptance and adherence to roles and norms is important for 
effective communication. 
Any collection of people which can be classified as a group has certain norms, \\ith a resultant 
conformity to these norms. (Burke, 1982; Hare, 1976; Patton, Giffin, & Patton, 1989; Smither, 
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1988). A group norm has been defined as a "shared acceptance of a rule. Members come to 
expect how other people will behave and how they them~elves are expected to behave" (Patton 
et aI, 1989, p. 103). Furthermore. DeRidder, Schruijer and Tripathi, in Schruijer, (1990) 
recommend that: 
Group norms can be described as, if, then statements: If a certain situation is present for a 
member of the ingroup or outgroup, then this group member is obliged (shourd~ ought to) 
perform a certain behaviour or abstain from a certain behaviour. If a group member is not 
behaving in accordance with a norm, that norm is being violated. (p. 48) 
Norms are standards or rules of conduct to which people conform and which govern the 
behaviour of group members by providing the basis for coordination and communication. The 
behaviour of individuals reflects the extent to which they conform to or deviate from the norms. 
When a group is highly resistant to change it is because conformity to norms or sets of norms 
is strong. (Burke. 1982). The occurence of a norm violation by a member of a group will have 
serious consequences for the rest of the group and is often seen as a trigger for negative 
intergroup behaviour. 
In most groups. there will be members who do not adhere to the norms. These are knO'Nn as 
deviants. In highly structured groups. deviance may be severely sanctioned, while in Icss . 
structured groups, deviance may be tolerated to some extent (Gcrson in Crosbie. 1975: GowJer 
& Legge, in Payne & Cooper, 1981). 
Althoug.h the violation of a norm can lead to interpersonal and interg.roup conflict, deviation 
from the norm may be useful on occasions. The deviant may be able to demonstrate alternatives 
to the established standards and provide an opportunity for other members to e>:pericnce and 
evaluate nonconforming bchaviour (Smither, 1988). 
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Roles are closely related to norms. Roles may be defined as "a class of one or more norms that 
applies to a person's behaviour with regard to some sp~ic external problem or in relation to 
a special class of other persons." (Thibault and Kelley, 1986, p. 142). Thus, the "\lay an 
individual behaves in a group, in contrast to the way in which the group as a whole behaves, is 
that individual's undertaking of a role. Roles in groups are established through co~~nication 
with c:ther members (Schultz, 1988). 
Different expectations are associated with the different roles that people fulfil in a group 
(Lieberman, in Crosbie, 1975). This is kno\\TI as role differentiation. Roles may be formally 
prescribed and various participants in the group will be assigned different jobs. When people 
are behaving according to specific roles, there are certain norms of behaviour which are 
appropriate for those roles. Whereas some of the norms in a group will apply to all members, 
some will only apply to members who occupy certain positions and fulfill certain roles. Members 
of a group are said to be fulfiling the same role if they have the same norms. 
In addition to this. roles will also form part of the member's self-definition. A clearly defined 
role will contribute significantly to a member's identity within a group. With regard to roles. _ . 
there is some status differentiation. In other words. the roles of different members may not be 
equally valued by the group and may also not carry the same power to exert influence or control 
over others (Brown. 1988). Furthermore. Mills and M urgatroyd (1991) emphasize that rules and 
roles relate to both boundaries and relationships. A boundary will mark the identity of a group 
or individual in an organization. These boundaries are defined not only by the tasks and roles 
of the individual. but also by the appropriate or inappropriate behaviours and levels of 
responsibility of the individual. 
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At the same time, status is linked with roles and norms. The roles in groups are not all equally 
\ 
valued, nor do they carry the same power to influence ,other group members (Brown, 1988). 
Therefore, individual roles will influence the individuafs'status in the group. Furthermore, status 
will influence communication in the small group by impacting on how members will speak and 
to whom they will speak. Status often implies power and the ability of one or_ mO.re group 
memt:.ers to influence the outcomes of any interaction (Tubbs, 1984). However, some individuals 
enter the group with a certain amount of status. This is ascribed status based on factors such as 
age, gender, position or wealth. Individuals may also be awarded status because of their abilities 
(Schultz, 1989). 
Higher-status individuals are likely to speak more frequently, they receive more messages and are 
likely to be seen as more powerful and influential. Furthermore, high status members are likely 
to converse more frequently with other high status members. On the other hand, low status 
individuals are likely to withhold opinions and beliefs. This may be because they are uncertain 
of the responses they -v,rill receive, or because they feel they have not earned the right to speak 
(Tubbs, 1984). 
Related to the concepts of status, roles and norms are the physical and mental territories within 
which members of a group operate. The physical territory is \vhere the group interacts. Mental 
territories are the tasks which are assigned to individuals because of that person's experience. 
expertise. role and status. An encroachment on eith er of these two territories can cause conflict 
in the small group situation (Barker e1 al. 1984). 
In the context of the flight ded there is a definitive role structure (chain of command) which is 
a powerful predictor of flight crew interaction. Thus the status of different crew members has 
a profound effect on the roles and norms fulfilled by that individual, as well as that person's 
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communicative behaviour. In aviation. position is largely determined by seniority and level of 
experience. The person in charge is usually the most ex-perienced, followed by those of lesser 
experience and so on down the line. This role structure'iIifluences how subordinates interact with 
superiors. Status may affect communication in the sense that members of lower ranking may feel 
inhibited to communicate in the cockpit with very senior crew members. 
In addition to this. status dictates what kind of communication takes place. For example, the 
Captain is likely to issue commands and seek the opinions of his crew members, while a First 
Officer is likely to follow orders and provide information when it is asked of him. A deviation 
from the norms and roles is likely to cause confusion, and interpersonal conflict on the flight 
deck. 
Suborclinate crew members have reported through the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). 
that Captains maybe so insensitive and intimidating that crew members hesitate to speak up even 
in critical situations (Foushee, 1984). An example of such an incident is the following: 
Air traffic control had issued a speed restriction which ~'3s repeatedly ignored by the captain. 
After several attempts had been made by the copilot to convey the information. the captain 
responded by saying "1'11 do ",'hat I want." Air traffic control inquired as to why the aircraft_ . 
had not been slowed. advjsed the crew that they had almost collided with another aircraft, and 
issued a new clearance which ~'3s also disregarded by the captain despite repeated clarification 
by the copilot. Following the last advisory from the copilot, the captain responded by telling 
the copilot to "just look out the damn ""indow". ~Foushee & Helmreich, 1988, p. 204). 
Such incidents are of particular conccrn in aviation, since subordinate crew might become 
conditioned nol to offer information after ex-pericnces with overhearing or intimidating Captains. 
In addition to the above. we find that although the prescribed role structure remains relatively 
constant. there could be wide variations in how cockpit roles are actually perccived and defined 
by the indi\;dual cre\\ members (Johnston. 1992). 
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With regard to the norms and roles in a group, the small group may experience problems which 
are described as "procedural problems". For effective functioning in the group, members must 
be in agreement as to which procedures \\ill be followed. Procedural problems are most likely 
.~ . 
to occur when there is role conflict and role ambiguity (Patton, Giffin & Patton, 19S9). Role 
conflict occurs when group members are confronted \\ith hvo or more conflicting roles. Role 
ambiguity occurs when members of the group are not clear about what is expe<.;!ecLof them in 
terms..of their kind of participation and behaviour on the job (Singer, 1990). 
When crew members on the flight deck are uncertain about the roles which they are ex-pected 
to play, confusion and misunderstanding will occur. At the same time, crew members are likely 
to encroach on the mental territories discussed previously. This results in a situation where some 
procedures are duplicated, while others are omitted because of the confusion concerning which 
crew member should be fulfiling which roles. 
2.1.3.5. Group tasks and goals. 
A final group factor affecting small group communication includes the tasks and goals of the 
group. Tasks are defined by Barker, et al (1991) as "an act, or its result, that a small group is 
required, either by someone or by itself, to perform." (p. 37) Furthermore: 
A task is thus viewed as what people do, what they produce, or that on which they work in 
small groups. Tasks are performed by the group to accomplish goals. Generally we think of 
members of small groups as working on the task to achieve the goals, but sometimes the goal 
is to complete the task satisfactorily. (p. 37) 
Tasks provide the group 'With some ex1ernal measure for evaluating the performance and 
effectiveness of the group and in this sense contribute to self regulation. While individuals may 
be more proficient at solving some problems and completing some tasks, groups may be better 
equipped for solving other problems (Patton, Giffin & Patton, 1989). 
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Groups need to be a\-\-'are of which tasks can most effectively be completed as a group, and which 
require individual effort. Complex tasks and decisions require members to compare their views 
and at times relinquish relentless conformity to the< ~orm. Tasks place restrictions on the 
behaviour of group members. However, members may also place restrictions on themselves. 
Such constraints evolve from the way members view a task and each other. Furthermore, the 
group will develop norms that regulate how they should act in relation to those tasks. )\;orms 
have been discussed earlier in this section and so do not need a detailed description here. 
Suffice to say that norms exert a great deal of influence over individual activity. 
Group goals have been alluded to above. The pnmary ambition of a group is the 
accomplishment of mutual goals. Two categories of behaviours are integral to the achievement 
of goals and tasks. These categories may be labeled task and maintenance behaviours. Both are 
necessary for the accomplishment of group goals (Benjamin, 1978, Patton, Giffin & Patton, 
1989). 
Task behaviours include initiating, clarifying and elaborating, seeking information or opinions, 
giving information or opinions. evaluating, coordinating and consensus testing. Maintenance 
behaviours are those which maintain the good working order of the group and are bcttcr known 
as "group maintenance" behaviours. These include harmonizing. gate keeping, encouraging. 
compromising. standard setting and testing and relieying tension (Patton, Giffin & Patton. 1989). 
On the flight deck. the task behaviours are crucial to the safe execution of the flight. 
\1aintenance behayiours. such as seeking the opinions of other crew members. and ensuring that 
all crew members are working together. and imprO\ing per~nal relationships and communication 
also contribute to the general effectiycness of the group as a team. 
2.1.4. Organizational factors affecting smaU group communication. 
The small group is constantly under the influence of the organization of which it is part. The 
organization creates ex-pectations concerning hm\' the<group will complete its work, as well as the 
quantity and quality of the work. At the same time, many of the organization's routine work 
habits will be carried over to the group (Jensen, 1991). 
2.1.4.1. The Operational environment of the flight crew. 
There are two aspects to the operational environment of the cockpit crew: The nature of the 
cockpit environment; and the organizational factors which have an impact on the cockpit 
environment. Foushee (198-+) suggests that input factors such as task characteristics. reward 
structure, position power and stress levels remain constant for cockpit cre\vs. 
It can be argued that task characteristics and position power are part of the nature of the· 
environment in which the crew operates, whereas reward structure and stress levels constitute 
that which impacts on the environment. 
The flight crew operates \\ithin a tightly prescribed operating environment ""ith a clearly defined 
role structure; that of Captain, First Officer and Flight Engineer. This role structure determines 
the rights and responsibilites of individual crew members and represents an inviolate chain of 
command (Foushee & HeImreich, 1988). 
Furthermore, inherent to the technical environment of the cockpit, is a tremendous amount of 
information that must be processed over short periods of time. In aviation, tasks are complicated 
by time constraints, vast amounts of confounding information and a highly technical environment. 
This underscores the importance of the coordination and definition of tasks and roles, a process 
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underpinned by Standard Operating Procedures which provide a framew"ork \.vithin which cockpit 
behaviour is demarcated. 
Furthermore. rigorous company hiring practices. employment conditions and flight standards. and 
regulations requiring frequent checking and retraining, contribute to the differentiation bet\veen 
appropriate and inappropriate behaviours in the cockpit (Foushee, 1984). These aspects have 
been eJl:plored at length in the discussion above. 
With regard to the organizational factors which impact on the cockpit environment, we turn our 
attention to the rostering practices followed in airlines. The constant changes in crew 
composition results in a situation where crews seldom consist of the same three individuals. This 
may be seen as an environmental factor (because the rostering practice is an organizational policy 
imposed on the crews), but one .,.,"hich has implications for the dynamics within the group. The 
constantly changing composition deprives the crew members of the time and eXl'erience needed 
to build themselves into an efficient and effective team (Hackman, 1987). 
Research shows that there is a distinct difference between the interaction of crews at the 
beginning of the duty cycle. and those at the end of a trip. Mer three days of flying with 
someone. the other crew members have some idea of that person's operational characteristics. 
communication style and personality as shown in Foushee and lIelmreich (1988):. 
If you are a copilot. you know a lot about when and how an aircraft commander or captain 
likes to be assisted. If you are the person in charge you knO\l; more about how your 
subordinates supply information and how to best elicit their input. As everyone knows. there 
is wide variation in human interaction. and the more you knO\v about someone. the better you 
are able to tailor your behaviour to the needs of the interaction. (p. 216). 
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Research conducted by Foushee and Manos (1981), referred to in Foushee and Helmreich (1988) 
indicates that crews who had flo\\TI together showed a higher level of communication overall and 
Captains of crews who had flown together issued mOr.e ~mmands. This was seen to indicate a 
better understanding and division of responsibility between the crew members. 
Furthermore, there were more suggestions and statements of intent made in crews that had flown 
together, indicating an increased \\1llingness to exchange information. It was also particularly 
interesting that in crews which had flown together. there was more disagreement sho\\TI by first 
officers. This indicates that increased familiarity to some e:x1ent. encouraged subordinates to 
question the actions of Captains. 
By contrast, in crews which had not flown together, there seemed to be more non-task related 
communication. indicating an attempt to get to know one another. However, also present was 
a higher level of frustration on the part of Captains \\ho had not flown \\ith the same Copilot 
before (Foushee & Helmreich. 1988). It must be stressed, however. that although the above 
findings might advocate the creation of permanent crews. this is not recommended. Permanent 
crews may result in complacency and boredom and perhaps even a decrease in performance due 
to increased familiarity. 
2.1.-1-.2. Affirmative Action Policy. 
Reccnt political deyelopcments have prompted South African companies to implement 
Affirmative Action policies. Broadly spcaking. Affirmative Action is a proactive policy which 
attempts to ensure that members of previously disadvantaged groups gain adequate 
reprcsentation in the workforce and institutions of higher education. Furthermore. such 
representation must be ill proportion to thcir numbers in the population (Smith, Crosby & 
College. 1992) 
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The implications are that existing \Vhite!Black ratios must change to an 80:20 ratio in South 
African companies. The existing feelings surrounding such policies are predominantly negative 
at this point. Affirmative Action is often seen as "reve~sc:: discrimination" which is doomed to fail. 
Several beliefs and perceptions underline such premonitions. 
First. there is the perception that putting less qualified individuals into positions as "tokens" 
simply to fill a quota. will damage an already struggling economy and lead to a falling of 
standards. At the same time, quotas may stigmatize and prejudice those who in fact do have the 
talent for the job. Second. is the fear of reverse discrimination and preferential treatment. In 
this regard, preferential treatment and proportional representation are seen as "manufactured 
instead of earned. the result is racial representation at the cost of racial development." (Steele. 
1990). In this regard. Affirmative Action has been criticised as a process which encourages victim 
status among Blacks and an acceptance of paternalistic handouts. Directly in line with the notion 
of reverse discrimination. is the suggestion that preferential treatment policies make 'Whites 
resentful and jealous (White backlash). and make the subjects of Affirmative Action feel 
patronized and doubtful of their ov.n competence. Furthermore. Affirmative Action places 
emphasis on racial discrimination instead of trying to dispel it (Steele, 1990). 
Third. referring to the American situation. Kendall and Louw (1989) suggest that there is no 
evidence that Affirmative Action has benefitted more than a small group of upper-middle class 
Blacks in the L'SA. Statistics showed that while advantaged Blacks forged ahead. disad\'antaged 
Blacks actually fell further behind. Fourth. the shift towards an 80:20 ratio of Black to \\'hite 
employees is perceived as a major threat to established white employees as well as school Jcavers 
and graduates seeking employment. At the same time. retrenchements are a constant threat due 
to the present economic climate. 
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Since South African Airways has made a commitment to fulfiling a ration of 80% Black to 20% 
White by the year 2000. the organization as a whole may begin to experience the repercussions 
of the negative attitudes and perceptions outlined abose. Such attitudes and perceptions are 
likely to have a significant impact on interaction bem'een employees in the organization in 
general, and on the flight deck in particular. 
~- -
South African Airways, has, however, taken some steps towards tailoring their Affirmative Action 
policy to the needs of their employees by implementing a Cadet Pilot's Training Scheme. In this 
training course, prospective pilots with zero flying hours are selected according to strict 
recruitment procedures. The candidates are provided with training including mathematics, 
corporate training, technical training and formal flying training. This Cadet Pilot's Training 
Scheme has only recently been introduced and so does not influence the data collected for this 
study. 
2.1.5. Summary. 
The above discussion has centred around the concept of the flight crews as a small groups which 
can be regarded an open system. The critical points \\1th regard to this idea may be summarized 
as follows: 
- The personal credibility of the crew members may affect crew interaction on the flight deck and 
in the organization in general. 
- The status of individual members of the flight crew may affect the style of communication used, 
as \\'ell as the amount of communication that takes place. For instance. a Captain may 
comerse more \\lth the Flight Engineer, who has a higher status, not only in the cockpit. but 
perhaps also socially. than the Black. first Officer. 
- The flight crew is a small group where a high level of interdependence is evident between crew 
members. Every crew member has the capacity to influence the other crew members by his 
31 
behaviour. \\'b.ere there is a deviation from the expected behaviour. interaction and 
communication may be affected. 
- The flight crew is a highly cohesive group whe1e· there is very little scope for personal 
autonomy. At the same time. the flight crew must be aware of the possibility of groupthink 
and constantly ensure that this does not occur. 
- Participation on the flight deck is crucial. Every crew member must be v.illing and able to 
participate effectively. 
Certain norms and roles are at play in the cockpit. Strict adherence to these norms is 
ex-pected. Norm \iolations may result in communication misunderstanding. and may adversely 
affect the climate in which communication takes place. 
- The flight crew must complete certain tasks and achieve certain goals. For this to occur, there 
must be an optimal use of both task and maintenance behaviours. 
- The environment in which the crew operates influences crew interaction. Specifically, 
interaction and communication is influenced directly by the technical environment of the 
cockpit, or indirectly by the policies and practices of the organization at large. 
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2.2. IJ\'TERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION. 
The central focus of this thesis is intercultural communication in the small group. The previous 
section examined the flight crew from a small group perspective. focusing on the aspects which 
affect small group communication. This section ex-plores the added dimension of cultural 
diversity and its impact upon small group communication. 
Upon entering the corporate environment, the individual is confronted by, and has to adapt to, 
a particular culture. In order to be accepted in the organization, he or she must, accomodate 
to the norms of behaviour and become part of the integrated whole. "Fitting in", however, is 
fairly complicated if one considers the variables which are at play in the process (DeBryn. 1992). 
In the South African contex1, a discussion of communication between \\'hite and Black 
individuals in the workplace must take into consideration the hierarchy created by the social 
political. economic and cultural factors surrounding that communication. In many ways this 
hierarchy is programmed into much of the speech and conversation between Whites and Blacks 
in the workplace (Brislin, 1981). 
Knapp. Enninger and Knapp-Potthof (1987) suggest that Black individuals are likely to have a 
history of frustrating ex-periences with bureaucracies. resulting in a distrust of \\'11ite officialdom. 
Black individuals are likely to experience a sense of powerlessness. stemming from the apartheid 
era and reinforced by the educational system. 
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Furthermore Knapp et (1987) acknowledged that: 
:"on-whites are also more likely to be perceived as members of the lower socio-economic 
strata, and have very little confidence in their ability to change their own circumstances 
through normal bureaucratic channels. Non-whit~s are likely to bring to the encounter less 
knowledge of the system, less information on their' rights and lower hopes of success. In 
communicative terms, they are most unlikely to have any sense of co-membership. or to have 
the confidence or skills to take or maintain control over the process of interaction. ( p. 29). 
\\-'bite members, on the other hand, are likely to have a strong sense of power, rd~riving both 
from their position as representatives of a White bureaucratic institution, and as representatives 
of the historically dominant culture. This is a result of the usual contex't for communication, in 
which Whites are in positions of power, w'hile Blacks are in subordinate positions. This is 
particularly true in formal institutional situations (Knapp et aI, 1987). As white collar workers, 
their social position \\ill normally be higher than that of their Black colleagues, and their 
experience will give them greater self-confidence in the interview situation. Their knowledge of, 
and information about. the system is much greater than that of the Black member (Knapp et aI, 
1987). 
However. even where informal interaction takes place. the White individual still holds a position 
of power: he or she is the property owner. member of the dominant culture and participant in 
the institutions which give power. The Black individual is in the subordinate role. whether as a 
minority in the workforce. unskilled worker. or "political instigator". The cumulative effect of 
such disparities in status and power will influence intercultural interaction in South African 
society. This broader social contex1 shapes the attitudes and behaviour of individuals and will 
influence til e process of interaction regardless of the personal views or qualities of the individuals 
involved (Knapp et aI, 1987). 
In addition to these factors. the individual enters the organization with his or her own values, 
norms. history. experience. expectations and culture. all of which. to some ex1ent. must be aligned 
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to the culture of the workplace. During cross-cultural encounters, Whites are likely to define the 
interaction according to their own structure. Because of the power and status variables in 
communicative relationships, Black people are accepted,· but not on intercultural terms. Rather, 
the terms are dictated by the \\'bite value system (DeBr)'ll, 1992). 
The place of work is likely to be a crossroad of various cultural values, and the challenge of 
socialization into, and the formation of an appropriate organizational culture becomes more 
significant than ever before. In order to fully appreciate the process of adaptation that takes 
place. one needs to understand the concept of culture. which is at the centre of this discussion. 
2.2.1. Culture. 
There are numerous definitions of culture, but consensus concerning the topic has yet to be 
reached Gudykunst (1991) suggests that culture can be seen as an)1hing that is human made. 
or as a system of shared meanings. Cox (1993) defines culture as "the system of values. beliefs, 
shared meanings.. norms and traditions that distinguish one group of people from another." (p. 
161 ). 
Furthermore. Borden (1991). suggests that culture should be considered from both a 
psychological and physical perspective. From the physical aspect. culture is something within 
which we live and which influences our lives in ways of which we arc unaware. However. the fact 
that we become aware of our culture when we change from one culture to another. indicates that 
culture is also psychological (Borden. 1991). 
I n this thesis. the definition pro\'ided hy Hofstede (1991) will be used as a point of departure. 
Flofstede suggests that culture consists of the patterns of thinking. feeling and acting that are 
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learned throughout an individuars lifetime. Hofstede compares this process with the way in 
which computers are programmed. by referring to the patterns of thinking. feeling and acting as 
"mental programmes" (Hofstede. 1991). 
A further emphasis is made by Hofstede, where he discusses the sources of one's "mental 
programmes" as lying \\ithin the social environment in which the individual grows and matures. 
Thus.. culture is learned. not inherited. and therefore it is possible to "learn" a new culture. 
However, once the patterns of thinking, feeling and acting have established themselves. the 
individual must unlearn those patterns before being able to adopt new "mental programmes". 
Hofstede suggests that this unlearning is often more difficult than the initial learning process. 
In addition to this. culture is always a collective phenomenon, because it is, to some ex1ent. 
shared by other people \\ithin the same social environment. Hofstede (1991) asserts that 
culture is "the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group 
or category of people from another." (p. 5) 
Finally. culture must be distinguished from human nature. \" hich is common to all human beings. 
and personality, \\hich is the unique mental programme which isnot shared with other indi\·iduals. 
2.2.2. OrQ.anizational culture. 
Organizational culture has received recent attention because of the impact of organizational 
culture on beha\'iour in organizations. 
I n line wilh his pre\'ious definition. Cox (1993) defines organizational culture as the "underlying 
\·alues. beliefs and principles that serve as a foundation for the organization's management 
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system. as well as the set of management practices and behaviours that both exemplify and 
reinforce those principles." (p. 161). 
Follo\\1ng the definition of culture put forward by Hofstede, organizational culture may be 
defined as the shared "mental software" of the people in an organization. The organization is 
the social environment from which the members receive the "mental programming" (Hofstede. 
1991). However. Hofstede highlights the difference between what he calls a "national culture"-
(the culture of one's country). "regional. ethnic or religious culture" (the culture of different 
regions, ethnic or religious groups) and "organizational culture". Hofstede emphasises the 
difference as follows: 
An organization is a social system of a different nature than a nation: if only because the 
organization's members usually had a certain influence in their decision to join it. are only 
involved in it during working hours, and may one day leave it. (p. 18) 
Cox (1993) suggests that organizational culture can be described and compared along two .. 
dimensions: content and strength. 
Content of organizational cultures. 
The content of a culture refers to the specific values, norms and styles that characterize the· . 
organization. Schein (1971) in Cox (1993) distinguishes between relevant and pivotal norms. 
Relevant norms are those which are desired but not binding. while pivotal norms are those which 
are \1tal for survival in the organization. Schein suggests that differences concerning the relevant 
norms will cause far less conflict than differences surrounding pivotal norms. 
In relation to the cockpit. certain norms associated with the appropriate behaviour of individual 
crew members may be considered as rele\'ant norms. while adherence to safety and standard 
operating procedures are seen as pivotal. 
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Strength of organizational culture. 
Culture strength refers to the ex1ent to which norms and values are clearly defined and enforced 
\\'here there is a strong culture. there are cues on hmv to behave. more reinforcement concerning 
what behaviour is acceptable. and higher penalities for nonconformity (Cox, 1993). 
Mischel (1977) in Cox (1993) suggests that in a strong culture. everyone understands a situation 
in a similar way. There are uniform expectancies and a uniform response. By contrast, Cox 
suggests that weak organizational cultures provide less direction and less approval for appropriate 
behaviours: 
\\'hen organizational culture does not provide a strong sense of how to behave, people invoke 
their olAn identities for modes of behaving. Thus one implication of this definition of weak 
culture is that people with different perspectives. norms, and values can more easily enact 
them. On the other hand. low enforcement may mean that even essential values are not 
shared by members, and the ex1reme of weak culture is organizational chaos. (p. 163) 
After combining the two characteristics of strength and content. Cox and Finley-I\'ickelson (1991) 
have put forward two types of strong organizational cultures. The first culture is one where the 
range of norms and values is restricted and the organization exerts extreme pressure towards 
c.onformity to core or pivotal values, but not so much to more nonessential values. In the second 
type of strong culture. conformity to a wide range of behaviours is expectcd. This may be secn 
as a conformity not only to relevant but also to pivotal norms. Cox and Finley-I\'ickelson (1991) 
cited in Cox (1993) suggest that the former type of strong culture is more suitable to divcrse 
organizations. This is becausc it is less prescriptive and allows for an expression of differencc 
in areas which are not critical for organizational outcomes. The findings of this research show 
that the culture of SAA generally. and the flight deck specifically. is a relatively strong culture. 
There arc definite cucs on how to beha\'c and particular penaltics for nonconformity. In addition 
to this. all crew mcmbers seem to undcrstand situations in a similar way. Howcver. SAA secms 
to be cncouraging conformity· to a wide range of both rclnant and pivotal norms. perhaps 
thereby allO\\ing for less express'ion of difference undcr a culturally diH'[sC climate. 
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Factors Affecting Intercultural Communication 
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Individual Factors Group Factors Organizational Factors 
Language Cultural differences Socialization and Adaptation 
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Figure 3. Factors Affecting Intercultural Communication. 
2.2.3. Individual factors affecting intercultural communication. 
2.2.3.1. Language competence. 
Communication difficulties are very often a result of an insufficient command of a language. 
:\fore specifically variations in pronunciation and usage of English have long been a point of 
concern in air-traffic control. Prosodic aspects of language such as stress and differences in 
intonation may lead to misunderstandings (Berry. Poortinga, Segall & Dasen, 1992, p. 3.+1). 
Communication competence, however, involves more than simply correct pronunciation~' 
Communication involves the exchange of messages and the creation of meaning. However, no 
t""o people ever attach the same meaning to a message. Wl1ether communication is effective or 
not depends on the degree to which participants attach similar meanings to the message 
exchanged. Thus, communication is effective to the ex1ent that individuals are able to minimize 
misu n derstandings. 
:\lisunderstandings can occur for a number of reasons when individuals communicate with 
culturally different people. Messages may not be encoded in a way that is understood by others, 
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messages may be misinterpreted, or both may occur simultaneously. Communication will be 
influenced by the degree of familiarity with the other person as well as that person's native 
language. Generally speaking, " ... the greater our cultural and linguistic knowledge, and the more 
.~ . 
our beliefs o\'erlap ""'ith the strangers with whom we communicate, the less the likJihood there 
will be misunderstandings". (Gudykunst, 1991, p. 2-+). 
2.2.3.2. Group identity. 
Group identity is important for tbe understanding of buman behaviour in organizations because 
the group identities of individuals are significant in interpersonal relations and because 
transactions between individuals are to some ex1ent, intergroup events (Alderfer & Smith, 1982, 
in Cox, 1993). 
Two particular types of group identities have been found to be salient in human behaviour. 
These are phenotype identity and culture identity. Phenotype identities are visible. They are 
distinguished according to tbings such as hair tex1ure, skin colour and facial features. Initial 
impressions and predispositions towards people are greatly influenced by phenotype identities. 
Furthermore, phenotype identities often activate prejudices and stereotypes. This is because 
individuals automatically rely on the expectations and assumptions concerning these identities, 
which may induce individuals to interact ""ith members of that identity in particular ways (Cox, 
1993). 
\Vith regard to pbenotype identies, research bas shown that skin colour plays a definite role in 
majority-minority relations as well as dynamics in the small group. This is a result of the 
stereotypes and attitudes immediately conjured up when identifying an individual with a particular 
group (Davis, 1985; Lincoln,1967 & Triandis, 1976, in Cox, 1993). 
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I n turn, this is likely to affect communication. since stereotypes and attitudes will impinge on 
interpersonal relationships. For example, where stereotypes based on phenotype identity impinge 
on the interpersonal relationships between crew mem?e.rs on the flight deck. they are likely to 
contaminate communication. This may occur in the form of defensive. aggressive or submissive 
communication. 
Culture identity groups. The culture identity is based on sociocultural factors. Members of the 
culture identity group tend to share similar worldviews as well as similar norms and values (Cox, 
1993). In situations where individuals need to identify \\1th a second culture. as when entering 
an organization. individuals may feel that a part of their identity is sacrificed in order to hold on 
to a job. This is the price that many minority group members pay. For persons who identify very 
highly with their culture. putting their norms and values aside in favour of those of the dominant 
organizational culture is more difficult than for those who have a weaker identification with their 
culture (Cox. 1993). 
2.2.3.3. Stereotyping. 
Stereotyping is defined by Cox \ 1993) as "a process by which individuals are viewed as members 
of groups and the information that we have stored in our minds about the group is ascribed to 
the individual." (p.88). The emphasis is on the process of group identity categorization and on 
the assumed traits of those categories. Individuals are usually categorized on the basis of some 
physical characteristics such as sex or ethnicity. A set of attributes is ascribed to all members of 
that group and there is an assumption that the members are all similar to each other. A 
difference between prejudice and stereotypes is that while prejudice may even increase with 
further contact. stereotypes will normally diminish as contact increases (Cox. 1993). 
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The utility of stereotyping can be seen in its use for coping with ambiguity and anxiety. In 
unfamiliar situations individuals reduce their anxi ety by means of the familiarity which stereotypes 
provide (Rens. 1991). Furthermore. stereotypes simplify the world and make perceptual and 
cognitive processes more efficient. However. stereotypes are often inaccurate and it cannot be 
assumed that every individual is a characteristic member of the group on which the stereotype 
r- -
is based 
Within the contex"t of diversity, knowledge of differences, as opposed to stereotyping, relies on 
knowledge which is gathered from reliable sources, and acknowledges that intergroup variation 
exists. The contrast occurs where stereotypes not only acknowledge differences, but also 
evaluates them. Stereotypes therefore have "built-in negative connotations." (Cox, 1993. p. 91). 
Gudykunst (1983) suggests that four generalizations can be made concerning the process of 
stereotyping. First, is the tendency to overestimate the correlation behveen group membership 
and psychological attributes. Second. stereotypes influence the way information is processed. 
Favourable information is remembered about one's O\\TI group. but unfavourable information is 
remembered about outgroups. This \\ill affect the interpretation of messages from members of 
ingroups and outgroups. Third, stereotypes create e:'l.l'ectations about how members of other 
groups should behave. There is a general assumption that our expectations are correct. and 
therefore. individuals \\ill try to confirm their expectations in communication. Fourth. is the idea 
that stereotypes constrain patterns of communication. Behaviours are seen to confirm 
stereotypes even when they do not. 
In interracial and interethnic situations. there are frequently mutual suspicions between groups. 
Suspicion is also heightened by feelings of mistrust. \\ here. because contact is limited. people 
42 
selectively perceive racial and ethnic groups that differ from their own. The result is mutual 
distrust. However, mistrust is often based on negative and incorrect stereotypes. 
Stereotypes can impact on the careers of culturally diverse individuals in several ways. 
Stereotyping can affect the level of social status that individuals are afforded. For instance, status 
is often attached to organizational roles such as the level of authority in a chain of command. 
However, attributes based on gender. race, ethnicity and even age form the basis of assumptions 
made about a person's ability and value. Thus, someone of a majority group (the minority in 
South Africa) might be afforded higher social status than an individual of a lower status group 
(Cox, 1993). 
Stereotypes also impact on the evaluation of performance in organizations. Due to 
preconceptions about ability and effort. different performance attributions may result for majority 
and minority groups. Stereotypes may also influence the distribution of power in the organization 
for the same reason alluded to above. Preconceptions about the ability and suitability of 
members of different culture groups may limit opportunities to serve in positions of high 
authority. In the same way, members of minority groups may find it difficult to influence 
dccision- making processes in organizations. 
Members of different culture groups may find that their career-development opportunities may 
be negatively affected by stereotyping. The belief that culturally different individuals lack the 
capacity or will to learn new techniques or technologies will inhibit career development. 
If stereot}ving is allowed to negatively influence the career opportunities of minority groups in 
an organization such as SAA. it is likely to foster negative attitudes and intergroup conflict. This 
is likely to infiltrate the cockpit and in turn damage the vital communication process on the flight 
deck. 
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2.2.3.4. Attitudes. 
The most far-reaching attitude affecting communication is prejudice. Prejudice involves a 
prejudgement of an individual based on that person's'membership in a group. Furthermore. it 
may be seen as a positive or negative predisposition toward another individual (Brislin, 1981). 
It is useful to think of prejudice as a continuum ranging from low to high. suggesting that we are 
r- -
all prejudiced to some degree. Even people with low prejudice. however, often prefer to interact 
with people who are similar to them, because such interaction is more comfortable and less 
stressful (Gudykunst, 1983). 
Cook (1978) in Gudykunst and Ting Toomey (1988) put forward five conditions which must exist 
in order for prejudice to be reduced: Individuals should have equal status; negative outgroup 
stereotypes should be disconfirmed: cooperation should exist: the situation should have high 
"aquaintance potential"; there should be a supportive social climate. 
Regarding attitudes in general, Gudykunst (1991) highlights seven characteristics which the 
contact situation must have for a positive change to occur. These characteristics include 
maximum cooperation and minimum competition: equal status within and outside of the contact _ . 
situation: similarity of members on non-status dimensions: avoidance of differences in 
competence; strong institutional support for the contact: the potential for the contact to ex1end 
beyond the immediate situation: and voluntary contact between equal numbers of ingroup and 
outgroup members. 
Under these circumstances. several changes may take place. Changes to\\ ards a group as a whole 
occur as a result of positive experiences with individual members. Our perceptions of outgroups 
may become more complex. Instead of seeing tile outgroup as a homogeneous group. the 
indi\'idual realizes that \'ariability can occur among group members. Altllough attitudes towards 
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the group as a whole may not occur, stereotypes ""ill be differentiated amongst "sub-categories" 
of the group as a whole. Finally, decategorization may occur. With increased contact with 
members of an outgroup, individuals gradually stop using group membership as a basis for 
.,: . 
identifying or classifying individuals. 
r- -
2.2.3.5. Expectations. 
Expectation has to do with our anticipation and prediction about how others ""111 communicate 
with us (Gudykunst, 1991). Expectations are derived from social norms, rules concerning 
communication and personal characteristics. Furthermore. expectations predominantly emerge 
from the intergroup attitudes and stereotypes that we hold. Attitudes and stereotypes become 
more significant in our expectations when we are unfamiliar \\lth the people with whom we are 
communicating. Gudykunst (1991) suggests that expectations are culturally based: 
There is a 'should' component to most of our e;..-pectations. We develop expectations about 
each other's behaviour, not only in the sense that they are able to predict the regularities, but 
also in the sense that they develop preferences about how others should behave under certain 
circumstances. Our culture and ethnicity provide guidelines for appropriate behaviour and 
the expectation we use in judging competent communication. The problem is that norms for 
certain behaviours vary across cultures and subcultures within a culture. (p. 61) 
Communication with strangers is usually based on negative expectations. Actual, ·or even 
anticipated interaction ""itb a member of a different culture leads to some anxiety in the 
individual. Four types of negative consequences may result from interacting ""ith strangers. First 
is our fear for our self-concepts. For example Gudykunst suggests that: 
In interacting with strangers, we worry about feeling incompetent, confused and not in control, 
we anticipate discomfort, frustration and irritation due to the awkwardness of intergroup 
interactions. We also may fear the loss of self-esteem, that our social identities will be 
threatened, and that we feel guilty if we behave in ways that offend strangers. (p. (4) 
Second. we may fear negative behavioural consequences from communicating ""lth strangers. We 
may fear exploitation. being taken advantage of, or fear domination by otbers. Third. we may 
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fear negative evaluation by others 10 terms of rejection, ridicule, disapproval and being 
stereotyped negatively. Finally, we may fear negative evaluation by members of our 0\\ u cultural 
or ethnic group. We fear that members of our ingroup will reject us, sanction us or identify us 
with the outgroup (Gudykullst. 1991). 
2.2.-1-. Group and intergroup factors affecting intercultural communication. -
2.2.4.1. Cultural differences. 
The majority of group level factors hinge on various cultural differences. Cultural difkrences 
usually occur along the foIlO\\ing dimensions: individualism versus collectivism, uncertainty 
reduction. power distance. leadership style. competitive versus cooperative behaviour, 
communication styles and information processing. 
Cultures vary in terms of ,vorld view, beliefs, values. norms and their communication patterns. 
Specifically, cultures vary along the lines of language and verbal behaviour, nonverbal beha,iours 
including sitting, standing. gestures, postures, tones of voice, facial expressions and the way of 
handling time, space and material (Kim, 1988). 
Although such cultural differences play an overt role in the communication process, the impact 
is often underestimated by participants in the communication process. In the context of 
communication between Black and White, cultural differences are often ignored This occurs due 
to the participant's belief that they are operating according to similar speech and cultural 
conventions and that they are the conventions which the socially dominant white group has 
established as standard (Kochman, 1981). 
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I n order to address the problems inherent to intercultural communication. there must first be a 
perception that differences exist. This principle of difference implies that people do not 
automatically share the same norms. thought p~tterns. structures and systems and at the same 
time explains communication difficulties. 
Individualism versus collectivism. 
-The most researched area of cultural differences seems to be in the area of individualism -
collectivism. Individualism may be seen as the tendency to give priority to the goals of the 
individual. While collectivism gives priority to the goals of the collective. (Triandis. Betancourt. 
Jwao. Leung. Salazar. Setiadi. Sindha. Tousard & Zaledski. 1993: Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey. 
1988). 
Collectivists "place greater emphasis on the needs and goals of the group. social norms and duty, 
and cooperation behaviours." (Cox. 1993. p. 113). Collectivists are also more likely to sacrifice 
their personal goals for the attainment of group goals. They also seem to have a stronger family 
orientation and are more satisfied ""1th team-based rewards. Hofstede's (1991) research shows 
that the United States. Britain. Ne\v Zealand and Australia are at the upper end of. the 
individualism scale, while West African, Latino and Asian countries fall lower on the scale. Most 
Black Americans are descendants of the \Vest African tribes. Therefore, most of the racioethnic 
minority groups have historical roots in collectivist cultural traditions. 
The link between individualism-collectivism and its relevance to the organization is easily 
identified. In individualist cultures. employees are expected to act according to their 0\Vl1 interest 
and work should be organized so that the employees and the employers interests coincide. In 
the collectivist culture. the employer will tend to hire not just an individual, but someone who 
is part of an ingroup. The employee ""ill be ex-pected to always act in accordance with this 
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ingroup. \vhich may not always coincide with the individual's interests. Thus. self-effacement in 
the interest of the ingroup is expected and encouraged (Hofstede, 1991). 
Furthermore. although organizations often encourage the establishment of teamwork. the 
organizational reward systems are still of an individualistic naturc. Cox (1993) mentions that: 
Although I have found dissatisfaction about the failure of organizations to emphasize 
teamwork among workers of alI identities. work organized in a way that emphasizes the 
individual contributor is likely to be least satisfying for members from Asian. African. Hispanic 
or American Indian backgrounds. (p. 115). 
In the workplace of a collectivist society. the workplace itsclf may become an ingroup. In such 
circumstances, the workplace resembles a familywhere there are mutual obligations of protection 
in exchange for loyalty. By contrast. in individualistic societies we find that the relationship 
between employee and employer is purely a business transaction l Hofstede. 1991). 
With regard to aviation. it is suggested that the cockpit must tend towards a collectivistic 
approach. Group goals, norms and cooperative behaviours and communication must take 
precedence over individualistic tendencies. Furthermore. the line pilots (including the Flight 
Engineers) become an ingroup. This is a collectivistic tendency. Theory suggests that Africans 
and Asians are more collectivistic than traditional Western societies. 
Therefore, Black pilots in SAA contribute to the collectivistic nature of the flight crew. In the 
past, there has been an emphasis on individualistic tendencies. A concerted effort has been made 
to change this to a more collectivistic approach in order to improve communication and 
interaction in the flight crew where individual leadership and initiative are highly valued (Foushee 
& Helmreich. 1988; Johnston, 1992). 
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Uncertainty a\'oidance. 
Uncertainty avoidance is defined as "the ex1ent to which the members of a culture feel threatened 
by uncertain or unkno\\TI situations." (Hofstepe, 1993. p. 113), 
Uncertainty creates anxiety and different cultures may develop unique ways of alleviating this 
anxiety. Feelings of uncertainty are not only experienced by individuals. but are to some extent 
shared by other members of the society (Borden. 1991; Gudykunst & Hammer, 1988: Hofstede, 
1991). Feelings of anxiety are acquired and learned along with other dimensions of the culture. 
Hofstede (1991) emphasizes the following: 
Those feelings and the ways of coping with them belong to the cultural heritage of societies 
and are transferred and reinforced through basic institutions like the family. school and state. 
They are reflected in the collectively held values of the members of a particular society. They 
lead to collective patterns of behaviour in one society which may seem aberrant and 
incomprehensible to members of other societies. (p. 111) 
In cultures ,>vhich are high in uncertainty avoidance, there is a lower tolerance for ambiguity and 
uncertainty. This is expressed in higher levels of anxiety and energy release, a greater need for 
formal rules and less tolerance for deviance. ThUs. in an attempt to prevent uncertainties in the 
behaviour of people. societies may develop laws and rules controlling the rights and duties of 
employees and employers (Hofstede. 1991: Gudykunst, Gao. Schmidt, Nishida. Bond. Wang and 
Barraclough. 1992). 
Low uncertainty avoiding cultures. by contrast. have lower stress levels and are more likely to 
take risks in the face of uncertainty. Hofstede (1991) suggests that the need for rules and 
regulations does not stem from "formal logic", but rather from "psycho logic". 
The need for rules in a society with a strong uncertainty avoidance culture is emotional. 
People - members of gO\·ernments. civil servants. employers and employees - have been 
programmed since their early childhood to feel comfortable in structured environments. As 
little as possible should be left to chance. (Hofstede. 1991. p. 121). 
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Borden (1991) points out that: 
To bring structure into one's life is to bring a sense of security i.e .. to avoid some of the 
uncertainties. \Ve know v,;hat to do, bow to ~o it. and when to do it, or we knmv something 
or someone that will tell us. (p. 121) 
Latin American, Latin European and Mediterranean countries as '.vell as Japan and South Korea 
have high scores on the uncertainty avoidance scale. Austria. Germany ani S'.vitzerland have 
medium scores. Asian countries and African countries fall lower on the scale (lIofstede. 1993). 
When relating these concepts to the cockpit situation. it is found that on the flight deck, there 
are very strict rules and regulations, perhaps indicating an inclination towards high uncertainty 
avoidance. 
Dodd (1987) emphasizes that all communication relationships have some ambiguity and that 
\vithin our O\\TI cultures. the ambiguity is lessened by some standard areas of predictability. 
However. interaction with someone from another culture means that we do not necessarily share 
the same communication rules, and as a result, the ambiguity increases. The need for an area 
of predictability therefore is strengthened. On the flight deck, Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) in the cockpit provide this area of predictability. 
One can suggest that the flight crew will be very high in uncertainty avoidance because of the 
emphasis on safety. Asian and African members who fall low in the uncertainty avoidance scale 
may contribute towards communication and interaction problems with regard to standard rules 
and regulations. Johnston (1992) verifies this: 
High UAI (Uncertainty avoidance) tend to generate rigidity and strong adherence to rules and 
regulations. This could manifest itself in a preference for clear guidance and a belief in the 
merits of e;.:plicitly controlling subordinates. Alternatively. Imv UAI could conceivably be 
associated with a permissive and indulgent approach to rules and standard operating 
procedures. (Johnston, 1992, p. 15). 
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Power distance. 
Hofstede (1991) defines pO\ver distance as the "extent to which the less po,verful members of 
institutions and organizations v.1thin a coup tTY expect and accept that power is distributed 
unequally." (p. 28). In situations where there is large power distance. superiors and subordinates 
consider each other as essentially unequal. Ilofstede (1991) describes the large power distance 
organization as such: 
Organizations centralize pO\ver as much as possible in a fe,v hands. Subordinates are expected 
to be told what to do. There are a lot of supervisory personnel, structured into tall hierarchies 
of people reporting to each other. Salary systems show wide gaps behveen top and bottom 
in the organization. Superiors are entitled to privileges (private Imvs) and contacts behveen 
superiors and subordinates are supposed to be initiated by the superiors only. (p.36). 
By contrast, in the small power distance organization. subordinates and superiors consider each 
other as essentially equal. The hierarchy of such organizations is seen mostly as an inequality 
of roles . ..,vhich may be changed at any time. Such organizations are decentralized. with flat 
hierarchical pyramids and there is a limited number of supervisory personnel (Borden. 1991; 
Hofstede, 1991). 
The flight cre,v may be considered as being high in pmver distance. This is because of the 
significant difference in terms of status behveen members. Johnston (1992) acknowledges that 
in high power distance countries junior crew members are likely to fear the consequences of 
disagreeing \\ith Captains. "Leaders are themselves likely to feel comfortable \\ith paternalistic 
behaviour and leadership by directive. Leaders, rather than followers tend to initiate 
communication." (p. 15). 
The importance of Hofstede's dimensions for aviation is supported by research findings. These 
findings are reported by Johnston (1992). Redding and Ogilvie (1984) cited in Johnston, set out 
to determine the influence of hierarchy on the "openness of the communication process in the 
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cockpit." (p. 17). In their investigation of six airlines dram1 from Europe. North America. Asia 
and the Pacific, they found that the status consciousness that one would expect in high power 
distance cultures, does in fact e:dst in the cockpit. Furthermore, where there was a lower pmver-
-, . 
distance tendency tow'ards egalitarianism. status was not perceived as a barrier to communication. 
Redding and Ogilvie concludes that there is some evidence that societal values about the 
distribution of power do infiltrate the cockpit. and that they influence the climate in which 
- communication takes place. 
Competitive versus cooperative behaviour. 
Members of different cultural orientations have been found to differ with regard to competitive 
or cooperative orientation towards interactions and the performance of tasks. Research provides 
evidence that Anglo American men tend to be highly competitive in social interaction and task 
performance. By contrast, Mexican Americans, Nrican Americans, and Chinese Americans 
adopt a more cooperative approach (Cox. 1993). 
With regard to organizations, competitive-cooperative orientations may affect organizational 
behaviour in the use of ranking systems for promotion. In these systems, individuals are judged 
according to tbe ex:tent to which they stand out from others. This approach generally fosters 
individualistic competition and as a result. many cultures feel uncomfortable with this system. 
Tbe data of this research suggests that a cooperative orientation will facilitate communication in 
the cockpit, while competitive behaviour works directly against effective communication between 
members. 
Direct versus indirect style of communication. The direct verbal style refers to the extent to 
wbich speakers reveal intentions through explicit verbal communication, w'bile the indirect verbal 
style refers to messages which conceal the real intentions of the speaker. Gudykunst and Ting-
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Toomey illustrate the differences and the roots of these differences through an analysis of 
Koreans and North Americans. The importance of preserving group harmony is one of the 
reasons why the collectivistic Koreans tend to .use the indirect style of communicating. Their 
preference for indirect style also fulfils the face-honoring process where respect for another's 
selfhood is highly valued. 
On the other hand. the North American people prefer direct verbal expressions. This stems from 
the individualistic value which fosters the norms of honesty and openness. This is achieved 
through precise, straightforward communication (Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 1988). 
The findings of the research show that the flight deck requires straightforward, precise 
communication correlated "'lth the direct style .. Use of an indirect style of communication is 
likely to result in confusion and misunderstanding. 
I nformation processing. 
Information processing depends upon two points of discussion. These center around the issues 
of monochronic versus polycbronic orientation, and high versus low-rontext communication. 
Both of tbese factors ",ill impact on the information processing procedure of the respective 
individuals. 
People follo\\ing the monochronic orientation tend to do things one at a time. They have a high 
need for closure, in other words. completing a task or coming to a conclusion. As a result, their 
tolerance for ambiguity is lower. \\'here there is uncertainty. monochronics tend to articulate 
solutions and work towards conclusions. Furthermore, monochronics tend to think in linear 
fashion. they internally process information in a segmented. sequential fashion. American. 
British. Canadian and German cultures are largely monochronic oriented. 
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Polychronic oriented cultures tend to think about and do a number of things simultaneously. 
They are more likely to suffer from information overload and often ex-perience procrastination. 
Polychronic cultures are likely to experience difficulties in situations that demand amonochronic 
orientation to information processing. 
In such situations. the polychronic indi\idual is likely to ex-perience stress and depression in the 
group. Latin American. African. lvliddle Eastern and Southern European cultures tend to be 
polychronic. However. although some cultures are largely monochronic or polychronic, there is 
a wide margin for individual variation along these dimensions (Dodd. 1982). 
The flight crew will depend on monochronic orientation. Standard procedures require that crew 
members complete one task before continuing to the next. Polychronic individuals may find it 
difficult to adapt to this orientation to information processing. 
High versus low contex1 cultures. 
This refers to the exlent to which cultures expect individuals to know when and how to respond 
to situations without having to explain. In other words, some cultures are high in providing 
members with information concerning routines and rituals and how to behave in common 
situations. On the other hand some cultures do not explictly provide this information and expect 
members to be a\-vare of it. The culture in which information is seldom provided is a high-
contexl culture. whereas in the low-contex1 culture. information is plentiful and expectations for 
behaviour are explicitly explained. 
Difficulty arises in the communication situation ""'here one individual is operating from a high-
contex1 mind-set. while the other ex-pects explanation. a low-contex1 mind-set. \Vhereas 7\orth 
Americans. Western and ?\."orthern Europeans tend to be on the low-contex1 side. Middle 
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Easterners. Africans and Latin Americans tend towards the middle. Japanese. Chinese. 
Southeast Asians. Indonesians, Micronesians and Indians tend toward high-contex1 
communication (Dodd, 1982). 
2.2.5. Organizational factors affecting intercultural communication. 
The concept of organizational culture has been discussed at the beginning of this section. The 
purpose here is to ex-plore the process of adaptation that takes place when entering an 
organization. There are several processes related to organizational culture: socialization and 
adaptation. acculturation, and integration. 
2.2.5.1. Socialization and adaptation. 
Schein (19'X)) suggests that culture perpetuates and reproduces itself through the socialization 
of new members entering th e culture. This socialization process may begin ,'lith the Selection of 
individuals who already have the correct set of assumptions, beliefs and values. Under these 
circumstances. less formal socialization ,vill have to take place. Most often. however. individuals 
need to be trained and acculturated. 
Organizational socialization is the process of conve}ing organizational goals. norms, and 
behavioural patterns to members. It is through this process that individuals come to understand 
the values. abilities and expected behaviours necessary for assuming organizational roles or 
participating as an accepted member (Cox, 1993; Schein, 1990). 
Vv'henever interaction results in the shaping or selection of socially approved behaviour. 
socialization occurs: 
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Typically. it involves rewarding approved beha,10ur and punishing unwanted behaviour. This, 
too serves to lessen the probability of future occurrences of socially dissaproved responses. 
(Segall, Dasen, Berry & Poortinga, 1992, p, 2,3) 
." . 
Furthermore. the aim of socialization is "to establish a basis of attitudes. habits, and values that 
foster cooperation. integrity and communication", (Pascale, 1984, p, 37). During the process of 
socialization. adaptation takes place. With regard to this adaptation, Gudykunst (1983) puts 
- forward a number of law's of interaction and adaptation. 
- \\'hen nonfunctional adaptive behaviour occurs, culture-based belief differences will come into 
effect. 
- When participants share a purpose requiring equal cooperation, they ""ill display equity in 
communication style adaptation. 
- When the setting favours one participant. the less-favoured will display more adaptive 
behaviour than the more favoured. 
- \\'hen the initiator of a contact has the advantage in status or power, the resJJ9ndent will 
assume the greater burden of adaptive behaviour. 
- The more functional adaptive behaviour an individual engages in, the more change will occur 
in his or her culture-based beliefs. 
Finally with regard to adaptation. Kim (1988) suggests that in order to understand the cross-
cultural adaptation process, both the macro and micro environments need to be examined One 
must consider the extent to which the environment is receptive to new members as well as the 
exient to which that environment exerts pressure on new members to conform. 
2.2.5.2. Acculturation. 
Acculturation is the process of learning and acquiring the elements of the host culture (Kim. 
1988'). Furthermore. this is the process for resolving cultural differences and of cultural change 
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and adaptation between groups, especially when one group is being merged into a larger. more 
dominant group (Cox, 1993). 
Cox (1993) inferred the following: 
It is possible to think of the parties to a cultural"merger" as being the organizational culture 
and the cultural backgrounds of its entering employees. (p. 166) :": 
However, there is usually a dominant culture group in organizations (Cox. 1993; Holt & Keats, 
1992). In South Africa. this is comprised of White, male South Africans. In this context. 
acculturation entails a process of unlearning old cultural patterns. while acquiring new ones (Kim. 
1988; Rens. 1991). 
In this dyllamic interplay of acculturation and deculturation. strangers gradually undergo an 
adaptive transformation in their communication system. Ultimately the new cultural patterns 
replace many of the old patterns and the overall transformation of strangers becomes 
noticeable, particularly to others. (Kim, 1988, p. 53) 
There are several strategies for handling intercultural relationships during the aCculturation 
process. Four types of acculturation processes have been described by Cox and Finley-Nickelson 
(1991) in Cox (1993). These are 1) assimilation, 2) separation. 3) deculturation and 4) pluralism. 
Assimilation is a one-way adaptation where the organization's culture becomes the ~tandard 
behaviour to which all entering members must adapt. The purpose of assimilation is to eliminate 
cultural differences. To accomplish this. culturally different members must reject or repress 
norms, values and practices of their own culture (Cox, 1993). 
Separation refers to the situation where entering members are ull\villing or unable to adapt to 
the organizational culture. and thus separate themselves from it. Separation is observed in 
organizations where members of minority cultural groups are segregated into certain job 
categories. 
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Deculturation occurs when the cultural identity of members is only vaguely defined: 
This may occur \\ith minority group members \"ho bave severed ties .""itll their original 
sociocultural group but have not been successful in forming new ties with the dominant culture 
or ha\·e been rejected by it. In the organizational conte:\1, deculturation is inconsistent with 
the notion of strong organizational culture. (Cox, 1993, p. 167). 
Pluralism refers to the two-way learning and adaptation that takes place ,\hen both the 
organization and entering mcmbers from various cultural backgrounds chllngc to accomodate the 
norms and valucs of others. 
Pluralism emphasizes interdependence and mutual apprecIatIon among cultures and the 
importance of preservation of microculture group identity. Moreovcr.. .. pluralism is an 
acculturation process in "hidl the entering members assimilate a limited number of corc 
behaviors and values while preserving important differences along other dimensions. (Cox, 
1993, p. 167). 
2.2.5.3. Integration in organizations. 
This section explores the ex1ent to which group identities such as racioethnicity. gender and 
nationality may impact on participation in informal groups. Holt and Keats (1992) state that: 
In modern multicultural environments interaction takes place on two levels. At one level, 
minority cultural groups interact over time with a dominant, majority, cultural community 
group. At the second level, multicultural interaction involves a situation where a number of 
work value systems compete for acceptance or incorporation into an individual's personal 
structure of work-related cognitions. In such muliticultural contex1s, it is likely that the 
influence of the dominant cultural group's cognitions about work ""ould be great-er on the 
minority ethnic individual, than the same cognitions from the individual's own ethILic group. 
(p. 423). 
Research has ShO\.'vll that participation in informal groups is influenced by factors such as 
common language, perceived social similarity and ethnocentricism. Cox (1993) suggests that 
social networks are important vehicles for communication and integration in organizations. 
However, where members of a social system have historically been concentrated in one cultural 
group, it becomes difficult for members of other cultural groups to join and fully utilize informal 
groups. 
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Sociocultural homogeneity makes relationships more predictable and facilitates communication. 
Therefore, one may expect a preference for interacting with members of one's 0\\11 cultural 
group, particularly in the informal context. We know that this preference is also true for minority 
group members in the tendency for members of these groups to take meals together and form 
support groups. 
Socialization. acculturation and integration are important for communication on the flight deck 
for various reasons: Firstly, acculturation is necessary before effective communication can take 
place because of the misunderstanding and confusion which occurs when members are unsure 
of the prevailing norms and roles. Secondly. members must adopt appropriate ways of behaving 
since this may impact on the stereotypes and attitudes lield by fellow crew members. This in turn 
impacts on communication. 
Thirdly. new members must adapt to the technical aspects of the cockpit. Where cre\v members 
are not proficient in technical aspects, negative expectations and stereotypes may be reinforced. 
Furthermore, technical mistakes, apart from placing the flight in danger, can lead to 
miscommunication and misunderstanding of problematic situations. 
2.2.6. SummarY. 
- At the individual level. the attitudes towards and stereotyping of crew members may affect the 
communication process and the climate in which communication takes place. Mutual suspicion 
and mistrust may influence communication on the flight deck and as a result, interaction may 
remain rigid and superficial. However, stereotypes may be modified and reevaluated as a 
result of increased contact. 
- Certain expectations may prevail amongst crew members, based on previous experience, and 
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perhaps fostered by historical. social and political surroundings. Such expectations may result 
in selective perception, leading to increased misunderstanding and misinterpretation . 
. " . 
- Differences in language proficiency. pronunciation and intonation can lead to misunderstanding 
on the flight deck. TIlis may be particularly hazardous during the checklist procedures. 
- At the group level, cultural differences. in various areas. may affect th~ _coJnmunication and 
interaction on the fligh t deck. I n particular. cultural differences may impact on the particular 
communication styles used by crew members. 
- Since Asians and Blacks are considered to be more collectivist than \\11ites. it is likely that 
Black pilots will approach group functioning from a more collectivist perspective. This may 
enhance tean) work on the flight deck. 
- The strict ranking and role structure on the flight deck may indicate a high pO\ver distance. 
\\'hite crew members may place more emphasis on rank and status differences. whereas Black 
pilots may be less concerned with these aspects. 
- At the organizational level we may find that new members to the organization must adapt to 
the organization. \\'bether or not this adaptation takes place. as well as the way in which it 
takes place. may alter communication patterns. and the climate in which communication occurs. 
- Social interaction and socialization may contribute to greater understanding of _cultural 
differences. 
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3.1. THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE STUDY 
The aim of this study was to provide a contextual analysis of intercultural communication in the 
context of the small group. The small group under observation in this study was the flight crew. 
In particular, this small group was observed in a specific environment, that being the flight deck 
or cockpit. 
Specifically, this study aimed to detennine which individual, group and organizational factors 
impacted on communication and interaction between culturally diverse individuals on the flight 
deck. An additional aim was to explore the process of acculturation and adaptation,?nd the 
extent to which acculturation and adaptation took place betvveen White and Black piluts, and 
between the organization as a whole and the group of Black candidates. At the same time, 
attention was paid to the prevailing climate in which communication took place, that is, the 
recent political changes and the implementation of Affirmative Action policies. 
3.2 THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT. 
South African Air.vays is a commercial airline employing approximately 591 pilots. 1750 cabin 
crew, 1858 engineering ground staff and 1291 administration and support staff. Historically. 
South African Air.vays employed only White. male pilots. with the exception of four White 
female pilots. These employees entered the organization with the minimum requirement of a 
commercial pilot's licence. an instrument rating and approximately 1500 hours of flying 
experience. 
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Although Black employees have been a part of SAA in areas such as cabin crew. engineering 
ground staff and administration and support staff. Black pilots have only recently been included 
in the pilot section. -;: . 
The recent move towards Affirmative Action and a more culturally diverse "pilot pool" resulted 
in a situation where culturally diverse pilots were expected to continue to interact and 
comJllunicate effectively 011 the flight deck. IIowever. the transition did occur without difficulty. 
Cultural differences along the dimensions outlined in Chapter Two were known to impact on 
interaction and communication between individuals. 
The first Black pilots were employed by South African Airways in January 199-L four months 
before the data for this research was collected. At the time that the data was collected. the 
Black pilots were completing their training as relief pilots. and were about to commence training 
as First Officers. Data collection took place over a period of six months. It is significant that 
the study took place shortly after an election in \vhich Black citizens were allowed to vote for the 
first time. and where. as a result of this election. a democratically elected government came into 
power. These political changes were paralleled by a broader openness to cultural and racial 
issues by the population at large and by organizations in particular. 
3.3. THE METHOD. 
The study involved a qualitative investigation of intercultural communication on the flight deck. 
using a multi-method and interactive approach to interpreting and explicating the communication 
dynamics in the cockpit. This method was justified by the idea of triangulation. which involves 
a "combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon" (lick. in Van Maanen. 
1983). 
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Essentially. this approach involved gaining access to five culturally diverse tlight crews; obtaining 
audio-video recordings of simulator sessions !n which these crevis took part; providing a 
preliminary analysis of the interactions accorCling to theory; the vie\ving of critical incidents by 
the Captains and First Officers and the recording of their interpretations: the conducting of 
interviews relating to broad perceptions and experiences of cultural issues and communication: 
~ - ~ 
and the analysis of the data generated by this process to extract themes. 
3.3.1. The sample. 
Five culturally diverse cre\vs were used in the study. Only five crews were involved. since at 
the time of the research. only five Black pilots were employed by South African Airways. 
Therefore the total population existing at the time of the study was utilized. 
3.3.2. The data analysis. 
The audio-videos of the simulator sessions were analysed by drawing on the methodology 
described by Craig (1988). This process followed four steps: 1) viewing of the tapes, 2) review 
of the tapes. 3) applying thick description 4) providing an explanatory account. A set of themes 
was extracted from the analysis of the video tapes as well as from the individual interviews which 
followed the analysis of the video tapes. 
3.3.2.1..The audio-video recordings. 
Viewing the tapes. 
Craig (1988) suggests that the preliminary viewing of the tapes enables the analysts to 
"familiarize themselves with the data, to begin to ask questions about certain points of interest 
in the data. and to discuss emergent ideas about the data among each other." (p. 97). The 
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transcripts of the videos showed the verbal and non-verbal transactions between the Captain. 
First Officer and Flight Engineer on the flight deck. Where relevant, the context and the actions 
of the crew members were also indicated. (See appendix A). During this first step in the process 
of analysis. some speculation was made concerning the intentions of the subjects (Craig 1988). 
Review of tapes. 
In this second step in the process of analysis. an attempt was made to answer the question: "What 
does the data mean?" (Craig 1988). Craig suggests that "the review of tapes involves essentially 
the selection of illustrative extracts from the videotape. The extracts are selected in order to 
illustrate crucial aspects of the summary-in-mind regarding the (possible) intention behind actions 
and the meaning which may be imposed on the actions." (Craig. 1988. p. 98). 
Craig (1988) at that point draws attention to the "uncertainty principle" which supports ~he idea 
that there is a need for continual discussion of "theory against data against theory" until one has 
achieved the most likely suggestion as to what the data meant. At this point, theory was tested 
against the data in a preliminary process of discarding inappropriate or irrelevant theory and 
exposing alternative channels of investigation. In this way. the meaning of the data was Jurther 
illuminated. 
Applving thick description. 
Craig (1988) describes Geertz' use of the tenn "thick description": 
The application of a coherent story to a 'bit' of data. It refers for him to the intellectual effort 
required to make sense of the bits and pieces of data (or information) which beg 
interpretation. The notion of thick description also emphasizes that the analyst must construct 
a coherent story of the data and that it is not the data which immediately and in richness 
equal a potential story. (p. 99). 
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Furthermore, Craig suggests that this thick description rests on questions concerning what the 
data means, what the intentions behind the bits of data are, what the context, goal and associated 
beliefs. practices and desires are that surrou·l'ld the bit of data. 
The analysis contains a mixture of interpretative elements. that is. speculation about intentions 
and possible consequences of this, propositions about the meaning of actions and evaluations 
of appropriate goals in such a situation. (Craig. 1988, p. 100) 
- Explanatorv account. 
The explanatory account was concerned with the coordination of the bits of data into an overall 
pattern. The methodology of this thesis follows a process which Craig (1988) suggests extends 
from an objective. through a phenomenological and into a generative account of behaviour. 
The motivation behind extending a phenomenological account of behaviour into a generative 
account. hinges on the belief that an explication of the functional structures (the 'mechanism' 
in the black box) provides a sound basis for the analysis of intentional and meaningful action: 
a sound basis in that the explication of the generative mechanisms for behaviour provides a 
theoretical account of 'action' which is not dependent on the particular content of the actions. 
(Craig. 1988, p. 101). 
Furthermore, in this process, there was an emphasis on the subjects' accounts of their actions. 
Negotiation involved all parties to the research, including the subjects and the researcher. 
Such negotiation may be regarded as a process of elaboration within a phenomenological level 
of analysis or a checking procedure for the validity of the analysfs proposed meanin.g(s) of 
the behaviour. (Craig, 1988, p. 101) 
3.3.2.2. The interviews. 
The analysis of the video tapes provided a basis for further interpretation of the data. In the 
individual interviews, critical incidents from the video tapes were shown to the subjects. The 
subjects were then asked to provide their interpretation of the actions portrayed in the video. 
The subjects themselves contributed to the generative level of analysis described above by playing 
an active role in the "explanatory account" step in the process of analyzing the video tapes. 
The purpose behind this methodological move was threefold: 
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1) To clarify the researcher's own interpretations of the data. This was necessary because of the 
intricacies of the aviation context. 
2) To expand upon the interpretations of the "researcher, who might have omitted crucial aspects 
of the aviation environment. which in turn could impinge upon the interpretation of the data. 
3) To compare the subject's interpretation of the data with that of the researcher, thereby 
~ - ~ 
providing an additional level of analysis. 
Critical incidents were highlighted in the interview situation. The critical incident, in terms of 
this research is defined as an instance where the transactions between crew members shmved 
misunderstanding. violation of norms. procedural problems, facilitative or inhibiting 
communication styles and general communicative problems such as interruption or talking over 
one another. 
In addition to the highlighting of critical incidents. general questions supported the data 
collection process. These questions revolved around the areas of education and qualifications, 
abilities. general opinions concerning cultural diversity and aspects such as the prevalence of 
stereotypes and the acculturation process. 
3.3.2.3. The extraction of themes. 
The extraction of themes occured on two levels: 1) the themes extracted from the interviews, and 
2) the themes extracted from the video analysis. These themes were related to the theory 
surrounding these areas. The themes extracted from the interviews in particular were 
categorized, and discussed according to the three levels of analysis discussed in Chapter Two. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESUt-TS 
The subjects involved in this study included four Black First Officers and one Asian First Officer 
in training. four White Captains and four \\'hite Flight Engineers. All the~ su~ects were males. 
All the crews consisted of a White Captain. a Black or Asian First Officer and a White Flight 
Engineer. In each case. the Captain and Flight Engineer were middle aged and were well 
established within the organization. having been employed by SAA for a number of years. In 
some cases. the Captains were qualified as instructors and training Captains. This meant that 
they vvere involved with the training of new pilots and had some insight into the specific 
difficulties that a pilot in training would encounter. Where the Captains were training Captains. 
a slightly more pedantic attitude was evident. The specific details of the Black and Asian pilots 
are supplied below. 
4.1. THE FIRST OFFI CERS. 
All the First Officers, except for one, spoke English as a second language. In terms of their 
formal flying training, all of the First Officers had a commercial pilot's licence and_had an 
instrument rating .,..,ith no less than a thousand flying hours. One pilot in particular, trained with 
Lufthanza and worked for Anglo An1erica another had completed his initial training in IsraeL 
and another had completed most of his training with SAA itself. One of the First Officers also 
had an instructor's rating. 
The emphasis in South African Airways was on the conversion of pilots onto particular aircraft 
types. rather than teaching pilots to fly. The eil:pectation therefore was that trainees already 
possessed private pilot's licences and commercial pilot's licences and therefore required only 
conversion or training for a different aircraft. 
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All the subjects showed an above average education, most baving graduated from private, 
multiracial schools. In addition to this, most of .the subjects came from fairly affluent families. 
they were cabinet minister's sons and business~en 's sons. Furthermore, some subjects came from 
liberal. political families. For example, the family background of one of the subjects was 
described by a Captain as follows: 
He came from a family background which I think was in the front line of tbe political 
movements at the time. not that I think that they were radical or an)1hing like that, but they 
were certainly free tbinkers, and also be went to a good multi-racial school. but a very strong 
Western and English private school type of outlook. 
At the time tbis researcb was conducted. all the subj eets bad been trained as inflight relief pilots. 
and all the subjects.. except for one who was already flying as a Copilot. were in training to 
become Copilots. The training for Copilots included jet theory. jet flying and cockpit 
management. Shortly after this research was conducted. all the candidates took part in Cre,\! 
Management Training. 
The sample was therefore very small and select. Their qualifications and level of ex-perience 
were up to standard. These factors were of particular concern for White members who were 
already established in the organization. A Captain made this comment: 
The problem is our sample is so small here. Our candidates are intelligent people and 
experienced people. But I could.. I really could foresee a problem with say township 
background. low DET education, a dominant parent structure, and perhaps a marginal 
aviation background, low experience background, and I can foresee a problem there. 
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4.2. THE AUDIO-VIDEOS. 
4.2.1. The critical incidents. 
From the analysis of the videos of the crew interactions. (prior to crew interpretation) a number 
of critical incidents were extracted. These \vere the incorrect use of jargol) ;;uch as the use of the 
word· "off' instead of "disarm": procedural problems (",-here cre\v members did not follow the 
correct procedures). interruption by the Captain. misunderstanding and miscommunication such 
as misunderstanding commands or misunderstanding phrases such as "Are you happy to fly". 
overbearing communication style by the Captain. instructing and coaching roles played by the 
Captain. assertive and submissive behaviour by the Copilot. conversation outside the immediate 
situation (this included personal disclosure and conversation). communication by the Captain 
which invited input from other crew members and the offering or requesting of information by 
the Copilots. These incidents and their frequency are given in Table 1. 
Additional information. 
]. In Crew A and D the copilots are flying. this may explain the higher frequency of procedural 
'problems, as well as the higher level of coaching and instructing behaviour on the part of the 
captain. In Crews B, C and E the captain does the flying. 
2. The same captain is used in Crew A and Crew B. The differences between Crew A and B 
occur in the areas of procedural problems, overbearing communication and instructing and 
coaching behaviour. The higher level of incidents in these areas are primarily due to the fact 
that the inexperienced copilot is doing the flying. 
3. The high level of interruption in Crew E seems to be due to the personality of the captain 
and does not occur across all 5 crews. 
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Table 1. The type and frequency of critical incidents regarding communication: Video tape data. 
FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCES 
Critical Incidents -< Crews 
A B C D E 
Incorrect use of jargon 2 2 1 2 0 
Procedural problems :; 0 1 '6- - 0 
Interruption by captain 1 0 1 1 6 
\1 iscomm un ication 'misunde rstand ing .., 2 0 3 I 
-
Owrbearing communication style (by :; 3 0 2 3 
captain) 
Instructing and coaching role (by 11 3 3 10 :-
captain) 
Assertiw behaviour (by copilot) 1 1 3 1 0 
Submissiw behaviour (by copilot) 0 1 0 1 0 
Conversation outside of immediate 0 0 8 0 0 
task 
Inviting input (by captain) 1 2 1 0 2-
Offering,'requesting of info (by copilot) 6 :; 6 :; 6 
outside procedures 
4.2.2. Interpretation of critical incidents. 
The following tables include a selection of critical incidents which occurred in each simulator 
session. In each case. the interpretations and comments of the Captain and Copilot are provided. 
Only the most significant incidents have been selected to illuminate the particular area of 
difficulty. All the incidents, across all the crews are of the same nature. The procedural 
problems indicate a problem at the individual level. where the Copilots are inexperienced and 
therefore unsure of the correct procedures. Interruption by the Captain. assertiveness and 
submissiveness on the part of the Copilots are also significant as individual level factors. 
However. in some cases. interruption by the Captain may be part of a group factor such as 
stereotyping and prejudice. Areas of misunderstanding and miscommunication are group level 
problem. where communication between members has been vague or ineffective. 
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Table 2. Interpretation of critical incidents. Crew A. 
1. Procedural problem 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
I see that 
Flaps five please. 
Okay we're going .... we need to 
accelerate a little bit more. 
Matthew. Okay would you like 
vertical speed? 
Vertical speed please 
rm going to give you about 1 500 
feet a minute. 
2. Misunderstanding/mis-communication 
Copilot. But then aren't we CAT 3 rated on 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
this aircraft? 
Ja. CAT 2 is 350 meters. 
350 meters and CAT 3? 
CAT 3 200 meters. 
200 meters. 
OK. 
So .. they say 210 meters. 
Copilot. 210 meters. 
Comments 
Captain 
What you're seeing there is the fact the he's 
inexperienced on the aeroplane. So basically what 
I was doing was playing captain and instructor. 
But that's only because of his )Tlewerience, he 
doesn't really know what he's doing. He did 
remarkably well under the circumstances. 
Copilot 
He thinks we need to accelerate a bit more. If I 
didn't want vertical speed I would have said no, 
it's that lead that I'm talking about. He has 
answered me - he said Okay. That ok means that 
he is going to do that, but he's just saying that we 
need to accelerate a bit more. If he doesn't give 
me, you see after a while I call for flaps five again 
because be didn't give it to me, if he was going to 
give it to me he would have said flaps 5 selected, 
running five green light. By saying we must 
accelerate a bit more I realized we were not ready 
for flaps five and that would come later. The 
speed is a problem of hands on again. You know 
you have to accelerate, but you don't have that 
experience of doing it yourself. The speeds are 
there to be maintained so that's why he says just 
remember your speeds. 
Comments 
Captain 
He was incorrect because Johannesburg is not 
CAT 3, it's CAT 2, but he didn't know that so it 
was a valuable input from him. I flew ,,;ith him a 
couple of months ago, and I forgot to put the taxi 
lights on, and he immediately said to me, inboard 
landing lights. So he wasn't afraid to open his 
mouth. 
Copilot 
Because inexperienced, wanted to check cat 3, but 
the captain did not answer his question, therefore 
asked again. Captain did not really seem to be 
listening. 
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Table 2. continued. 
3. Misunderstanding/mis-communication 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
OK are you happy to fly the 
aeroplane? 
Do you want me to fly it manually? 
No, No. Are you happy to continue 
flying the aeroplane? 
Yes. 
OK. 
;\ow you've got to select P~lS 
Charles. 
P:\lS - OK I've got it onto nlS. 
4. Instructing/coaching behaviour 
Copilot. Flaps one please. 
Capt. OK I think we're a little bit far out 
for that. If you don't mind if we 
just go dO\vn a little bit lower. 
Because we've got quite a lot, but 
long way to go otherwise we're just 
going to stooge around here with 
flap and really low speed. Just 
keep on your heading and when we 
get onto 15 miles we can start 
putting on flaps. 
Comments 
Captain 
His understanding of what I said was different to 
what I meant. It's an ex-pression which one would 
usc, it could be due to inexperience, not knO\\ing 
the jargon. The thing is here you've got an 
abnormal situation. You've got two qualified 
people and one unqualified person. Basically what 
we ,vere doing here was trying to give him a 
chance to fly the aeroplane. That's why there are 
so many mistakes. Unless you understand the 
aeroplane, and you are qualified on it. this kind of 
thing doesn't come naturally, you've got to be 
prompted all the time. The one thing I can 
mention here is something I noticed with this guy 
is that his interpretation of what we sometimes 
think as being the normal way of speaking is, 
could possibly be a little bit different. He 
sometimes is inclined to take things at face value, 
the way you say it, he'll actually take things. He's 
the type of person you need to be very clear in 
what you said. If you imply something without 
really telling him what it was I think you might 
have a bit of a problem. 
Copilot 
Does not understand what he is referring to there 
- could be referring to flying the plane man ually 
or with the autopilot. Needed to make clear what 
he meant. Reminding again, supporting the 
copilot. 
Comments 
Captain 
Instructing 
Copilot 
Guiding and supporting role again because the 
copilot is unsure of the procedure. 
72 
Table 3. Interpretation of critical incidents. Crew B. 
1. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Procedural problem 
At 3000 we tum left and return to 
Delta November ?\DB. If we have 
to go round l"ll call go around 
thrust, go around altitude, flaps 20, 
positive climb, gear selected up. 
OK right. 
OK. 
Uh, that checks. 
Capt. Thanks. 
Copilot. OK l"ve captured the DME my side 
and select Durban. says we routing 
direct. 
Capt. Put Durban vour side 1125. 
2. Change of Roles 
Capt. Would you like to fly the 
aeroplane: 
Copilot. Oh, well I can fly it if you want me 
to. 
Comments 
Captain 
He's getting pushed a lot. but it's normal pressure 
under which a normal copilot would be able to 
rope quite adequately is he was experienced on 
the aeroplane, but if you take a bpnd new guy 
you're going to get him reallyrbattling no matter 
who he was. You can put somebody under 
pressure just like that. 
Copilot 
I am inexperienced on the aircraft and so 
sometimes I am not sure of the procedures. They 
are different on all aircraft. 
Comments 
Captain 
Changing of roles, clarification. at this stage it was 
actually quite difficult for him because we 
were hot and high. But he did fine. 
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Table 4. Interpretation of critical incidents. Crew C. 
1. Procedural problem 
Capt. OK Sipho you just fly this machine 
OK. 
Copilot. OK. 
Capt. It"s not easy flying on this 
instrument. 31 ODD. It looks like 
we've had damage - watch speed. 
watch your speed there. 
Eng. Speed watch your speed there. 
Capt. Speed get your thrust up. 
Copilot. OK I'm getting the thrust up. 
2. Assertive behmiour 
Copilot. Can we go down to level 260'? 
Capt. Let"s go to the dual engine failure 
checklist first and then we go to the 
engine generator failure. OK 250 
knots. maintain 250 knots and level 
250. 
Copilot. 250 now thanks we'll go down to 
250. 
Capt. Thanks let's go both engine flame 
out. 
Eng. OK they are stabilizing slowly. but 
surely. 
Copilot. Captain. we need to go 260. we're 
going even level directions. Shall I 
make it 260') 
Comments 
Captain 
OK what"s happened here is the engines have 
flamed out and he hasn't realised it and we haven't 
realised it yet.· And the nex1 thing is the aeroplane 
stalls and falls out of the sky.~ BLLt his task is very 
difficult because all his instruments are dead and all 
he can use are a few instruments on the left hand 
side. A very loaded situation there. so that's why 
I'm saying watch your speed. because I didn't 
understand why the speed was so low. It was a 
crucial thing that had to be sorted out before we 
could go any further. 
Copilot 
We have a problem. In these kinds of situations, 
the captain stabilizes the problem. and then he 
hands itove r to the copilot. That"s basically what 
he's doing. so he can now move his chair back and 
he can now have a look at the front and at the back 
panel. I was not used to flying and the speed was 
dropping off, so the captain was just reminding me 
and drawing my attention to the fact that w~ 
needed to get the speed up. And the w.ay he does 
it is he makes me very aware that the situation is 
critical. That tone of voice shows that it is critical. 
Comments 
Captain 
OK. interesting. he's spotted, that I said lets go to 
250, because that was the highest altitude we could 
fly - I remember the checklist said 25000 and he 
said that 25000 was an inappropriate level. so he 
said ok we need an even level. lets go to 260. Very 
interesting because I was unaware of it, so he's 
picked up something. He could have said well 250 
is an inappropriate level. and left it to me. but he 
actually nominated a level. 
Copilot 
It was critical that we get dO\\ll to a lower level. 
:\ow what's happening with the 260 is that 25000 
feet is the level at which we should be. now. but it 
was in conflict \\;th the direction in which we were 
going. So I was just alerting the captain to that. 
So once again. as I say. everyone has an input. 
74 
Table 4. Continued. 
3. Interruption bv the Captain 
Capt. Do you agree with that as a general 
principle? 
Copilot OK urn. 
Capt. In other words you bypass the lost 
communication procedures on the 
star. 
4. Assertive Behaviour 
Copilot. Can I just request. one request. 
Holding pattern luliet Sierra 
Victor. do you have any plan with 
that? 
Capt. Vh. Juliet Sierra Victor that's a 
good one. let's use the same one. 
Comments 
Captain 
OK now that's a slight urgency there as well. 
because there's a speed limit on this aeroplane. the 
speed limit's are important. There was a danger of 
losing both engines because th!y were exceeding the 
upper fan limit. As far as authoritative or 
democratic.that's fully authoritative. 
Comments 
Captain 
Right.interesting point here. what is picked up here 
is that on the normal approach plate for 
Johannesburg. the normal holding pattern is set on a 
long directional beacon. Juliet Sierra, not Juliet 
Sierra Victor. Juliet Sierra Victor is the VOR. okay, 
and there is no hold on the VOR, The VOR is all 
we had. we had lost everything else. And he's nmv 
Copilot. OK the same one right hand flying with the VOR and his question is what hold 
patterns Juliet Sierra Victor. Thank should we enter because there's actually ,no public 
you. hold over here and we have to. the rules of lost 
Capt. OK. 
communication say yes we have to enter the hold 
first and then start our approach from there. so he 
spotted the problem. which is also quite interesting. 
I guess a more experienced copilot would have 
improvised for himself and not worried us in the 
middle of a checklist. but its perhaps a question of. 
experience and the extent to which he would-h'ave 
been prepared to make a unilateral decision like 
that. 
Copilot 
1 was alerting the captain to the fact that there \'lias 
no pattern there. are you aware of that? 
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Table 5. Interpretation of critical incidents. ere\V D. 
1. Instructing/Coaching role 
Copilot Alright Captain. the .... the 
departure Captain, is uh Rhino 2 
Alpha departure. 
Capt. OK. let's start with the ah. engine 
failure - The engine failure 
procedure RTO in other words. 
2. Miscommunication/misunderstanding 
Copilot. and speed ahh .... 
Capt. 297 
Copilot. 297 yes thanks. 
Capt. OK 297. Flaps up and the lights are 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
out. And John if you're happy you 
can unstrap them. 
Ah, sorry. 
You can unstrap the pacs. 
Comments 
Captain 
That is simply called protocol I suppose. there's a 
seq uence by which the departu re has to take place, 
and this guy at this stage left out about two or three 
items. So my role is to remind him of the correct 
procedure. r- ~ 
Copilot 
Ok l"m in the stage of uncertainty. because I'm 
doing the takeoff now. Do you see the captain 
there. he tried to help me he saw I had problems so 
he tried to help me. This is \vhat they do you know, 
they do not let the process or the problem escalate. 
Once they see that they are in a bit of a problem. he 
comes in and that's what he's supposed to do as 
well. We all help each other. 
Comments 
Captain 
Well I suppose a slight little confusion when I said 
unstrap them, I think initially I think maybe it went 
over him. and then he said I beg your pardon, I said 
can I unstrap the passengers? Once again if the 
guy's experienced in the airline. when you say 
unstrap them, there would really be no confusion as 
to who you're talking about. 
Copilot 
No I wasn't quite sure what he was talking about to 
be quite honest. when he said unstrap them, now 
this is outside our phraseology that we use, now 
what he actually meant there was I must s\vitch off 
the seat belt lights, that J can switch those off. 
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Table 5. Continued. 
3. Misunderstanding/miscommunication 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capl. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
OK lefs. what's the frequency? 
11-P 
OK the frequency is 11.+1 Captain. 
1141. Insert Oh. 140 insert South. 
OK South is 2906 
06 
And East is 261 
Is that 29060 or 2906 
29060 Captain. 
Right. 
And East is 26181 
6181 
and I 
1. OK. 2618 OK, let's try again. 
East? 26181. 
4. Overbearing manner 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
What do you want to do now John? 
Sir I must put in. 
No. no it's already there. I say I've 
put it in. 
OK sorry. 
OK, so if you want to. you can just 
stick in your descent. 
Copilot. OK. ah. 
Capt. Or do you want to do a manual 
descent? 
Copilot. I'd like to do a manual. ja I'd like 
to fly it man ually. 
Capt. Manual 
Copilot. Manually Captain please sir. 
Comments 
Captain 
That particular situation. no. but it would depend on 
how crucial or vital the information is and how much 
time you have to process that infomlation. we had to 
get that information into the computer quite quickly 
to assess the situation as to nO\\" 10. what would be 
best to do under the circumstances. I already had a 
preconceived idea of what I thought the situation 
was. but I thought I would just confiml my suspicion 
as such by using the computer and its quick 
calculation ability. but of course. through 
communication inaccuracies. a task which is 
supposed to be easy and fast to accomplish. took a 
bit longer. And. yes it could be stressful. especially 
under certain conditions. yes it could be stressful. I 
suppose irritation could result in stress hey? 
Copilot 
Ok whafs happening there I'm giving the 
coordinates to the captain. and he's putting them in 
the P\IS and initially I don't know whether he made 
a mistake or the P:'v1S didn't accept them but he 
wanted to make sure. Somehow he realised' that 
there might be a mistake so he wanted 'to make sure 
that the figures he put in there were 1009(. so he 
just wanted to check. 
Comments 
Captain 
OK. I wonder if he perhaps didn't bear what I said. 
or he misinterpreted. he obviously misinterpreted 
what I said. What] said was 'J have put in a mach 
of 855 cruise. and possibly all he heard was 'put in a 
855 cruise'. Instead of him realising. or him hearing 
me making a statement, he heard me commanding. 
I think the first bit of the communication he didn't 
hear. 
Copilot 
I didn't realise that he had already put them in so he 
came back to me and said its alright. If he had a 
chance I would have preferred him to tell me that 
he had already put them in. but on the other hand 
probably why he did that \\'as because he saw I was 
busy \\ith something else .. when he put that thing in. 
There is really no problem with that. 
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Table 6. Interpretation of critical incidents. Crew E. 
1. i\1 isunde rstandin g/miscommun ication 
Copilot. That is Durban. 
Capt. Let me just check that the co-ords 
arc right. South 2958-l. 
Copilot. Uh. negative I've got here 290. 
Capt. Just stick these in .. , South 29583. 
Copilot. 295. 
Capt. 583. 
Copilot. 583. 
Capt. East 305070. 
Copilot. 305070. 
2. Instructing/Coaching behaviour 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
OK the go around is going to be go 
around trust. disengage auto 
throttle. urn. go around thrust, 
flaps. positive thrust. 
Go around attitude. 
Go around attitude. 
That's it. 
Comments 
'Captain 
We're busy loading coordinates and the copilot and 
captain are checking the coordinates. and he seems 
to be having trouble putting them in. I don't know 
whether that's due to communication. The 
communication seems very dear 10 me. But he's 
having trouble putting them in the right order. he's 
getting a bit confused. Any figures we use will 
always be cross-checked very carefully. 
Copilot 
There we were busy sticking in the coordinates for 
Durban and Bloemfontein. He is very proficient in 
using the thing so you sometimes find that the 
captain does \ .... ork faster. but we're not used to it. It 
takes us a while to get used to it. He usually does 
help you along. but sometimes they put you under 
pressure. because he's very qualified. it's awkward 
for them. the adaptation for them to fly \\;th pilots 
who are not acquainted with this stuff. So you find 
they want information quicker and you can't work 
quicker. He says there is Durban. which wasn't 
Durban. that's why I said negative. that's not the 
coordinates. so he was just saying well slick it in. 
Comments 
Captain 
He's missing a step there in the procedure ~I)d 
immediately when I mention it. he's knows that he's 
missed it out. The scenario requires that time is of 
the essence, so I would. if I wasn't coaching him, or 
coaching an inexperienced person. this would be 
pushing him. but because of the scenario of the sick 
person it is important that we use as little time as 
possible but that now would be pushing him. it's not 
the way you would allow an inexperienced first 
officer to operate and certainly it is putting him 
under ex1reme pressure and I'm trying to relieve that 
pressure by saying do this, do this, do that. And he's 
complying \\;th that and in that way we're not 
putting the operation in jeopardy. by letting him deal 
with it himself. in his own time. I'm preempting 
things as they come along. 
Copilot 
He's reviewing the go around procedures. He's 
adding more to what I'm saying. 
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Table 6. Continued. 
3. Instructing/coaching role 
Capt. Just put speed in there. 
Copilot. OK. 
Capt. Thatll keep the speed where it is 
and then when we're ready. we just 
go. 
Copilot. Got indicated air speed. 
Capt. OK once we want to go down not 
yet. 
Copilot. Not yet. ja. 
Capt. And then of course we can only use 
vertical speed with auto throttle 
speed. 
Copilot. Can't use it no. 
4.3 THE I l\;'TERVlEWS. 
Comments 
Captain 
He wants to make a selection which is incompatible 
so I'm explaining to him why its not. It's coaching, 
it's instruction in fact. 
Copilot 
There he's explaining to me the situation. I didn't 
know all the systems,what works with what. That 
you only do on the actual conversion to the aircraft. 
He's quite precise, he doesn't beat about the bush. 
This section contains the data collected from the individual intenie'tvs. The findings are 
presented according to the three levels of analysis, which are set out throughout the thesis. 
Therefore, the themes are categorized according to the individuaL the group and the 
organizational levels. Each level includes the most prominent themes under that 'h-eading. 
supported by verbatim transcripts of the subject's comments. The remarks of the Captains and 
Flight Engineers, and the First Officers are separated for the purposes of clarification and 
comparison. 
4.3.1. Individual level themes. 
-u. 1. 1. Ability and experience. 
The White pilots were aware of the levels of ability and experience of their Black colleagues. 
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The Captains and Right Engineers: 
It was actually a pleasure. It was an eye-opener for me. It was nice to see the quality we had 
taken and if we could keep that quality we'le going the right way . 
• ,t: • 
There's no \vay we can compromise. We've got to lay dO\\TI standard. We've had white guys 
who havcn't come up to that standard and thcy've left. So if they don't come up to that 
standard. we've gOI a problem. And I think all thc guys in the airline, they ,von't mind who 
comes in as long as thc stan dard is there. 
r- -
I think if we can produce a good product through the training. and we put it out onto the line, 
and the line sees it. there \\111 be more acceptance. 
The point of departure is that you're working with a qualified person, you're expectcd to be 
able to do whatevcr is ex-pccted of you in his respective position. And everybody is trained 
to thc same. or a basic minimum standard. so you really just expect the guy to be able to 
conform to that standard. 
But I would say the vast majority of the guys are "colour blind". We think in terms of pilots 
and what their capabilities are, not what colour they are. 
Furthermore. ability became crucial in the training scenario. where candidates had to perform 
to standard. 
In the training section we have a problem because I can't afford to send a substandard 
product onto the line. But now if I don't send the guy out. what is the company going to do? 
Are they going to come back at me and say 'Why? Are they going to accept the explanation 
on why I don't want the guy to go? I'm not happy with it. It puts you in a difficult situation 
because it is my signature whether he goes or he doesn't. OK I can be overridden. If they 
override me then it's not my problem, but somewhere I'm going to have to say no: ' 
4.3.1.2 Stereotypes, expectations, prejudices and suspicions. 
As the first Black group of trainees, the Black and Asian candidates seemed to have attracted 
much attention. This was particularly due to of the uniqueness of their position, the novelty 
surrounding them and the existence of some suspicion and caution towards them. 
The Captains and Right Engineers: 
Being a black person he is obviously under the spotlight. People are looking for signs of 
arrogance, of assertiveness and of course if they find those signs, they are going to react to 
them where as a white person I think there is a level of tolerance for white people that is 
higher because people are not suspicious. You know the line guy will be naturally suspicious 
because of the artificial nature of their introduction. 
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I guess stereotypes are a bit of a problem. you see a black man. you will automaticaly 
stereotype him as being a product of the transitional period. of affirmative action. although 
that is not altogether true. I mean you must remember some of them were selected on merit. 
Although one can't generalise. because the bottom end of the group can definitely be classed 
as affirmative action and are therefore tbe.object of very fine and careful focus by the line 
cre'y\s. 
Along with the careful observation of the Black pilots. there seemed to be some suspicion and 
caution towards them: 
I suppose its only natural. in the South African contex1. to be slightly biased. or not biased, 
but preconditioned is perhaps a better word. in terms of one's suspicions. 
There is definitely an uneasiness. an uneasiness. not because they're black or white, but 
because one doesn't know what they're thinking. I haven't noticed any great change in 
behaviour of anybody. people tend to behave the way that they normally do. It's more, who's 
thinking what. It's subtle, but its there. Different people. you know what's acceptable. what's 
the norm, ,,\hat's unusual behaviour to other people. 
The idea that the current suspicions would fade away with time and increased contact seemed 
to be a common thread running through all the comments: 
That will be something that ""ith ex-perience and exposure to it will fall away. . 
The viewpoints concerning ex-pectations appear to contradict the subjects' opinions concerning 
stereotypes: 
My expectations are precisely the same as for anybody else who comes into the airline. 
suppose you size them up from the moment you meet them. I normally take an even view of 
people, so I'll wait a bit and see what he's like. The way they conduct themselves in the 
cockpit, they way they fly the aeroplane, the way they handle the rest of the crew, the way they 
handle other people and that doesn't matter \vhat colour they are. 
If I had to say there was something over and above that r d expect. or something any worse, 
in my expectations. in so far as do I expect less of a non-white pilots as opposed to a white 
pilot, of the same training and same standing. the answer's no. 
The point of views ~f the Copilots seemed to vary a little from those of the \\'bite pilots: 
The Copilots: 
I think if people do not know much about the black culture or black people, then you should 
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say "Let me just find out if there will be problems" thaCs hmv I feel. And then, okay, lers see 
what they're like and you know you'll either find that you have a lot in common, or you don'!. 
But I've been very fortunate, people come back to me and say 'You know, I had my 
reservations about you, but not anymore' and thars very encouraging, especially now. I think 
we've got to make the difference for the fle1(t people. But the people here are very helpful. 
I think if you came here expecting preferential treatment because we're black, thars not going 
to happen. \Ve're expected to perform and show that we can perform. So I think irs going 
to depend a lot all the attitude people are going to take. But we are fortunate that the crew 
respect other inctividuals and realise that we all form part of the chain that creates the airline, 
the organization. ~ - -
.. U.1.3 Attitudes. 
The attitudes of both \\i'bite and Black pilots seemed to have a profound effect on 
corrm1Unication between \\11ite and Black pilots. 
The Captains and Flight Engineers: 
I think there is a certain amount of adaptation, but I think irs. it probably results from the 
political dispensation in the country, probably people's attitudes towards these people. What 
I've seen from my experience, from what I've seen so far its been a lot easier that I thought 
it would be and possibly because of the quality of the people we're dealing ""ith. We're sitting 
here \\ith the cream on the top, what it might be like when one gets down "to the milk 
underneath, I don't know. 
The situation we could have here is an attitude more than a language problem. And huge 
expectations and resentment coming from both sides. 
The performance of the Black pilots in this regard, seemed to have a significant impa~t" on the 
attitudes of the \\i'bite pilots to the Black pilots. 
I guess when they first came into the airline and before I had any contact in the simulators 
in a way I suppose I had a question mark. But I've seen them perform in the simulator. 
Furthermore, \\ith regard to the attitudes of \\i'bite employees of SAA there were incidences of 
tension between pilots and cabin crew. One of the subjects related this incident: 
On this last flight one of the black copilots was one of the crew members and one of the 
stewards was supposed to serve us and all of a sudden there was friction between the black 
copilot and the stevvard and really at the end of the day I think the problem was with the 
steward. He ctidn't actually like it. serving this guy. And then the black guy actually called 
the steward and said look you can't talk to me like that and then things sort of started 
snowballing and eventually I went into the cockpit and said to the captain there's a bit of a 
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problem coming your way, and I believe its the steward's fault. I think you need to be fair and 
professional in this whole thing, you know, so I warned hin1. And one thing led to another 
and the black guy went into the bunk and I went about an hour later and then the steward 
carne and he actually pulled open the curtain and he said to this guy "You know you're 
supposed to sleep not do ""hatever you're doing", which is wTong. And then he came out of 
his bunk and he woke me up and he said now I'm really furious and you know now the whole 
crew is, it really was the stew'ard's fault. Now what I'm really saying is that at the end of the 
day you're affecting the whole crew concept and maybe that will take a bit of time. that type 
of thing. If you bring in the political angle. there's a lot of cultural differences in our country 
and we all have to accomodate and change, that's the way to go and t befieve it. 
From the Black perspective, attitudes had a distinct effect on the climate in which communication 
took place. Especially where a person higher up in the hierarchy seemed to have a negative 
attitude, this significantly impacted on the perceptions and expectations of the Black pilots. 
The Copilots: 
I can quote a situation where one of my colleagues went on a trip and he said you know the 
captain never really said much. And he didn't create a conversational atmosphere. So hewas 
never really sure what his position was. And then a bit later tbe guy cracks a racialjoke. Now 
tbis guy felt in an awkward position. because, you know does he take offence or does'he crack 
a joke back? . 
.. U.l.-l. Language. 
There appeared to be mixed ideas concerning the impact of English as a second language 
amongst the Black pilots. 
The Captains and Flight Engineers: 
:\0 I don't think it will. because, aviation worldwide is conducted in English and these people 
learn to fly in English, they're instructed in English. they study in English. they ""Tite exams 
in English and all their dealings in aviation are in English. 
However: 
We're going to have to have some training because of the nature of the work. English is the 
a\'iation language, the books are all in English. and overseas they speak English so the guy 
must have a command of the language is goilig to have to be good. For example: I say OK 
carryon ""i1h the checklist and he came out here with "cargo doors" and they guy says 
"cagados .... so I said .. what did you say? \A,'hat are you trying to tell me? Eventually I had to 
look at the checklist and ask '\\llat are you reading here?' And "cargo" came out as "caga". 
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Just the intonation. ]\ow in an emergency that might be a problem because I don't 
understand what this guy's trying to tell me. So I think that is the aspect we're going to have 
to have a look at. It's bad enough when we fly to Europe and they all speak EngJish with a 
different accent. 
-.€ • 
From the Black pilofs point of view there was less of an emphasis on pronunciation and 
intonation: 
The Copilots: 
]\ot really because in the Ciskei when 1 started flying we always spoke EngJish and there were 
no procedures that \"ere laid dmvn in our language so right from the beginning we spoke 
English and also we had come from a flying school where they used EngJish. So rm quite OK 
although I must say of course EngJish is not my Mother language, it is not easy sometimes 
because you not only speak the technical kind of EngJish in the cockpit. sometimes you have 
to speak general English so that sometimes is a bit of a problem. 
4.3.2. Group level themes. 
4.3.2.1. Role structure. rank structure, status and power. 
Appropriate behaviours in the cockpit were determined by very specific role and rank structures. 
The Captains: 
The cockpit is fairly tightly defined in terms of your function ego the copilot. one of his 
functions is to liason with the company represented by Operational Control Centre.liase about 
things like passenger handling provisions on board, technical aspects. 
I suppose among other things my role is to elicit and recruit the cooperation of my crew. to 
lead by example. Also to create a congenial atmosphere so that everyone feels needed. useful 
and participative.1 think my role influences the other crew members simply in either a positive 
or negative way. Hopefully the way I do my job v-ill rub off. if it's good. and of course the 
\va1' I treat them in doing my job will either make them feel part of a team or left out. 
The notion that althougJl each member had a different and specific role to fulfiL all three roles 
interacted in a team work type of scenario was particularly emphasized: 
The point is we require all three of us to make up the crev-. the copilot and flight engineer 
are part of the links in the chain. It has to be a team. In fact we're encouraged very strongJy 
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against being a one-man band. 
In the culturally diverse cockpit. another role -appeared \vith regard to the Captain: 
.,t. • 
My role is almost that of a mentor. because the copilot is new. It does put more of a workload 
onto the captain. As far as the cultural aspect is concerned its a matter of understanding and 
realising that you are dealing \\ith somebody of a different culture and like I said. there are 
assumptions that we make that can't be taken for granted. 
The Copilots: 
You have your duties to perform. you have certain legs to fly. where you are now responsible 
for fuel decisions. and you fly the legs. So now the responsibility is on you to decide the 
amount of fuel that you want. things like that. He does the radio work. that's his duty while 
you're flying and while he's doing the flying you do the radio work. 
11 all coincides because while he's doing the radio work you're not just flying. you're listening 
out as well because he could have made a mistake so you always very attentive. same as if he's 
flying and you're doing the radio work, he's also listening out. 
The specific roles of each crew member seemed to be clearly demarcated and understood by each 
individual. 
As far as handling the aircraft goes, my role is to cooperate \\ith the captain in an efficient 
and professional manner. Basically I am the second person in command of the aircraft. I 
must be very aware of what is going on at all times. At the end of the day, it all comes down 
to teamwork. If the captain is having problems at home and is not really with it. or if he's 
making mistakes. then I must be aware enough. and assertive enough to take over and perhaps 
even make some decisions. 
The Black pilots perceived the Captain's role as follows: 
First of all he is a person who. he must be a good communicator. that is, the first thing he 
must be able to communicate with the other crew in the cockpit. And he must be the kind 
of person who also gives a chance to the other crew members to make their own decisions and 
ultimately he must be the kind of person who can put all the decisions together and form one 
decision. but based on expertise from various people. 
4.3.2.2. Norms. standards of behaviour, cohesion and conformity. 
The adherence to norms was particularly emphasized in the findings. 
85 
The Captains: 
One's own behaviour becomes very stereotyped and operates \\ithin very narrow limits. You 
each have your own characteristics. but you w~lI recognise a movement outside the limits very 
quickly. . . 
With regard to this. it seemed to be very important to behave appropriately and dress according 
to rank: 
The first time I got hold of them I said "You guys are boy pilots, not because you're black. 
when I joined I was a boy pilot". It's just an airline word and they accepted it. I said "when 
you come you will ,\ear tie as well and dress as if we are going to fly the aeroplane". And 
they came dressed better than I was. 
Also within the cockpit. adherence to roles and rank seemed very important, although team work 
was a prerequisite: 
A lot of the duties of the copilot can be initiated by himself. of his O\\n incentive. as long as 
they are routine. but as soon as they go beyond routine. where perhaps a decision has to be 
made. a decision involving the onward progress of the flight or something more important. or 
that would require input from the captain normally, and he makes the decision without 
reference to the captain. assuming that there is no pressure on time. and .hehad the 
opportunity to discuss it. but instead took it on himself to make the decision for the captain. 
and go ahead 'With and make the request. That would be considered out of line. 
The Copilots: 
It is important that there is a rank structure as it were. there is a pecking order, tl~at needs 
to be there. Our operation requires that to be there, but that being said. it has to be a team 
effort and a chain is only as strong as it's weakest link. 
Discipline is the most important thing in the sense that, like I said initially. you've got duties 
as a copilot and the captain's got his duties. Now you've got to stick to your duties. you have 
to be very highly disciplined. to stick to your duties. But at the same time. we have to work 
as a team. if one member of the team is not performing as he should. then the whole process 
is broken down and he is actually a flight hazard. One should always perform up to 
expectations, not below. 
You've got to anticipate things and get things ready (the copilot). You don't say "Oh I can 
see we're going to need this". and then do nothing about it. I'm there to help him. to do the 
radio work if he's flying. find things that he needs in the manuals etcetera. You also neeel to 
establish that everybody is in the same frame of mind. Everybody needs to be happy with what 
you are doing according to the standard procedures. and what you are asked to do. 
In the cockpit itself. its not a one-man show. You know especially in the 7.+7 cockpit we hdve 
three crews at the same time so you really have to concur about what you are going to do and 
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\\'hat your actions \\ill be and you know if anybody disagrees he's go to voice it out and say 
listen] think tbis is not right or this is kind of wierd or this is not according to SOP (standard 
operating procedures), SOP says this, then we, can discuss it. So its quite, everybody's involved 
in decision-making, and so \ve talk to one another. 
.~ . 
One candidate gave a detailed description of the kind of interaction that took place in tbe 
cockpit: 
Well you know you're fl)'ing as captain and copilot and each bas his duties, the copilot has his 
duties as well so basically in short flight the cockpit is basically sterile. The v'iork load is high 
during take-offs and landings and you find that you're so busy all the time there's no time to 
chat or do other things, you've got to do your work and as you get airborne, during the climb 
you find sometimes you're ahead of the aircraft. you have a bit of spare time and you can do 
other sorts of duties that you normally do on the ground otherwise, you maybe have a small 
conversation with the captain. You alv,ays fly with a different crew so you now have to 
intermix and get to know one another. so nex1 time you're flying you know you've met the 
captain and he knows your background, he knows where you come from you see. You've just 
got to adapt, different captain's operate differently. But basically I've found flying with 
different captains. everyone has their own view, everything is done in a standardized way so 
what everyone is telling you is more or less in one direction, so you don't get lost. 
The ideas represented above were strongly related to the notion of assertiveness in the 'cockpit. 
. . 
This seemed to be very important, although there was a subtle difference between \o\'hat was 
viewed as assertive and what was seen as over-assertive or arrogant. Assertiveness in the cockpit 
was necessary and encouraged to some extent: 
The Captains: 
The fact that we have to work together there's no one-upmanship and you mustn't be scared 
to ask if you don't know what's going on. And you must be prepared to listen to what other 
guys say no matter how junior they are. ]t could be the boy pilot, he could be black, he may 
see something that I miss. If he brings it to my attention I must appreciate this and encourage 
this guy to talk. 
The Copilots: 
Unfortunately its happened quite a lot of times that you have an overbearing captain and the 
copilot watches him going from one error to another. eventually they kill themselves. purely 
because he's not been able to say - that's it. You have to learn to see where you must be 
assertive. Because the cockpit is not a place for conflict. You don't want to create conflict. 
but if the captain is like that. then you have to be assertive when it comes to a point where 
you realize this could be unsafe. If I don't consider the aeroplane to be in imminent danger 
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from \'ihat he is doing. I could let it go and monitor it. because he's not really putting it in 
danger. My approach would then be to speak to him about it in the right place. not in the 
cockpit but 011 the ground and say look captain. I would rather appreciate it if you would brief 
me about what you are going to do. . 
On the other hand. established. higher ranking members were quick to point out when the level 
of assertiveness was perceived as arrogance. One of the Captains made this particularly clear: 
~ - -
- The Captains: 
In terms of the route training I had to highlight certain areas which were peculiar to the 
situation of being black. which I \vouldn't have had to handle with a white person in such 
absolute detail. That was with the route training which is after the simulator training. and it 
was right at the end of the route training. I suppose. I just had to warn him against appearing 
to be over assertive is not the word. precocious is the wrong word as welL but I had to warn 
him against being too clever. too forward. too. natural if you like. too creative in his input and 
had to describe to him a little bit the ethos that we operate with in this airline is largely 
military although. adapted to a civilian nature over the years and he could be hurt by various 
people with a stronger military background. 
Until he had been hardened you know it takes a year or two to become hardened and to 
discover exactly where you are in the whole structure and what your limits are and what you 
can get away with and what you can't and situtations where you really have to 'make a 
decision. whether you risk being precocious or assertive or not ifs certainly you 'have to. it's 
required of you. i1's part of your job to be assertive. But the other areas, probably 95% of the 
time where i1's better not to be that way. Because of the rank structure and the military 
history. I1's only because he's intelligent. he is experienced. he is obviously grown up in an 
environment where he was not afraid to question authority. But obviously you have to adapt 
that behaviour to this environment otherwise you could get hurt. 
\\'11at I was trying to tell him was that I didn't expect a very junior co-pilot to hold forth on 
how he feels the company should be run on major issues at an early stage. I expect that later, 
later down the line. There are norms which one gradually absorbs in the airline, and one of 
the norms is. yes that you are not going to e>..-pect a very junior man to make judgements on 
major policy issues like that. There is also a code of behaviour in the cockpit and a) its 
determined by rank structure. you are allowed to open up as your seniority increases, years 
of service with the airline as well I suppose as a base line of experience level when you start. 
so it is very subtle thing. but you are expected to behave in a certain way. 
4.3.2.3. Crew composition. 
Due to the fact that the crew composition was constantly changing. crew members might not have 
found themselves flying with the same crew very frequently. 
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The Copilots: 
No. not at ail, because you can work with th~ other crew and they bave different ex:periences 
that they have had on a flight, or somethipg happened to them a long time ago, then they can 
relate to you and then you can apply that to yourself and say listen, this can also happen to 
me. So J must really be wary of things like that and that and that. And you know flying is 
never the same. You can take off today this minute and come back to land one minute later 
and the conditions will be different. So it's a learning game, you never stop doing it, so you 
are learning everyday. So I think it's part of the everyday learning. flyi!,lg \'..:ith different crews 
and you get the experience and you get to see what they operate like and you get to see how 
you should operate and so I think \\lth the different crews it works quite well. 
Some candidates did suggest, however, that changing cre\-\' composition impinged on the time 
available to get to know each other and perhaps break dO\\11 attitudinal barriers. This was 
especially so on short. internal flights. 
-U.2.4. Standard operating procedures. 
The Standard Operating Procedures ensured that there was a set structure for operation in the 
cockpit. These procedures ensured that each member performed a certain duty. and that crucial 
tasks were not omitted. 
The Captains: 
They always work. I'm one that goes along with it. I always have. It makes life a helluva lot 
easier. easier for me, for the people you're dealing with. copilot, flight engineers. Doesn't 
matter whether they're white or black. it just makes life a lot easier. Another thing. that if you 
are dealing with a cultural difference, or somebody who doesn't understand the English, SOP 
makes life a helluva lot easier. 
The Copilots: 
It makes a big difference. because you know when you get into the cockpit. you know this is 
my duty. Without that you're just lost, you don't know what to do. So the laid out standard 
procedures are such that the copilot performs these duties. the captain, and it's like that from 
when you jump into the aircraft. to the end. all standardized. so exactly. once the aircraft is 
standardized. we find that the operations run much more smoothly. 
The copilot knows what he has to do. In other words. there is a clear cut definition for each 
crew member. They know what they need to do. In that sense there is no confusion, and you 
don't have to be afraid that you don't know what this one likes, what this one dislikes. you just 
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do your standard work and tha1's it. 
4.3.3. Organizational level themes. -< 
4.3.3.1. Affirmative Action. 
In particular. the Affirmative Action context affected the attitudes of the ,WI1~te pilots. 
The Captains and Flight Engineers: 
I guess stereotypes are a bit of a problem. you see a black man, you will automatically 
stereotype him as being a product of the transitional period of affirmative action. although this 
is not altogether true. I mean you must remember some of them were selected on merit. 
That's the kind of problem situation I see arising where you have a particular individual who 
feels he's disadvantaged and that. you know. we've had it already. where talk about the fact 
that they should have been introduced into the airline when I joined the airline, they've been 
disadvantaged therefore they must get instant promotion. And if they don't that's the sort 
of resentment that's going to build up. the sort of resentment where they think its white 
authority being exerted once again. 
Our biggest problem is going to be accelerated promotion. You know they're saying they were 
disadvantaged. It has been mentioned that maybe management might look at one stage and 
say we have a black guy who is 40 years old. where is the contemporary .vhite at this stage. 
he might be a captain and this guy should be there but he was disadvantaged. Now that is 
going to cause tremendous trouble with the people he bypasses. OK the airline is a numbers 
game, your number determines where you are. 
The idea that these people are part of an Affirmative Action policy and by virtue of the fact that 
they were the first Black pilots in the organization. put them in the spotlight. 
I think you might appreciate the fact that he was unique and that if he blew it he would 
probably blow it for the rest of them. 
4.3.3.2. Social interaction. 
A fair amount of social interaction took place amongst the pilots. especially on lengthy trips. 
where they had some time to spend together. 
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The Captains and Flight Engineers. 
It was normal. there was no feeling of wanting to go your 0\\11 seperate ways, or wanting to 
bend over backwards to accomodate. . 
Most of the pilots at SA.A consumed alcohol behvcen their trips and these "drinking sessions" 
were an integral part of their getting to know one another, and provided an opportunity for the 
~. -
forming offrien dships. Participation in these drinking sessions therefore seemed very importan t: 
This guy doesn't drink. which would be a problem in the airlinc. He came out with us, he 
drank coke with us. while we made fools of ourselves, ill fact. had a good time. Lots of beer. 
But he fitted in. I think because the rest of the guys were \\illing to accept him. Nobody 
shunned him. A very Afrikaans crew - I was surprised. It was also I think maybe these guys 
have also realised there's no way they can fight it. 
Some of the other Black pilots who usually did not drink much. found that they had begun to 
adapt: 
I was on one of the overseas trips ill Munich with one of the black guys. The black pilot said 
that he only drank one beer. He was then encouraged by the crew to have another and after 
some persuasion. he did. saying that this was his last. The crew managed someho"" to slip 
another beer in and noticing this, the black pilot said he couldn't possibly have it, but \\ith a 
bit more persuasion, he drank it. 
The Copilots: 
We've got a very good thing here. There's a very good culture, put it that way, thaJ,.if I've 
got a flight overseas. on the first day of arrival. everyone gets together and we go and have 
supper together. We all share whatever we want to share and I think in that way you get to 
know all the crew members. So we get to know them on a different level to flying and J 
actually recommend it. 
\\ lIen overseas or on a night stop we go together as crew. We get a chance to get to know 
each other and this is a positive thing because if you know. if you see a person at work. you 
really don't know that person. but if you see him out of his work environment. you get to 
understand that person and you get to know that person better and then you can know this 
person is like this. So I think it is quite a positive thing. 
I n this sense. long trips seemed to be especially beneficial: 
If you're on a short trip you find that you're under a lot of pressure. it's a working 
environment. you don't ha\'e a lot of time to talk. On a long trip. there are times when you 
have some timc during the flight to relax and get to kno\\ one another. So sometimes you 
find that you spelld a day \\1th these people. but at the end of it you don't know them any 
better. :\0\\ if you go on a night stop. you go away, and you actually have a bit of time 
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outside the work environment and you have a drink together, go out for a meal, whatever. 
4.3.3.3. Adaptation. 
Adaptation seemed to take place on three le~~eis: the training, the technical aspect~ of the work, 
and the interpersonal relationships. 
a) Training. 
The Captains: 
We're learning as well, the cultural aspect being a major part of the training. I mean we have 
to adapt our ways. I think what the airline has done, is we're going to put a lot more effort 
into ensuring that there are no hiccups in the path of this group, particularly that group, being 
the first. You can understand the problems if they don't come up to expectations, that's going 
to be a problem. so we had to, we've got to adapt to some slightly different circumstances. 
Well we have to look at the profile of the individuals who have joined this airline. In the past 
we have been similar to each other. to the culture that we know, so they come through, most 
of them what seems to be logical to one group of people, it may not be logical to others and 
that is what we've discovered with this initial training that we've done is that we can take 
nothing for granted, we can't say a technical aspect and assume any knowledge. you'ye got to 
ensure that the basic knowledge is actually there. It's an understanding of whatever the 
concept happens to be. No assumptions can be made. In the past, because of the fairly 
stereotyped background people come from, you could make assumptions. We now can't do 
that, we've got to make sure the knowledge of whatever subject is there. 
However. although training had to accomodate new members, there could not be a decrease in 
the standard of the pilots. This seemed to be one of the most crucial factors for SAA. 
These people were selected very very carefully. they're very intelligent people, not that we'd 
ever take, we'll certainly take people with a lower education. We cannot allow it to affect the 
standard, there will have to be more training, effort \-viII have to be put in, and also the quality 
of the training. There is a shift in emphasis, that will have to take place. We intend to still 
select the best people. but they will be very young, they might not even have driven a car or 
anything like that. We will take people like that and train them. But they will be trained 
from square one. Which means that we will come into contact, and how our methods and our 
way of thinking is instilled in them right from the start. And they may be better off than these 
people who have had some flying experience and are now put into this. Their education will 
always be different and I think cultural aspects will definitely come into play. Adaptation that 
not only the students will have to make, but that we have to make. To adapt our training to 
ensure that it actually achieves the same goal. 
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\Vith regard to the training. the candidates suggested that the type of training instructor 
significantly impacted on the learning process, as well as future expectations. 
What J find is that some training captains<are really good people and they make a difference 
to what we expect of other people. You can have an instructor and you can have an 
instructor. You can have a guy who can put across certain points and then you have other 
people who don't know how to do that. And those are the people who can make or break. 
To me if an instructor can see himself as having a responsibility towards his students. then you 
have a person who is committed because he cares. Instructors can eith,er make or break your 
confidence. I've been lucky. I've had the good ones. 
The emphasis on better and more intensive training was seen to be particularly important with 
regard to less experienced pilots. This process of adaptation seemed to become a cause for 
concern. particularly with regard to less experienced and qualified candidates: 
For others J do think we're going to need some bridging training. for example in 
aerodynamics. for those who might come to SAA without that lUnd of education. where they 
learnt about those lUnd of things. One needs to know those things before you can do the 
training proper. Black people have not, very few have been exposed to good science and 
maths in schooL so they are going to need help. And this is a profession which requires a lot 
of that. So I'd like to see them have a course with a lecturer from a technikon or whatever. 
You can do stuff like aerodynamic. gyro electronics etc. They all love flying but they don't 
really know everything what is involved. 
Well there's one thing. we were a big class in the first place so you could not get that. some 
other guys were ahead of us. because they were flight engineers and we were the new intake. 
so we couldn't really catch up with them so those were the problems, but at any rate we had 
to work very hard just to speed up, to catch up with them. 
b) Technical. 
Adaptation also took place in relation to the technical aspects of flying. 
The Captains and Flight Engineers: 
I1's not only a new company. ifs a totally new environment the cockpit. the crew concept that 
we use. and many of these people have got very limited e)l,'perience in that sort of flying. It's 
a totally new concept of flying aeroplanes. So that's where there's most of the difference. 
The Copilots: 
It is quite different because the aircrafts 1 used to fly were not jet aircraft. the thing is with 
boeing they have their O\\TI way of doing things and with the new aircraft and the different 
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limitations and things like that, so we really and to be introduced to the \vhole system. 
The technical was a bit different. because 35 far as what I was flying, I never flew jet. I never 
flew pressurized aircraft so and then we've flo\vn the 7~7, you know it's a very big aircraft, it's 
very technical. it was different. it wasn't difficult, it was just different. Well I hadn't had any 
experience, so it was a good learning curve for myself. It wasll't difficult. lots of work, but \ve 
got on quite well. 
1 dOll't think I've had much of a problem in terms of changing because first of aliI was flying 
in the Ciskei. I flew as a copilot so 1 had a bit of experience \\ith tl1-a-t. - 1 also flew as a 
captain as well so I had my copilots working under me. So in terms of really changing, I 
didn't really have much of a problem, The only problem that 1 did have was the procedures 
that they have in the airline (referring to the whole organization). They are very s1rict kind 
of procedures. For example let me start in the cockpit. When flying the jet engine, its 
different from flying the turbo prop engine. Now there are certain procedures that one has 
to follow and if you don't follow these procedures, then you're out of here. Now I'm talking 
about those procedures that you have to follow orders to be in line or in sequence \\;th the 
aircraft and the whole organization as such. It wasn't easy I must admit. 
c) Interpersonal. 
Although the Black pilots had to adapt to the technical and training aspects, adaptation with 
regard to interpersonal relationships was a two-way process between \\'hite and Black members. 
The Captains and Flight Engineers: 
I think the guys have realized the changes that have come about and I think in a way the guys 
will bend over more to accomodate, to help and to show them the ropes. In a way I ih'ink its 
different. I mean when you go for a meal its not the same as with the boys or the females, 
it's different. You talk about different things. I think you're a bit wary, wary in the sense of 
you know if things go wrong, let's say the black guy speaks too much, then the implications 
of that would be much more severe, certainly I would feel that the odds would be more 
against me, so on that basis you're more aware of the things that might go \\Tong. Generally 
I mean to accomodate in the working environment I don't think that a problem, as such I 
mean if the guy can do the job at a high level. 
It is quite interesting that in fact that there is as much of an adjustment for us as there is for 
him, I suppose you've go to work at it. 
This candidate especially emphasized the point of accommodation taking place on the part of the 
W11ite pilots. In addition to this there seemed to be an understanding that adaptation takes time, 
but could be speeded up by inereas.ed interpersonal contact: 
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Well I really believe that if I had to fly \\;th certain black guys for the nex1 ten years then 
obviously one would learn to grow together and understand each other better and maybe in 
understanding a lot of the suspicions. and I don't mean suspicion in a negative sense. or the 
differences would be diluted and you will understand more why certain people do things a 
certain way. I guess what I'm trying to say is that it might take a long time, rilaybe it \\ill 
actually be easier for them to adapt because they are thrown into this river of white water and 
that's all they see is white faces. And really I'm not a racist. in fact I'm a great democrat. but 
I just feel there are big differences. They're definitely not stupid, they're very capable, but 
they are different. Some of the differences you understand. but some, I'd say 70 percent of 
the differences you don't understand because you don't understand the-culrure, the thinking 
process. 
We have to be careful now because it's a common thing. you know "you're flying like an Af', 
and you can't say this. ]\'ow with this. So one has to be careful. I mean racial jokes are 
sensitive and when you're sitting with these guys you just have to be careful what you say. 
Although I'm sure these guys will take it in the way you mean it. they're not going to take it 
offensively. 
The Copilots: 
Initially it was very stressful. because first of all its a very big organization and I've come from 
a very small organization, we were basically like a family. We all know each other, our likings 
and dislikes and everything. but nmv here you come and today you're flying with this captain 
and this flight copilot. flight engineer and tomorrow its a different crew and all. So that puts 
a lot of pressure on you. because you don't know what each guy actually likes. arid you have 
to adjust to each. 
I1's not really any different from what I've experienced before. OK it is a big organization. but 
as I said before. with the people being friendly and helpful we don't feel as if you're a black 
sheep in the whole herd. you feel as part of the group, you know you feel that if somebody 
comes and asks something you will be willing to help because they also help you. 
It is the first time that I'm being exposed to a big Afrikaans culture. But at the same time. 
I think it depends on your attitude. I used to associate the Afrikaans language with that of 
the oppressors. But I think an acceptance of people as individuals and also a matter of trade-
off. For example. an Afrikaans captain might tell me to learn Afrikaans. and I will say to 
him. OK. if you learn an African language. 
It might be a problem for those who come from a predominantly Black organization. But all 
these people love what they are doing. I've found that there is only conflict in aviation if 
someone does not respect the profession; if he has the wrong attitude. or the way he 
approaches his work. It gives aviation a bad name. But generally I mean I told someone I 
would like to know more about a certain aeroplane. and the next thing is someone put the 
notes in my box. you know it's that kind of thing that. that common interest that brings us 
together. 
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Limitations to the adaptation process. Exiernal pressures made the adaptation and acculturation 
process more difficult than perhaps necessary. 9ne Copilot spoke specifically about this aspect: 
In the beginning we had problems getting ourselves settled in. And that created exiernal 
pressures and unfortunately that did create some tensions. TIle inefficiency of the 
recruitement process put pressure on us during our conversion. in that the recruitement 
process was not don e very well. people not getting adequate facilities. you arrive here and 
there are problems which we encountered. like our families had not been considered, so, like 
we had to stay in a hotel, but like are we going to have to pay for our farnriies. kind of thing. 
And then there wasn't a period given to us to settle in. we came straight from there into the 
course. We had a full day. so we never had the time to go to the post office. go to pay bills 
etcetera. And then the other thing is the guys are not getting their full salaries because 
they're still in training. so there was a lot of pressure that we didn't need. So unfortunately 
the lack of consideration filtered into our training. 
-l.3.3.4. Acculturation. 
The acculturation process was an important factor for Black pilots who had to learn the norms. 
roles and structures which were part of the airline's culture. 
The Captains and Flight Engineers: 
I think its really more getting used to the way we do things in the airline. where they fit in. 
possible perceptions about what things might or might Dot be like. how they would be 
accepted. that kind of thing. I think that would be foremost in their minds. From our point 
of \;ew. I think to us. \\ould be - are they capable in the job? 
The Copilots: 
SAA is one of the top airlines in the world and the way we operate is very much in line with 
other airlines in the world. So if we try to change that direction I think that would be very 
much detrimental to the airline and also to us. Maybe sometime in the future I would like 
to join one of the other airlines. If I approach it in the same way that SAA is doing. then I 
don't have a problem. So I'm quite happy to change to fit in with SAA. 
For the pilot who had worked with SAA before. things seemed a little different: 
It wasn't much of an adaptation for myself because I've been here before. known the people. 
I've flown \\;th the captains. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DlSCVSSI6~ OF RESULTS. 
Several issues must be clarified at the onset of the discussion. 
In the simulator sessions observed. the Captain was always a \\11ite. experienced pilot. whereas 
the First Officer wa<; ahvays a Black. inexperienced pilot. The communication preuominantly 
occurred bemeen Captain and First Officer. The First Officer and Flight Engineer rarely 
communicated. unless it was in the process of completing a checklist. or making decisions. The 
focus of these themes. therefore was on the CaptainlFirst Officer dyad. The words Copilot and 
First Officer are used interchangeably. The term "training Captain" refers to a Captain who is 
qualified as an instructor and is involved with the training of incoming pilots. 
5.1. DISCUSSION OF THEMES. 
The discussion of the themes extracted from the interviews and observation will be e;...-plored 
according to the indi\;duaL group and organizational levels outlined in the contextual framewor k. 
5.1.1. Individual level themes. 
5.1.1.1. Qualifications and experience. 
South African Airways found themselves in a relatively fortunate position with regard to the 
introduction of culturally diverse pilots into their organization. The organization was fortuitous 
from the point of \;ew that. at this initial stage in the inlplementation of an Affirmative Action 
policy. they were able to select fairly qualified individuals. All five of the Black pilots had secure 
educational backgrounds and had the necessary qualifications required of any individual who 
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must proceed through the selection process. This meant that all the subjects had a Private 
Pilot's licence. as ,veIl as a Commercial Pilot's licence, together \vitb some experience either in 
other commercial airlines. or larger organizations. Therefof(~, the subjects who took part in this 
research had a higher education. and had been exposed to more opportunities in the areas of 
flight training than the average Black SOllth African. 
This suggested that bridging training. and possible cultural differences in the areas of education 
and experience ,vere to some eJl.1ent lessened. The result \vas that the instructors at SAA were 
able to concentrate on the conversion of pilots onto Boeing aircraft. \.\hile the problem of 
integration and acculturation of new members into the organization played a very secondary role. 
The expectations amongst the established line pilots. therefore were that culturally diverse. new 
members would have the necessary qualifications. This had a significant impact on the 
stereotypes and attitudes held by the members of the organization. Once again. these 
circumstances will change as SAA becomes obliged to select less qualified and experienced 
candidates. 
Furthermore. the fact that all the subjects had some experience as commercial pilots, (especially 
one subject who trained with SAA previously), illuminated the notion that acculturation and 
adaptation for these new members was significantly easier than was expected for very 
inexperienced newcomers. 
Finally, with regard to training, all the Black subjects began their training at the "relief pilot" 
level, and proceeded through the same process of training and promotion that any Wl1ite 
candidate would be expected to follow. This was possible because of the qualifications already 
acquired by the Black subjects. Furthermore. this was a significant situational variable which had 
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to be taken into account when interpreting the results. Future Black employees of the 
organization will not be expected to have th e ~ame high level of experience. I n such cases 
additional bridging training ranging from< inatric level science and maths, through to 
aerodynamics and tuition ""ith a \iew to obtaining Commercial Pilofs licences. \vill be e~.:pected. 
5.1.1.2. Ability and experience. 
Both the level of education and the abilities of the new members affected the stereotypes and 
attitudes already held by established members of the organization. This corresponded with 
Schultz's (1989) idea that an individual's credibility in the group will determine that person's 
reputation in the group. The credibility of the subjects in this case increased their acceptance 
by the group. It seemed particularly vital that ne\\comers had the necessary abilities for flying. 
and this. more than an)'1hing else. impacted on the attitudes and impressions formed by the 
Vvllite pilots. Along these lines of ability, there were no margins for compromise. 
Regarding this particular group of subjects, however, it was indicated in the data that although 
the subjects had the necessary qualifications and abilities. they were still inex-perienced in terms 
of flying a Boeing aircraft. This inexperience was evident in the high number of proGedural 
problems encountered when the Copilot was flying the aircraft. (See Critical Incidents Table, 
Crew A and D). Most of the communication difficulties were a result of the inexperience of the 
First Officer in terms of the procedures for the aircraft. 
The fact that the First Officers were very inexperienced was anxiety-provoking for all the crew 
members. and emphasized the need for accurate and effective communication between them. 
Furthermore. the inexperience of the First Officers made it necessary for the Captain to perform 
an additional role - that of instructor, as well as leader of the flight crew. 
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The ex-pectations of the White crew members were contradicted by the fact that the Black 
candidates were of above-average intelligence. This also appeared to enhance the general 
credibility of the Black members. This confir<lned the idea that expectations emerged from the 
intergroup attitudes and stereot)-pes which we hold. and that these expectations might either be 
fulfilled. or violated in the contact situation. 
It is interesting that although White established members of the organization were quick to stress 
that their expectations of Black pilots were no different to those imposed on White candidates. 
they did emphasize an increased acceptance as a result of the factors outlined above. Therefore. 
there seemed to be some dissonance behveen yvhat was verbalized and what was actually believed. 
This may have been due to the interview situation. but is more likely a result of the ex-pectations 
placed on White members to abide by and facilitate the transitional period in the organization. 
This might have been in opposition to their deep-seated desires. 
5.1.1.3. Stereotj-pes. 
The subjects of the study indicated that there was some suspicion between White established 
members of the organization and the incoming Black pilots. This could be attribute_d. to the 
situational factors surrounding the current step tow"ards cultural diversity. particularly the racial 
struggles that surrounded intercultural communication at that point. In addition to this there 
seemed to be a covert sense of uneasiness between crew members. The subjects admitted that 
this anxiety stemmed from a fear of the unknown thoughts and perceptions of other crew 
members. This correlated with the 10hari window representation which suggested that personal 
communication under these circumstances was very limited Instead, communication tended to 
be rigid and superficial. Crew coordination and communication under these circumstances could 
have been limited. 
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This had significant implications for communication on the fligllt deck. Firstly, while stereotypes 
and suspicions prevailed. crew members communicated rather superficially with one another. 
Communication was centred around task t'elated issues. This was evident in Table 1. which 
shol,ved no incidences of personal communication except in one crew. In this particular crew. the 
copilot was more experienced and more confident than the other Black pilots. At the same time. 
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crew members were acutely aware of the m'ert differences amongst themselves. those being 
physical and linguistic differences. For example: 
I suppose it's only natural. in the South African context. to be slightly biased. or not 
biased. but preconditioned is perhaps a better word. in terms of one's suspicions. It's 
more who's thinking what. It's subtle. but it's there. Different people, you know what's 
acceptable. what's the norm, what's unusual behaviour to other people. 
The result was that behaviour was very tentative. Both parties were still "testing the waters". 
In the light of these observations all the subjects indicated that they were aware of. the 
stereotypes they held and that these stereotypes were likely to influence their communication and 
interaction with culturally diverse individuals. However, there was a strong indication that these 
stereotypes were reevaluated and modified as a result of increased contact. Because of the 
modified stereotypes, crew members' perceptions of Black members became more complex. As 
the theory suggested. they were now able to consider individual variability and avoid vieV:ing the 
outgroup as a homogeneous group. 
Therefore, established members of the organization held certain stereotypes concerning Black 
applicants. which had not been tested before. Under the legislation of an Affirmative Action 
policy. however. members were being forced to interact \\>lth culturally diverse individuals and. 
as a result. were able to test the credibility of their previously held stereotypes. However. 
because of the edul.:ational level and qualifications of the Black members who took part in the 
study. the similarir..- bemeen ~1J.ite and Black members was increased to some ex1ent. This 
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increased the likelihood that stereotypes would be discredited. However, this might not 
necessarily be the case where Black candidates who do not have the same level of qualification 
and experience begin to enter the organization'. Thus. although these first Black candidates were 
making a very positive contribution towards breaking down previous stereotypes. there was no 
guarantee that these stereotypes would not be reinforced by less qualified and less educated 
candidates. 
The data corresponded with the theory put forward by authors such as Rens (1991). Cox (1993) 
and Gudykunst (1991). who suggested that the stereotypes individuals used to cope with 
ambiguity and anxiety were reevaluated and often found to be inaccurate. It was found in the 
data that although there were significant status differences both in the organization in general 
and on the flight in particular. negative outgroup stereotypes were being disconfirmed. 
Furthermore, because cooperation was so necessary for effective crew coordination, prevailing 
prejudiced attitudes decreased. 
5.1.1.4. Attitudes. 
It was indicated in the data that the attitudes of tbe White and Black members affected 
communication, and tbe climate in which communication 'took place. The attitudes of botb 
\\'bite and Black pilots were predominantly a consequence of the political inequalities 
experienced in tbe past. Although the negative attitudes were not often overtly encountered. 
there had been isolated instances where Black pilots were confronted by very negative attitudes. 
Under such circumstances. Black pilots ex:perienced ex1reme anxiety. especiaUywben the negative 
attitude came from an individual of higher status and ranking. 
I n such situations. Black pilots were. firstly. very uncertain about how to interpret tbe situation. 
and secondly. very unsure of how to react. This caused interpersonal difficulties and tension. 
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The subjects commented as follows: 
He (the Captain) didn't create a conversational atmosphere. So he was never really sure 
what his position was. And then a bit later the guy cracks a racial joke. Now this guy 
felt in an awbvard position, because, <YQu knmv, does he take offence or does he crack 
a joke back? 
This kind of conflict in the cockpit was certainly a safety hazard. In particular such attitudes 
might have inhibited Black members from alerting the Captain to deviant information and at the 
same time may have caused all members of the flight crew to misinterpret messages. This 
corresponded 'vvith the theory which suggested that status differences complicate the 
communicative situation because the Black employee never knows when a comment. racial slur 
or joke might occur that will test the worker's ability to interact 'With the \Vhite employer (Brislin. 
1991 ). 
Gudykunst (1991) put forward several characteristics of the contact situation which could foster 
a positive attitude change. While some of these were present in the South African Airways 
contex1, others were not. Cooperation between individuals in the flight crew was vitally important 
for effective functioning on the flight deck. In this sense, the cooperative circumstances necessary 
for changing attitudes were present. There ,vas also very little, if any, competition betvveen 
groups in aviation. 
Furthermore, intergroup contact had the potential for extending beyond the immediate situation, 
due to free time that pilots had during eX1ended flights. Under these circumstances where pilots 
were together away from home, there was great potential for social interaction. In addition to 
this there was very strong support from the managerial side in favour of the interaction between 
culturally diverse individuals. 
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By contrast. several important aspects ,vorked against the reevaluation of attitudes. First was the 
significant status differences betweenmernbers of the ingroup and outgroup. This occurred both 
in and outside of the contact situation (the flighJ deck). However. status differellces outside 
the contact situation were lessened to some extent as a result of the higher education of the 
Black candidates. 
Second, were the extreme differences in competence levels of the members in the group. For 
example the difference between highly qualified and experienced Captains and Flight Engineers 
and less experienced and lower ranking First Officers. Finally, there was a very significant 
difference in the numbers of \Vhite members in comparison to the number of Black members 
in the organization. This emphasized the minority status of Black members. 
Therefore, whereas there was some scope for decreasing negative attitudes, it was more likely 
that stereotypes would have been modified and negative attitudes would linger. Whereas a 
White pilot might have changed his stereotypes concerning Black pilots, for example, in the areas 
of ability and competence, he might still hold a very prejudiced attitude toward~ Black pilots 
which would not easily be diminished. 
There were two additional areas which related to the theme of attitudes. The first was the 
occurrence of overbearing communication styles. There was some indication that Captains who 
perceived themselves as very much more qualified, and therefore of higher status than their Black 
colleagues, had a higher degree of overbearing communication style. It was found in the data 
that at times the Captains interrupted the Copilots and practically dismissed their statements. 
This overbearing manner might have caused interpersonal conflict on the flight deck. However, 
there was not much evidence of conflict actually developing at that stage. This was partly due 
to the power distance between Captain and First Officer. Thus, the First Officer would have 
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been reluctant to react negatively to being interrupted. 
This corresponded \vith the second area whic]l yvas concerned with status differences. Captains 
spoke more frequently with the Flight Engineers (vI,ho were of higher status than the Copilots), 
in terms of general or personal communication. Furthermore. the Captains spoke far more 
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frequently than the other crew members. This was partly due to their leadership role. but also 
because of the higher level of status. This overbearing manner was not always perceived as 
such by the Copilots. however. This may have been due to the attitudes of the Copilots who 
might have perceived themselves as having lovver status. 
(A'erall it \\as verified in the data that the attitudes of the crew members were predominantly 
positive. From the few negative instances, however, it was evident that negative attitudes could 
have caused tension and interpersonal conflict on the flight deck. This could have severely 
impeded effective communication. and in the ex1reme detract from effective task ·completion. 
Under emergency conditions, negative attitudes could have contributed to miscommunication and 
endangered flight operations. 
5.1.1.5. Language. 
The literature indicates that language competence is not sufficient for effective communication. 
This however. does not detract from the importance of language competence. In the cockpit 
situation. pronunciation and intonation were important for mutual understanding between crew 
members. 
It was found in the data that although Black pilots were instructed in English and completed 
their examinations and training in English, there was still some margin for error with regard to 
pronunciation and intonation. A slight mispronunciation of certain words might not only have 
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caused confusion and misunderstanding. but could also have delayed the communication process. 
This was indicated in the high number of misunderstandings and miscommunications in the 
"Critical Incidents" table. This could have been vital considering the time constraints placed on 
communication in the cockpit. 
The checklist procedure is a case in point. In this particular instance. there was sufficient time 
available to clarify what the Copilot was trying to say, but under emergency conditions there 
might not have been sufficient time available for negotiation of meaning and pronunciation. A 
discrepancy in this checking process might have Jed to confusion and misunderstanding. Perhaps 
even more significantly. failure to check, or use of inappropriate jargon might have resulted in 
incorrect readings and consequent safety hazards. In this area in particular. pronunciation and 
intonation became important. 
However. because the crew members were anticipating the answers to checklists and instruments, 
they already had some inclination as to what the other crew members would say. Correct 
pronunciation, however became crucial in an emergency situation where there was insufficient 
time to clarify further. 
Language competence in the technical aspects of flight might also not be sufficient. Although 
culturally diverse members could learn the technical language and jargon, and overcome the 
difficulties of pronunciation in these areas. competence in the more general areas might not have 
been acquired so easily. Specifically. misunderstanding on the flight deck occurred around three 
areas. The first was where jargon was used in communication. the second was where crew 
members used inaccurate or vague communication and the third was where the Black pilots 
tended to take the communication at face value. or too literally. 
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An example of \vhere the incorrect a\iation jargon was used, and could have caused confusion 
and misunderstanding. was where the word "off' was used instead of the correct aviation term 
"disarm". Also the use of the word "normal" in "Okay I'm going to put mine on normal" was 
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misleading and confusing. There was evidence to suggest that under stressful conditions.. 
ine:\-perienced pilots mig.ht have neg.lected to use the correct jargon, and in the case of Black 
pilots, for whom English was a second language, the completely incorrect- term might have been 
used. 
The second area of concern was the use of inaccurate or vague language. It was clear in the 
simulator sessions that this occurred mostly on the part of Captains and experienced pilots who 
were clear in their minds about what they would like to have said. but were not imparting this 
in a precise and accurate way. Tbe third area was v .. here the Captain and the Copilot 
misunderstood each other completely. This occurred mostly with regard to the subtleties of the 
English language, where some misinterpretation took place on the part of the Copilot and the 
Captain. In tbis kind of communication in particular, it seemed that tbe Black pilots 
communicated at face value. Captains therefore needed to ensure that their statements did not 
have more than one level of meaning, ego "Are you happy to fly the aeroplane", which the 
Captain means as "Are you happy to continue flying the aeroplane?" 
5.1.1. 6. Leadership style. 
The theory regarding this area suggested that Captains of flight crews were most effective when 
they combined concern with task with concern for the group. It \'las found in the data that the 
Captains in these scenarios seemed more concerned with the task. Evidence for this was found 
in the low number of instances in which the Captain invited input from his crew members. They 
often used leading or closed questions. These kinds of questions did not give the Copilot time 
to think, hurried the Copilot into responding and did not invite any real participation from the 
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other crew mt:mbers. This might have been the result of a number of factors. 
Firstly. due to the emergency situation in the'simulator sessions. tht: crew members were mort: 
concerned with completing the task than under normal situations. However. under emergency 
situations. the Captain should have incorporated the input from his fellow crew members during 
the decision-making process. In addition to this. most of these Captains had learnt to fly in a 
military environment where the Captain was the ultimate authoritarian leader. Thus. adopting 
a more collective approach seemed difficult for most of these Captains. Although Captains 
included their crew members to some extent. they were likely to follow this process up to a point. 
but did not follow through. 
Secondly. the inexperience of the Copilot might have encouraged the Captain to do most of the 
decision-making himself. At the same time. because of the language difference, and perhaps the 
nervousness of the Copilots, they might have been taking too long to give inputs: 'This could 
have encouraged the Captain to interrupt an input or refrain from asking for one. 
Related to leadership style. was the nonverbal behaviour of the Captains. This appeared to have 
had a profound effect on the communicative behaviours of the other crew members. and the 
dynamics of the group in general. In crews where the Captain maintained a significant amount 
of eye contact \\1th the other crew members. communication seemed to be more effective and 
more personal information was shared. This was indicated by the high incidence of 
communication outside the task situation in Crew C. (See Table 1.) 
There was evidence in the data that Captains who ,vere perceived as not paying attention or 
listening. ,\ere negatively evaluated to some ex1en1. and there was some suggestion that the 
Captain might have been preoccupied with another task. It seemed vital however. that the Black 
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pilots felt that they were able to explore and learn as they flew. and that the Captains \,vere open 
to this kind of process. It appeared that listening and responding to questions. regardless of 
whether they were appropriate or not. was iihportant for the general repertoire between crew 
members. For example: 
But the Captain did not answer his question. therefore (he) asked again. The Captain 
did not really seem to be listening. ~ - -
5.1.2. Group level themes. 
5.1.2.1. Cohesion and individual autonomy. 
The flight crew was a highly cohesive group Il1 which individual autonomy was neither 
encouraged. nor possible. As suggested by the theory. this might have led to the phenomena of 
"groupthink". This appeared to be significantly countered by the "watchdog" role of crew 
members - the commitment to checking and rechecking each other. This occurred mostly when 
commands \;vere issued. or when the crew members were checking instruments and' checklists. 
The words "check" and "affirm" were used most often. or phrases were actually repeated. 
Also of crucial importance was assertiveness on the part of the Copilots. This was imyortant 
for alerting the Captain to deviant information. The number of assertive behaviours on the part 
of the Copilots were minimal at this stage. This seemed to be mostly due to the inexperience 
of the Copilots. 
5.1.2.2. Participation by cre\', members. 
As suggested in the theory. participation in the group was the cornerstone of communication. 
Several issues were raised concerning participation. one of which was active listening. The high 
level of interruptions in some scenarios shO\ved that in some instances. the Captains were not 
really listening to their Copilots. The Copilots themselves agreed that the Captains were not 
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listening at certain times. but indicated that an interruption could have been due to a time 
constraint in some cases. \Vithout this understanding of the situation. however, an interruption 
might have been perceived in a very negati\"e'way. 
A second issue was the area of personal clisclosure and conversation outside the immecliate task. 
Only one crew indicated any instances of interpersonal communication outside the immediate 
task. 1 n this scenario. the Copilot was significan tIl' more experienced than the other Copilots and 
so this might have been a determining factor. It is evident. however, that in this scenario. as 
suggested by the lohari Window theory. communication was more open. crew members were 
more relaxed and comfortable with one another and communication generally seemed more 
effective. The third issue. concerned information processing. It was found that all five crews 
showed no hesitation in clarifying, checking or seeking information. 
5.1.~.3. Role structure and definition in the cockpit. 
The roles in the cockpit were very tightly defined: Captain, First Officer and Flight Engineer. 
As a result. there was also a very strict adherence to the behaviours which were appropriate or 
inappropriate in those roles. For example. while the Captain was flying. the Copi!ot was 
expected to do the radio work and visa versa. Evidence showed. however. that the reversal of 
roles could only have taken place at the initiative of the Captain. Should the Copilot have tried 
to reverse roles. it would have consituted an infringement on the role boundaries and "territory" 
of the Captain. 
It was particularly important that crew members were aware of their roles and the beha\~ours 
which those roles require. I nsufficient role definition could lead to confusion. misunderstanding 
and conflict on the flight deck. Of particular intercultural significance was the perception of 
impenetrable boundaries. For example. roles could not readily be reversed or entwined. If anv 
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crew member had to encroach on the role of the Captain, for example. interpersonal conflict was 
likely to occur. In the case of a Black pilot encroaching on roles, the consequences might have 
been more severe. 
There was an emphasis on the role of the Captain as a leader. Although the final responsibility 
for the flight was vested in the Captain, the emphasis amongst Black members seemed to be on 
the collaboration and cooperation on the flight deck. In this sense. it was preferred that the 
Captain acted less as an authoritatian leader and more as a team leader. Since the final 
responsibility was with the Captain however. it was accepted that in some circumstances, the 
Captain would issue commands and make decisions independently of other crew members. 
Furthermore. the Captain was expected to be able to elicit the cooperation of his crew. The 
Captain also set the atmosphere on the flight deck by his use of interpersonal and leadership 
skills. 
The Copilot on the other hand was the second person in command. This was the case regardless 
of the difference in status or experience between the Copilot and the Flight Engineer. Although 
this was not the case in this study, this could have caused some interpersonal conflict. e~p'ecial1y 
in an intercultural encounter, where the Black person was perceived not only as inexperienced 
and junior in the cockpit. but also outside the cockpit. in society in general. This could have 
caused extreme tension. especially in circumstances where an inexperienced Copilot issued 
commands to an experienced Flight Engineer. 
Furthermore. the Copilot was expected to cooperate with and support the Captain. In addition 
to this. however. the Copilot was expected to perform a "watchdog" type of role, where he 
monitored the actions of the Captain and Flight Engineer at all times. The Captain and Flight 
Engineer in this sense had to be constantly aware of the actions of the other crew members. This 
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essentially constituted a type of backup system where everyone was double-checking everyone 
else. 
There also appeared to be a significant interplay between the different roles in the cockpit. This 
was evident in the team \-\ork approach to the flight deck. The emphasis here seemed to be on 
collaborative decision-making. Also. the Captain, Copilot and Flight Engineer identified 
themselves very much as part of a team. This emphasis on team work was especially prevalent 
amongst the Black pilots. 
With regard to the Captain in the intercultural context. it was found that the Captain also played 
a mentoring role and at times even adopted a very paternalistic communication style. Due to the 
inexperience of the First Officers. it became necessary for the Captain to perform an instructing 
role as well as his usual role of leader. The high frequency of such communication styles can be 
seen in the "Critical Incidents" table. The style of instructing and leading became important in 
the discussion of intercultural communication because of the danger of misunderstanding and 
misinterpreting the behaviours of different cultural groups. For example. an overbearing manner 
could have been misinterpreted as condescending or patronizing and might have led to 
interpersonal conflict on the flight deck. 
The analysis of the video tapes illuminated a range of behaviours associated with the 
instructing/coaching/nurturing role which the Captain assumed with an inexperienced First 
Officer. Firstly. the Captains tended to assume the role of instructor. This was a natural 
progression for the training Captains. but the same instructing role emerged in Captains who 
were not qualified instructors. TIle use of the instructing role became particularly frequent when 
procedural problems occurred. This was where most of the difficulties in crew cooperation and 
coordination took place or where the First Officer failed to comply with. or was unsure of the 
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necessary procedures. Under such circumstances the Captain would either directly remind the 
First Officer of the neAi procedure, or would ask the First Officer if he would like the neAi item, 
thereby implying that he had omitted an item from the procedure. There was evidence in the 
data that this instructing, and at times, nurturing role facilitated the acculturation process of the 
Black pilots. Through a trial-and-error process which was overseen by the Captain, the Copilot 
was able to absorb and learn the procedures first hand. 
Furthermore. the Captain at times adopted a type of parenting role. This style was appropriate 
considering the inexperience of the First Officers. Although one might have expected the Black 
First Officer to perceive such a role as condescending or patronizing, it was indicated in the data 
that this was not the case. Furthermore. a nurturing parent role was observed under stressful 
circumstances. 
Although the Captains maintained an instructing role during most of the complications 
encountered. there was evidence that under stressful conditions, or perhaps where the 
experienced Captain became frustrated \Vith the inexperience of the First Officer, a somewhat 
overbearing manner came to the fore. 
5.1.2.4. Norms. 
There were very strict norms in SAA generally and in the cockpit specifically. In order to be 
fully accepted in the organization individuals were expected to abide by these norms and rules 
for behaviour. Furthermore, the norms prevailing in the organization led to a fairly stereotyped 
workforce with regard to what was expected of them. This indicated a limited margin for 
personal autonomy. It was found in the data that the flight crew was a highly cohesive group 
in which personal autonomy was not encouraged. It was vital that crew members behaved 
according to specific norms. A violation of these norms, for whatever reason, be it a result of 
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individual or cultural differences. was not tolerated. 
The ranking order in the organization. and ilH~ norms which accompanied that ranking order 
were very standardized and fixed. Th us. these norms of behaviour did not alter with the inclusion 
of culturallv diverse individuals. AccordilH~lv. ne\v members. whether they were Vv1lite or Black. 
... ~ ~ - . 
were expected to abide by the expectations of the organization. 
Furthermore. adherence to particular norms required some degree of discipline. Indi\ldual crew 
members were required to fulfil their duties and not to venture outside of those duties. thereby 
encroaching on the role of another crew member. This implied that there was a degree of 
essential trust between crew members. M embers trusted that fellow crew members would fulfil 
their specific duties thoroughly and to the best of their abilities and would not attempt to fulfil 
the role of another crew member. However. at the same time. all crew members were e.xpected 
.. 
to observe the performance of other crew members. and in this way provided a backup system. 
Other established norms in the cockpit were the Standard Operating Procedures. beha\lours 
which ensured that everyone in the cockpit was in the same frame of mind and an effort towards 
making sure that all crew members had equal access to information. This could have been seen 
as a collecti\lstic attitude rather than an indi"';dualistic one and in this sense. Black candidates 
might contribute significantly to the norm of teamwork in the cockpit. 
In this regard. it was observed that the Black members emphasized teamwork and mutual 
understanding to a larger degree than the White subjects. This might have indicated a higher 
inclination towards a collectivistic attitude. but at the same time might have been due to the more 
military history of the training of the \\lhite pilots. a military training which encouraged an 
authoritarian tendency. 
114 
Another norm concerned appropriate and inappropriate communication. For example. during 
take-offs and landings, there was an expectation.that all communication would onlybe concerned 
with the flight and that idle conversation was JIlappropriate. At the same time, Captains expected 
their Copilots not to bother them ,vith ullnecessary information at such times. Subjects 
emphasized that on short trips. most of the flight consisted of take-offs and landings. During 
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these times the cockpit was considered "sterile", that is. all communication was concerned with 
the flight only. 
The final norm cOllcerned the level of assertiveness which was acceptable or unacceptable in the 
organization in general and in the cockpit specifically. This level of assertiveness depended to 
. a large ex1ent on the ranking order and status of the individual in the organization at large. 
In particular. very junior pilots were not expected to put forward opinions concerning the 
managemen t of the organization. In the cockpit for example. junior crew members were not 
expected to speculate on the abilities of crew members of a higher status and ranking than 
themselves. This was a very strong etiquette and once violated might have led not only to 
reinforcement of stereotypes, but also to interpersonal conflict and tension. There was a subtle 
difference between behaviour which was seen as precocious and behaviour which was c~~sidered 
to be assertive. 
The interesting perspective here was that \\,'hite instructors and trainers seemed to view over-
assertiveness as an essentially "Black" phenomenon. This w'as partly based on the education and 
upbringing of the Black pilots which were perceived as contributing to a higher confidence and 
level of assertiveness than would be expected from the average Black candidate. 
The instructors and trainers therefore appeared to expect Black pilots to tone dO\\TI their level 
of asserti\·eness. The following comments illustrate the point: 
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There are norms which one gradually absorbs in the airline. and one of the norms is, yes 
that you are not going to ex:pect a very junior man to make judgements on major policy 
issues like that. There is a code of behaviour in the cockpit and a) it's determined by 
rank structure. you are allowed to open up as your seniority increases. It's a very subtle 
thing. but you are expected to behave in' a certain way . 
. < 
To some extent this indicated an attempt to get Black pilots to behave as they were expected to 
behave. not only as very junior pilots, but also as Black, Affirmative Action candidates. This was 
evident in one instructor's comment. that in some situations it was necessary for the safety of 
- the flight to be assertive. but that most of the time "it's better not to be that >vay". 
This idea of assertiveness also overlapped into a behavioural domain. As suggested by the 
subjects. initiating action outside the limits of the Standard Operating Procedures without 
consulting the Captain first. would be considered as over-assertive behaviour and would be 
frowned upon by fellow crew members. 
This idea of over-assertiveness was not perceived by the Black pilots. Rather, Black s~bjects ,\iere 
more concerned about the importance of assertiveness in the cockpit with regard to pointing out 
deviant information and checking on the actions of the Captain. The cockpit was seen as a place 
where conflict had to be avoided unless completely necessary, yet there was to be no hesitation 
in confronting fellow crew members at more appropriate moments. 
In summary, it was suggested that culturally diverse members might not have naturally 
incorporated and accepted the norms outlined above. Therefore, adaptation to and acculturation 
of these norms was imperative for communication on the flight deck. It was found that Black 
pilots adhered to these norms with only minimal difficulty. However, future training may have 
to address difficulties that could be encountered with regard to less experienced, qualified or 
perhaps "Westernized" candidates. 
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5.1.2.5. Cultural differences. 
Differences along the dimensions of intimacy of the relationships, the degree of formality. the 
degree of hierarchy present and the degree of qeviation allowed, seemed to be related to some 
eX1ent with dimensions of cultural variability. Between White and Black cultures there were 
differences along these four dimensions. The Black candidates did appear to place more 
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emphasis on the intimacy of the interaction. but correlated with the White subjects along the 
lines of the formality and hierarchy on the flight deck. Along the dimension of deviation from 
the ideal. the Black pilots also seemed to accept this more than the White pilots. This might 
have been due to the higher collectivism on the part of the Black pilots than on the part of the 
\Vhite pilots. 
a) Individualism versus collectivism. 
Africans and Asians are considered to be more collectivistic than Whites (Hofstede, 1991). 
Therefore. it maybe put fonvard that on the flight deck. the Black pilots woould approach group 
functioning and group interaction from a more collectivistic perspective. 
The findings of this research supported this. The Black pilots placed significant emphasis on 
team work. crew coordination and participation by all crew members. They also continually 
referred to the crew as a chain which was only as strong as its weakest link. Furthermore. there 
was an emphasis on the common goal of safe and efficient flight. The White pilots. however, did 
not place as much emphasis on collective functioning of the crew. and in cases where they did. 
it was usually a result of training which encouraged this type of interaction. 
This was a very positive consequence of the cultural diversity. because of the recent emphasis on 
increased teamwork on the flight deck. This cultural difference may thus enhance 
communication on the flight deck. 
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b) Power distance. 
Finally. it was observed that the cockpit and SAA as an organization at large conformed to higher 
power distance. This observation was bas~d_ on the fact that members of the- organization 
accepted that power was distributed unequally in the organization. 
Specifically. on the flight deck there was a very high power distance in the strict hierarchy 
according to rank and position. The \\'hite subjects seemed to place a stonger emphasis on status 
and rank differences. and the appropriate behaviours attached to them. On the other hand. the 
Black pilots were more concerned that the Captains took their opinions into consideration. 
regardless of ho\},' junior they were. The Black pilots also placed significant emphasis on 
assertiveness in the cockpit regardless of status and rank differences. 
This had 1\-\/0 consequences. Firstly. the White~ experienced and established pilots tended to see 
this behaviour as arrogant and overassertive as well as overstepping the boundaries of appropriate 
role behaviour. This may have reinforced previous negative stereotypes and prejudices. Secondly 
in time. communication between crew members can actually be enhanced and members may be 
encouraged to disagree with the Captain when necessary for the safety of the flight. 
5.1.:!.6. Standard Operating Procedures. 
Under stressful or uncertain conditions. the crew members tended to rely more heavily on the 
Standard Operating Procedures. This adherence could be seen as an uncertainty reduction 
mechanism. The crew members relied more heavily on SOP's under two kinds of stressful 
conditions. The first was when there was anxiety or uncertainty concerning the technical aspects 
of the flight. The critical incidents described in Tables:! to 6 show that under emergency 
situations. most of the discussion revolves around the necessary procedures. The second was 
where there .vas uncertainty concerning the interpersonal relationships on the flight deck. Where 
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interpersonal relationships on the flight deck were uncertain and there was very little 
communicatio'n outside that which concerned the f]jght, crew members were more likely to be 
uncertain about what was expected of them, as well as about the likes and dislikes of the Captain . 
• ~ w 
Under these circumstances. reliance on Standard Operating Procedures lessened the anxiety and 
ambiguity of the situation. Crew members knew what was expected of them and by concentrating 
on doing the job. anxiety about interpersonal relationships was lessened. tile -transcripts of the 
- videos indicated that most of the communication centres around the Standard Operating 
Procedures. Little communication outside of the task occurred. 
With regard to general communication, the subjects indicated that adherence to the Standard 
Operating Procedures made communication far more efficient. In terms of intercultural 
communication, this was particularly important since members could simply fall back on 
operating procedures and the margin of error was lessened. 
This also fell in line with Borden's (1991) suggestion that in new situations there is uncertainty 
concerning what to say. In such situations, individuals might have fallen back on their 
stereotypes. I n the cockpit situation, crew members could rely on standard procedures. With 
specific regard to intercultural situations, Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey (1988) reported that it 
was more difficult to know how to initiate a conversation and to know what to talk about when 
initiating a conversation with a person who was culturally dissimilar. 
5.1.2.7. Crew composition!. 
The crew composition is important to our understanding of the communication between crew 
members because the changing crew composition limits the amount of contact time behveen crew 
members. Uncertainty about the likes and dislikes of fellow crew members appeared to impact 
on levels of confidence, assertiveness and general psychological comfort in the cockpit. With a 
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constantly changing crew, uncertainty in these areas was never lessened. 
However. it was observed that crew members seemed to accept that they would' constantly be 
flying \vith different people and viewed this as a learning opportunity. and an occasion for 
engaging in interaction Y\ith a diversity of personalities. 
5.1.3. Organizational level themes, 
5.1.3.1. Affirmative Action policy. 
The contex1 of Affirmative Action had an influence on the expectations and stereotypes which 
established members held. Established members of the organization tended to correlate Black 
pilots with the transitional period of Affirmative Action. although this was lessened to some 
extent by the level of experience and qualifications of the Black pilots who had become part of 
SAA. 
This was in line with the views of Brislin (1981). Knapp, Enninger and Knapp-Potthof (1987) and 
DeBryn (1992). who suggested that historical, social and political surroundings impact on 
communication. In this case there was a particular emphasis on the fact that the Black pilots 
were part of a transitional period. 
The most overriding opinion. however, seemed to be that Black pilots would anticipate priviliged 
treatment and rapid promotion. Since this was a gross infringement on the norm of strict rank 
structures and promotion procedures. it was likely to cause resentment towards Black individuals. 
In particular. this would threaten the strict status hierarchy in the cockpit. and in turn seriously 
impinge on positive and effective communication. 
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Both the established members, as \.vell as the incoming Black pilots, were acutely aware of the 
uniqueness of the situation. From the Black pilots'point of view, a significant amount of pressure 
,,\as imposed on these individuals to perform a} t.heir peak and to some extent "prove" themselves 
to the organization and its members. There was a prevailing air of "setting the stage" for those 
who \vere likely to follow. An extreme effort \vas made on the part of Black pilots to compensate 
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for and change negative stereotypes that were already established amongst \Vhite members of 
the organization. 
Regarding the rapid promotion of Black pilots in the organization, tension was experienced by 
the instructors and trainers who were responsible for ensuring that a high standard of 
performance was maintained. The Captains emphasized that the Affirmative Action policy 
followed by SAA could not allow a drop in standard because of the emphasis on safety in the 
aviation environment. The following comments highlight this tension: 
I can't afford to send a substandard product onto the line. But now if I don ~t send the 
guy out, what is the company going to do? Are they going to come back at me and say 
"why"? Are they going to accept the explanation on why I don't want the guy to go? I'm 
not happy with it. It puts you in a difficult situation because it is my signature whether 
he goes or he doesn't. 
5.1.3.2. Social interaction. 
Cox (1993) emphasized that social nehvorks were important channels for communication in 
organizations and for the personal efficacy of organization members. However, Cox also stressed 
that in social systems where participants had been members of one predominant culture group, 
it was difficult for members of different culture groups to become part of those social networks. 
In the data, in relation to South African Airways it was found that social interaction occurred 
on an informal basis during extended flights where crew members were together away from their 
home environments. During this time, crew members had the opportunity to interact on an 
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informal social !evel and therefore were able to get to know one another m a different 
environment to that which prevailed in the cockpit situation. 
This kind of interaction made a significant contribution to the breaking down of social 
stereotypes which surrounded interracial and interethnic encounters. In such social interaction, 
which to some e:x1ent was unique in SAA. and was perceived as such by all the racial groups 
included. some anxiety and uncertainty concerning the situation might have prevailed. However. 
it appeared that neither the Vv'hite. nor the Black candidates overreacted to the situation. 
Instead. both parties seemed to be taking the transition into their stride. The White pilots 
included the Black pilots in their activities as they would with any newcomer to the situation. 
This was seen particularly in the drinking ritual. Crew members would usually socialize during 
their leisure time on overseas flights, or extended internal flights. This ritual seemed to 
contribute significantly to the cohesion of the flight crew and it was during these drinking bouts 
that much informal sharing of personal information and experiences took place. As previously 
suggested by the Johari Window representation. this contributed significantly to the cohesion and 
interaction of the flight crew. 
The point of significance appeared to be the fact that some crew members did not consume 
alcohol. These individuals have notoriously been considered outsiders and have often been 
ridiculed because of their decision to abstain. In circumstances where the crew member not only 
abstained from alcohol. but was also a member of a minority group. the distinction between the 
"ingroup" (those crew members who consumed alcohol and were involved in the socia:! interaction 
between crew members) and the "outgroup" (those who abstained from alcohol) became even 
clearer. 
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Some Black crew members who usualJy abstained. however. seemed to find it easier to adapt to 
the expectations of fellow crew members and take part in the social drinking rituals. This might 
have been a result of the desire to become pa:rt. of the ingroup and establish comm0-n bonds with 
fellow crew members of all cultural origins. thereby facilitating the acculturation process. 
5.1.3.3. Adaptation and acculturation. 
a). Adaptation. 
Training. There was an emphasis on the organization adapting and learning from this 
transitional period. In the past. instructors dealt ""ith a fairly homogenous group of trainees. 
With the inclusion of culturally diverse individuals, this was no longer the case. The inclination 
_ was toward improving the training programs. being aware of cultural differences and addressing 
those differences. and making sure that nothing was taken for granted. This would become 
particularly salient when less experienced and qualified candidates were selected because- the 
over arching concern was that the standard of flying was not lowered. The emphasis therefore 
shifted towards bridging training necessary for preparing new members for the actual flying 
tra i n ing. 
All the subjects acknowledged the need for adaptation and accommodation in terms of the 
training programs. This was specifically in relation to the pace and quality of the lectures. In 
this sense. the Black pilots did not have much exposure to certain aspects of the training. and so 
learning did not come as easily as it did to the White pilots. Furthermore. in the training 
context. the instructor had a significant impact on the learning process of the subjects. as well as 
their general self-confidence. It was suggested that instructors could either make or break the 
candidate's confidence. and later performance in the training. 
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Technical. Adaptation was also expected to take place on a technical level. The 
adaptation on this level was likely to occur on the part of Black pilots only. since the technical 
aspects of the aviation environment displaye;-d .little scope for change. The new members were 
expected to adapt to a new organization. new cockpit environment and a different crew concept. 
In particula·r. adaptation in this sense involved becoming familiar with the procedures and 
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limitations involved \\ith the aircraft. Furthermore. the size of the aircraft seemed to be a 
conml0n factor to which all the subjects had to adapt. 
I nterpersonal. The theory concerning adaptation stressed that communication was at the 
centre of adaptation, and that the cross-cultural adaptation process was a process of achieving 
the communication capacities necessary for new members to be functional in the host culture. 
Thus. one learnt to communicate by communicating (Kim, 1988). 
The adaptation with regard to interpersonal relationships in SAA appeared to be·taking place 
on the part of both established members. and new, Black members. Established members were 
very aware of the change in the composition of the fleet, and at the same time were aware that 
there were differences between themselves and incoming pilots. For example: 
In a way I think it's different. I mean when you go out for a meal it's not the same as 
with the boys or the females. it's different. You talk about different things. 
The emphasis therefore still seemed to be on differences. rather than mutually accepted goals 
and values. This could have been a result of strict norms for be]Iaviour and the stressing of 
certain values. but at the same time seemed to be result of previous historical factors surrounding 
intercultural encounters as suggested previously. Although one might have expected a perception 
of Black members as part of an outgroup encroaching on the territory of the ingroup. this was 
not expressed in any overt way. 
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More significantly, however, the subjects exprcssed a sense of wariness concerning culturally 
diverse in dividuals and seem cd more aware of communication difficulties and their consequences 
for interaction. The emphasis seemed to be on fhe idea that thcre was as much of an adjustment 
for White pilots as for the Black pilots. 
Although the latter process (work values from both cultures being incorpor<fted as opposed to 
- adapting to a dominant culture) might have takcn place in other more "opcn" organizations, 
culturally divcrse individuals in SAA had to adapt to a dominant culture. partly because of the 
strict roles and norms enforced in the organization. 
I ncreased contact over time was seen to contribute to enhanced interpersonal relationships. This 
was due to the expectation that the preconceptions and stereotypes would be modified. and 
suspicions would be lessened. However. there was a strong perception that there were significant 
differences between the White and Black members and. to some ex1ent, these differences might 
never be understood. For example: 
I just feel there are big differences. They're definitely not stupid. they're very capable, 
but they are different. Some of the differences you understand, but some, I'd say 70 
percent of the differences YOll don't understand because you don't understand the culture, 
the thinking process. 
The fact that these differences would have to be accepted and incorporated into an interpersonal 
relationship seemed to be the general opinion. Regarding the White pilots in particular, there 
was heightened awareness of the language and social jargon used in everyday conversation. This 
was specifically in relation to the use of racist language and racial jokes. This essentially seemed 
to involve a reevaluation of the appropriateness of past behaviours and attitudes. To some 
ex1ent, White members expected Black members to view racial language in an accepting kind of 
way. and not to react defensively. The following comments indicated this: 
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So one has to be careful. I mean racial jokes are sensitive and when you're sitting with 
these guys you just have to be careful what you say. Although I'm sure these guys will 
take it in the way you mean it, they're not going to take it offensively. 
However, it was found that although Black 'members did not al\\'ays take racial language 
offensively, it could have caused tension and anxiety in the interpersonal relationship. 
Furtbermore, when racial language was used Black subjects became uncertain about how to react, 
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as to whether to be assertive or to ignore racial slurs. 
In line with the hypothesis that the respondent would assume a greater burden of adaptive 
behaviour when the initiator has greater status and power. it was evident that for the Black 
subjects, adaption seemed to be more stressful. Adaptation for the Black pilots ex1ended beyond 
the interpersonal relationships into an adaptation to the entire organization. The size of the 
organization seemed to be the most important factor. Here the emphasis was on the family 
atmosphere in previous organizations. which was difficult to achieve in an organization the size 
of SAA. With regard to this observation, there was a further implication that in smaller 
organizations. members developed a deeper understanding of each other and were more aware 
of the likes and dislikes of individual crew members. 
In SAA there were too many crew members for this kind of understanding to occur and so this 
consitituted a significant adjustment for the Black members. Black members stressed. however. 
that the impact of this was lessened to some ex1ent by the friendliness and helpfulness of 
colleagues in the organization. An overarching factor seemed to be the notion of a common 
enthusiasm for flying amongst members of the organization. It was this love for flying that 
provided the common characteristic essential for group functioning and which to some extent. 
facilitated interaction and compensated for cultural differences. 
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Factors limiting the adaptation process. 
Several ex1ernal circumstances made the adaptation process difficult for Black subj ects. External 
pressures such as finding accommodation ,for families. inadequate settling in' periods and 
insufficient time to settle into the new environment created tensions that affected the smooth 
running of the adaptation process. 
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b). Acculturation. 
All subjects emphasized the idea of acculturation. of the process of learning the norms. roles and 
structures inherent to the organization. Evidence that an acculturation process took place was 
seen by the fact that the subject who had already been trained by SAA found the acculturation 
process far easier. Furthermore. the acculturation process entailed not only learning new norms 
and roles. but also establishing how and where they "fitted into" the organization. 
SAA as an organization might be seen as the host culture. The emphasis in the data appeared 
to be more on the process of acculturation than on deculturation. although it could be assumed 
that if acculturation took place, deculturation, in terms of unlearning previous behavioural 
patterns, must have taken place. Furthermore, the organization exerted an enormous amount 
of pressure on new members to conform. This was evident in one subj ecfs words" 
'Kow there are certain procedures that one has to follow and if you don't follow these 
procedures. then you're out of here. 
Furthermore. new-comers who were better educated and better informed about the host culture 
found the acculturation process easier. It is suggested that the subjects for this study found the 
acculturation process easier than the individual with a lower education and level of experience 
in aviation. 
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Theory suggests that when new-comers are from a similar culture to the host culture, they begin 
the adaptation process \\'ith a far greater advantage. This explains in part why the subject who 
had already trained \-vith SAA found that acculturation for him was far easier. EveI1 though this 
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individual did not come from a similar culture, he had already adapted to some point and further 
acculturation was therefore easier. 
Furthermore. theory suggests that the ease of the acculturation process increases when members 
are open minded and receptive towards the host culture. It appeared that all the subjects ,>vere 
open to SAA. This was seen in their openness towards discussion, as well as their willingness to 
reevaluate attitudes and stereotypes. Also, the adaptation and acculturation process was fostered 
by a better preparedness for change. The subjects all showed a significant willingness to change. 
This preparedness for change was illustrated and justified in the following quote from a Black 
pilot: 
SAA is one of the top airlines in the world and the way we operate is very rouch in line 
with other airlines in the wmld. So if we try to change that direction I think that would 
be very much detrimental to the airline and also to us. Maybe sometime in the future 
I would like to join one of the other airlines. If I approach it in the same way that SAA 
is doing. then I don't have a problem. So I'm quite happy to change to fit in with SAA. 
128 
6.1. CO~CLUSIONS. 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECO\lMENDATIONS 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the findings presented in this thesis.- l~he Black subjects 
observed were very experienced and qualified in comparison 'N1th the average Black candidate 
and this profoundly affected the expectations and attitudes of the \\llite members of the 
organization. As a result, the general comments of the White subjects reflected a positive rather 
than negative reaction. 
However. the political climate in generaL and the transitional phase in which South African 
Airways finds itself. created some mutual suspicion and mistrust. There \\as. however, llttle 
evidence that this has any significantly negative effect on interaction and communication. 
At the individual level. factors such as stereotypes. attitudes and expectations did affect 
interaction In initial contact situations. Particularly, these affected the climate In which 
communication took place. The emphasis, however, was on the modification of these stereotypes, 
attitudes and ex-pectations. and upon entering the cockpit, a determined effort was made to level 
out differences, and to concentrate upon the tasks at hand. Although the conditions in the 
organization at times contributed towards the breaking dO'NTI of negative attitudes, there were 
some aspects, such as the status differences which were inherent to the organization, which could 
not be changed. 
In the communication process, difficulties were mostly encountered where incorrect pronuncia-
tion and jargon was used, where there was more than one level of meaning. 
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and where the communication was vague and unspecific. These were areas in .vhich additional 
effort will have to be made by all members of the organization. For example, Black pilots will 
also have to be included in elocution lessons. Captains in particular need to concentrate on 
.< 
communicating clearly and clarifying their statements. 
Furthermore. the leadership styles of the Captains were sometimes fairly auth;ritarian. although 
this could have been due to the Copilots' inexperience. The result, hO'vvever, \vas that there was 
not much real inclusion of the other crew members in decision-making. At times the Captain 
was very overbearing and even patronizing. 
At the group level, it ,vas found that participation amongst crew members remained rigid and 
superficial. Vv'here communication outside of the immediate task did occur, it was on the 
initiation of the Captain. The adherence to roles, and the norms of behaviour which 
accompanied those roles was strongly emphasized in the organization and in the co.ckpit. New 
members, regardless of cultural origin, were expected to adapt and conform to those roles and 
norms. Deviation from the norm was highly sanctioned. 
I n terms of cultural differences, the Black subjects ,vere inclined towards a higher level of 
collectivism, and in this way positively contributed to the teamwork approach on the flight deck. 
At the organizational level, the process of adaptation and acculturation, was very significant. 
Because there was little scope for cultural differences at a group level, and personal autonomy 
at an individual level, there was not much emphasis on the acceptance and incorporation of 
cultural differences. Rather the prevailing idea was that cultural differences which could 
negatively affect group process and communication, should be eliminated Black candidates, 
therefore, were expected to adapt to the ne,v environment. The result was that acculturation 
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became an important process for the Black subjects. 
6.2. RECO\t\1ENDATIONS. 
Although communication difficulties did occur, the frequency of these difficulties was lower than 
expected. This was a result of the high calibre of the subjects who werginvolved in this study. 
This is likely to change when less experienced and qualified pilots are employed. South African 
Airways as an organisation will be recruiting pilots \vho have no flying e:'l:periencc and perhaps 
only a DET education. Therefore, these pilots \"ill need additional bridging training. Higher 
levels of miscommunication, misunderstanding and general communication difficulties may be 
encountered. 
Interpersonal skills training should address the effects of stereotyping and negative attitudes on 
the flight deck. A better understanding of cultural differences, as well as unmet.c:qJectations 
should also be dealt with. Specifically, the leadership styles of the Captains should be analysed 
and perhaps modified towards a more collectivistic approach. 
The organization in general should attempt to make the acculturation process for new members 
as uncomplicated as possible. Particularly, SAA should focus on the notion that adaptation is 
a 1\\:0 way process in which both the organization and the individual have a part to play. The 
general mindset is that cultural differences will negatively affect communication and should 
therefore be eradicated. However, when cultural differences are understood and incorportated 
into the general work ethos, greater creativity and productivity may result. 
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The high level of education, experience and qualifications of the Black subjects involved in this 
study have significantly influenced the results of this research. Therefore, further research \\111 
have to be undertaken, to account for those Black candidates who enter the organization 
with zero flying hours. Their experiences;' expectations and needs, and the quality of their 
interactions \vith other members of the organization are likely to be very different from those of 
the subjects involved in this study. 
Research in these areas will contribute to a theory base which contains ex1ensive information on 
cultural differences, factors affecting intercultural communication and the processes of adaptation 
and acculturation, but which often lacks a practical application. In particular, theory is often 
difficult to relate to the aviation conte:\1. 
Finally, recommendations can be made regarding the multi-method approach used in this study. 
Triangulation has been used to improve the accuracy of the researcher's interpretations. One 
aspect of this triangulation method involved the use of the subjects' own interpretations of the 
data. This method might be extended by using focus groups and incorporating the subjects to 
a greater extent. 
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APPENDIX. A. 
Transcript - Crew A. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
_ Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
ATC 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Cabin. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Okay see them on the right? Could we have the check list please? 
Okay, it says. 1':aycelle anti-ice. 
Off. 
Aileron rudder trim. .: 
Okay, we've got five degrees here so let's put it on because we've got visible moisture. Thank 
you. 
Electrical. 
1':0 lights set to normal. 
Bleed Air valve switcher. 
Checked -open. 
Hydraulics. 
Auto normal. 
Doors. 
Closed. 
Ground-equipment. 
Clear. 
After-start checklist complete. 
Okay. it's all yours. 
Smuts ground, Springbok 2 .... whatever we are uh taxi clearance. 
What are we? 
239. 
Roger Springbok 239. Taxi bolding runway zero three. 
Springbok 239. Clear taxi. Clear this side. 
Thank you. 
Good evening Captain, the cabin is stenle and everybody's ready for take-off. 
Thanks Mike. 
Captain, I see the instrument monitoring lights - both sides are illuminated. 
Okay, I'm going to put mine on normal. 
Okay, would you like some flap? 
Okay, uh, 10 flap please. 
Okay. selecting 10 flap. and 10 flap is running. 
Okay. we have 10 - 10 with the green. Would you like me to check the controls? 
Yes please. 
Okay. ready (To Engineer) 
Yes, skipper. 
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Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Okay, and on kft, left aileron up. left spoiler up, right aileron dO\\l] zero right. Right aileron up. 
righ-t spoiler up, .. left aileron down, Zero forward, full deflection, zero coming back, full 
deflection, zero, rudders kft first. 
Okay. 
Left rudder, full deflection, and zero going right. 
Okay. 
Full deflection, and zero. Woulcl you like me to re'view the card'] 
Review the card. 
Okay for this takeoff we require. I.-P. Reduce thrust which will come in - thanks. 
Okay. 
V I 129129 rotate 129 V2 146186226 Target rotation attitude 15% we require ten flaps we ha\'e 
10 flaps. 10 - 10 green lights, zero dump time, 2 and 3 quarter units, which is nol set, and 1 will 
set now. Switch set light e\1inguished. 
Thank you. 
Okay if you would like to do RTO and ........ 
Okay. 
Engine - out after take-off. 
After lOa knots, this will be a goal orientated take-off. However. in the event of a decision to 
stop before VI, which a hundred and 2..5 ..... 
1\0 129 knots. 
1\0 129 knots. I \',ill close thrust power levers simultaneously and then apply full-brakes. Then 
raise speed brake manually then use reverse thrust simultaneously. 
Okay then ... 
Okay I'll do that again. 
No, that's okay. 
After a hundred knots this \,ill be a goal orientated takeoff however in the decision to stop 
before Vl I \\,ll simultaneously close thrust levers and apply full brakes. Rais-e' speed brake 
manually and use reverse thrust asymmetrically. 
On symmetrical engines. Okay. Lefs stop over here. This is our holding point. Pause. 
Okay and your engine out. 
Then the .... 
Are you happy \"ith that. Would you like me to go through that for you. 
Yes please. 
Okay, contact ATC soonest. Climb straight ahead on runway heading to 5-5 nautical miles. 
Fifteen degree bank then right to November Lima, which is set on both ADF's, to 6400 feet. 
And once clear we1l climb to 7800 feet. 
Okay that checked. 
Would you like me to review the ATC clearance, the Rhino. The Rhino to Alfa, which is climb 
straight ahead, 5-5 DME, turn right to New Lago cross CTR boundary, above 8000 feet, which 
is no problem for us. Clinlbing to flight level 90 which is set. When instructed by A TC, climb to 
flight level 130 at flight level 130 turn right, on flight plan route. Wlllch is 
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Copilot. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Victor Delta which is set on both ADF's on standby. 
Okay are you bappy? 
Yes, I'm happy. 
Okay and before takeoff, checklist to the line, please 
Okay, let's just have a look at this instrument light here. 
See that, the instrument monitoring light. 
.: -. 
Ja. 
What is it on? It shouldn't be on, hey? 
It shouldn't be, but it just shows ..... 
Is it a snag or? r - :'" 
It was on when we got in, I assumed it was a simulator snag. 
(to Captain) We can't reset it - hey. 
And your side skipper? 
It shouldn't actually go off when you switch the light switch onto dim. 
Oh, I see yes. 
No, No, that's dim there. 
Is that the dim? 
Yes, that's the dim position there. 
Jeepe rs, it's he J]uva dim. 
Yes, that's why I'm saying I'm putting it on there, all right so we're going to live .vith this. 
Okay, we're going to live with this. The instrument monitor just tells you the/e's a power Joss 
to your instrument warning. 
Okay, I just want to make sure that we're bappy to live with it okay. 
Okay. 
Before takeoff, checklist says. Flight instruments aligned. 
Aligned, no flags. 
Flaps. 
10, 10, green light. 
All green my side. Stabilizer trim. 
Check stabilize trim what are we 2 and 3 quarter units, switch set, light extinguished. 
Thank you. Galley power is on. APU off. Fuel is set for take off and the heat is off. 
Airconditioning and pressurization is set and auto. Annunciator lights are checked at the back. 
Checked in the front. 
Take off data. 
Reviewed. 
Take off briefing. 
Complete. 
Before take off checklist completed to the line. 
Cabin crew is alerted. 
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.~ -. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
ATC 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
ATC 
Capt. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Tha~k yo~. 
What are we? 239-? Springbok, 239 is ready for take off. 
The wind is 130/5 knots. The visibility at the end of the runway is decreasing and you are cleared 
for take off. 
Thank you. Springbok 239 cleared for takeoff. 
And he said the I,isibility at the end of the runway is decreasing . 
. ,: -~ 
Do you \vant to consider a full thrust takeoff? 
1"'0, we are so light, it won"t matter that much. Are you happy \\ith that? 
Yes, rm happy \\ith that, thank you. 
Okay, do you want some lights? 
Yes all the lights please. 
rm just going to dim this light as well okay? Skipper? Okay, Skipper? Are you h;Jppy with that"? 
Yes, fine. 
Can we have the before takeoff checklist to body gear steering. 
OK below the line says cabin crew. 
Alerted. 
Landing and strobe lights. 
ON. 
I:--;S and transponder. 
Set. 
Pack valves - all off. Ignition - flight start. Standing by body gear steering and ta.ke off clearance. 
And Springbok 239 is standing by take off clearance. 
Springbok 239 is cleared for takeoff. 
Springbok 239 cleared for takeoff. 
OK for body gear. 
Body gear off. 
Disanned. 
Take off clearance. 
Obtained. 
OK before take off checklist completed. 
Thank you we are cleared for takeoff. 
Are we cleared for rolling take-off? 
Set reduce takeoff please. 
Setting. Trust set. 
80 knots. 
Checked. 
VI Rotate 15 degrees. 
Positive climb. 
Gear up please. 
Selected up. 
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Copilot. 
Capt. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
_ Capt. 
ATC 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Copilot. 
ATC. 
Capt. 
ATC 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Indi~ated .airspeed. Would you like ... 
Indicated airspeed? 
Okay, indicated airspeed and drift angle is zero. 
Okay, Climb thrust? 
Climb thrust please. 
Setting. 
1000 feet to go. 
Checks. 
You're clear to go. 
Springbok 239, climb 130. 
Climb level 130. 
Climb thrust set. 
Uh, Okay. 
Captain tum me right to .... 
Roger. 
November Lima. 
1013. 
... 013. 
Still zero drift. 
.: 
Tum right please heading 089. 
089. Then at 130 uh, through 100. 
Springbok 239, 1267 area. 
Roger 1267. 
Area Springbok 239, Good morning. 
Springbok 239 Good morning. Climb level 290. 
Level 290. 
Level 290. (putting it in) 
290 
Level 290 set 
Checks 
I see that 
Flaps five please. 
Okay we're going .... we need to accelerate a little bit more.. Okay would you like vertical 
speed? 
Vertical speed please. 
I'm going to give you about 1 500 feet a minute. 
Okay 
At flight level 130 further right, further right 
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Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Pause 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Cabin 
Capt. 
Cabin. 
Okay we're going to (setting beacons) 
Let me find vector Dt:lta, about 16-1 
16-1 
Both ADF's on 170 approximately 170 at the moment for Victor Delta. 
Okay, thank you 
Give me flap five 
Okay 
Flaps five 
Flaps fine selected and running 
Five five green. 
Flaps up uh flaps. 
Flap one se lected. 
Okay just remember your speed, hey. 
Yes sir, OK. 
It's very light, so it's going like a homesick angel. 
And flaps up please. 
OK let's wait until it gets to one first before we select flaps. 
OK 
Just remember your speed. 250 at this stage is your limiting speed. Until the flaps are at one, 
and then it's 275. OK flaps selected up. 
Mumbling, sees captain move, wants to ask something but doesn't know v,'hat to ask. 
Flaps up. 
And I'm giving you 290, flaps up lights out. 
Would you like PDC or PMS rather. 
P:\IS, PMS. 
Old habits die hard. Auto throttle. 
Auto throttle coming on. 
OK 
Thanks. 
OK we cleared level 290 PMS has been selected. 
OK after take off checklist has been completed. 
Thanks. 
Thank you sir. 
OK Nacelle anti-ice can go off. 
Passenger has had a heart attack. 
Is he in a bad way? 
We need to get on the ground asap. 
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Capt. 
ATC 
Capt. 
ATC 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
,Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
ATC 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Company 
Capt. 
OK. 
(to A TC) J o'burg.Springbok 239 
Springbok 239 go ahead. 
Could we have your latest weather please? 
Roger, at moment RVR 210 temp 5 Q~H1029 and the surface wind is calm. 
Roger thank you. 
(to crew) OK guys what do th}Jflk. here. Doesn't look as though we can' go back to Jo'burg. 
(\0 I don't think so. 
With 210 meters we're just got to get to Durban, I think as quickly as possible. Our alternatives 
are Durban, Bloemfontein. They're about a much of a muchness in differences. \Vnat do you 
think? 
Durban um I think Durban is .... 
There's not a lot of difference. 
Ja, not at this present stage. 
\Vhat about Waterkloof? 
Waterkloof is also misty. 
r - • 
Ja, they had mist at Waterkloof as well. Also reported mist. Johannesburg Springbok 239 could 
we have the Waterkloof \'leather please. 
Standby, I'll get through to them. 
Personally I think the best thing we can do is get through to Durban as quickly as possible. 
Yes as quickly as possible. 
So let's just put up our airspeed a little bit. 
Skipper do you want to just make sure this guys put on oxygen? 
I think that might be a good idea. 
I'll go and speak to them OK? 
I'm going to give you manual climb at 3~0 knots. 
(simultaneously) 3~0 knots, thank you. 
I don't at this stage, think there's much chance of us getting back to Johannesburg. Waterkloof 
was reported misty as well. I think our best bet is to continue as fast as we can to Durban. 
To Durban. 
Roger OK. 
I'm going to talk to our company quickly. 
OK. 
Springbok lo'burg 239. 
Springbok 239. Go ahead. 
Roger. We have a problem on board where a passenger's had a heart attack, at the moment they 
say the Johannesburg weather is deteriorating and is below limits for a landing. 
We're finding out what Waterkloof weather is like but if doesn't look like, urn 
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like it's much good. It looks as though our only alternative is to continue to 
Durbiln which \\e \vill probably be doing and I'll keep you posted. 
Spnngbok 239 Roger. 
But then aren't we CAT 3 rated on this aircraft? 
Ja, CAT 2 is 350 meters. 
350 meters and CAT 3? 
CAT 3200 meters. 
200 meters. 
OK. 
So .. they say 210 meters. 
210 meters. 
I"m just checking this, 03 left, CAT 2 only in Jo'burg, no CAT 3 in Jo'burg. 
?\o, there's no CAT 3 there, ja. 
239 Johannesburg. 
Go ahead. 
Waterkloof weather very much the same as Jan Smuts, Bloem and Durban are CA VOK. Have 
you got that? 
Roger thank you. Just to keep you advised we have uh, a passenger on board who's had a heart 
attack and we need to get him on the ground as soon as possible. We'd like you to possibly 
ad\ise Durban ATC that we have such a situation on board and I'm going to speak to our 
company to make sure that they ha~'e an ambulance waiting for us immediately. I'd jike you to 
ask them to make sure there's no delay for our landing. 
Roger from present position direct DNV - What level would you like? 
Ah, level 290 would be nice thank you and direct DNV. Thank you. Spnngbok 239. 
Direct DNV and level 290, thank you. 
He's cleared us direct which is 2~ Apha. 
2--l Alpha. 
Should be about the same about 16-l, 165 is the heading. 
165. 
And you're still on heading would you like to take INS? 
un, affirm. 
OK NA V you've got NA V green. 
mumbles. 
OK I think use the autopilot if you can to urn ... 
OK I'll use autopilot B. 
Spnngbok Johannesburg Springbok 239. 
Springbok 239 go ahead. 
Roger we're unable to go to Johannesburg and we're going to have to continue to Durban. I'd 
like to please advise Durban that we're going to need an ambulance to meet 
the aircraft and we're also going to require a doctor to meet the aircraft. This 
passenger apparently is in a bad way. 
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(simultaneously) Standby. 
We a!e clil!lbiIl~ through level 290. 
290 Selecting autopilot. 
(simultaneously) Ambulance will be at Durban for Addington hospital. 
OK the autopilot's are out. Are you flying the aeroplane? 
Yes, rm flying the aeroplane. First, we went through level 290. 
OK. 
.: -. 
Skipper do you want to change the cruise schedule on the P:\IS there please. 
Oh, yes OK I'll do that. 
ThaCs why we're urn ... maybe to 8 ..... 8S. 
Oh, ... why not. That's nice and fast. You're got SS in it. 
OK, if you can stick the lot in it now, we']] probably get away with the auto throttle engaged. 
OK we gonna think about this. We wont be able to do a low speed descent. We'll have to do 
a high speed descent. 
Affinll. 
Hopefully by this time they \\ill have advised. Try and stay at level 290. 
290. 
OK your auto throttle is out. 
1\0 the autopilot as well. 
Autopilot is off. I just want to get to level 290 and then I \\ill put the autopilot in again. 
OK, rm going to speak to the cabin cre\..,. in the front. 
(To Cabin crew)- We think we have about another 30 minutes. We have no alternative. We have 
advised them there \\ill be an ambulance and a doctor to get him to .. or preferably a helicopter 
to get him to Addington Hospital. We really have no alternative at all. We can't go anywhere 
else other than to Durban. lo'burg as you're probably aware is closed. 
Skipper you might like to think about the alternative because we 11 be using a lot more fuel now 
flying lower, and flying fast. Vh, I'm not sure I haven't got a SIT A in front of me, but '" so are 
you going to be happy to say with Durban. 
Durban is CAVOK. 
CAVOK. 
So you're happy "'ith Durban? 
And the cabin shouldn't be a problem if you want we want to do a high speed descent. 
Do you want to go higher? 
No that's fine. 
Are you happy to stay here? 
Yip, it's no problem ... it's fine ... thanks. 
I was just thinking about trying to keep the cabin as low as possible. 
We're at about 2800 feet now. 
OK. So there won't be too much of a bump down for him now. (Referring to the sick passenger) 
Autopilot OD. 
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Th:lnk you .. 
Allto throttle 'orr: 
OK arc you h:lppy to fly the aeroplane: 
Do you want me to fly it manually? 
Ko, Ko. Are you happy to continue flying the aeroplane? 
Yes. 
OK. 
Now you've got to select P:-'!S .. 
P~lS - OK I've got it onto P:-'lS. 
That's fine. 
And auto throttle. 
OK, Looks good. OK just watch that fuel situation. We've got a contingency which is an c\1ra 
1580 I think plus we've got an ex1ra 1500 kilos of fuel which probably should uh, Durban's 
CAVOK and from my experience of Durban if it's CAVOK very unlikely that 
it, uh, the only thing that will happen is if they have a serious problem there, 
you know with somebody pranging on the runway or something like that. 
la. 
Ja. 
OK. And then we'll have to think about Bloemfontein. Then the only thing is, that guy's going 
to die. 
The only thing is if we nominate Durban as the alternative you know legally, legally we have to 
have a parallel runway and all that. 
Legally, we are OK we still have Bloemfontein. 
Provided we have enough fuel for Bloemfontein. That's what I was trying to get at. 
Will we have enough fuel for Bloemfontein? 
I don't know, if you give me a SIT A I can just work it out. Have you got a SIT A there? 
Yes. 
Take that one. 
OK thanks. 
We don't have the latest weather on Durban 
CAVOK 
No like the wind direction and ... (pause) 
Are you guys happy. Anybody can think of anything that we should be doing that we're not 
doing? 
Urn 
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Are you happy? 
Yes: I'm liapp)'. _. 
One thing you must remember ... our airspeed is dropping off. 
Our airspeed is dropping off. 
Our auto throttle is in. ·We've got 88 manual cruise. OK there the thrust is coming back. The 
only thing is you must remember we've got to plan this descent properly. 
This uh .:; -. 
Make sure that we don't have to do an overshoot or a go around or something, and also don't 
get too low, because you also don't want to stuff around for 5 minutes while we, uh, at low 
speed. 
OK sir 
3·+0 at a hundred knots. We've also got a nice wind up from behind. We'w got 609610. (609, 
610 re [ers to speed.) 
After about uh, OK. 
So we're moving along at a fair lick. 
The landing bug should be at around about to 12~ knots 
12~. 
2~1 6~ 20~. 
6~. 
Durban's CA YOK hopefully runway 23. 
Skipper did you copy the weather somewhere? Not yet? 
Not yet. We'll get it as soon as we talk to Durban. 
OK. 
We're 163 miles. 
Mmm .. 
Thank you for the SITA 
Thanks. 
OK what I've done is I've talked to ZUR and asked them to get hold of Durban. So they know 
about us and I've also told ATC so you have probably heard, so hopefully everything will go 
without too many hitches. 
Springbok 239 could you continue with Durban 1191. 
1191 Thank you, gcxxl day. 
Durban Springbok 239 Good afternoon. 
Springbok 239 we understand your predicament. flight 
level 290. Are you ready to copy the weather? 
Go ahead please. 
Surface 'Wind is 180 less than 5 knots visibility better than 20 km CAYOK 1020 nosig. 
Roger 1020 Confirm 23 runway in use. 
And temperature please. 
Affirmative runway 23 if you'd like that and temp on the ground as well - 17 degrees. 
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Roger copy 17 degrees and considering our predicament we'd would like a straight in visual right 
hand onto 23 ifpDssible please. 
Roger copied. 
And radar assistance ;vould also be appreciated. 
As soon as we have you identified. 
Thank you Springbok 239. 
OK did you copy that? 
Yes I did, sir thank you. 
OK whenever you're ready, you can do a briefing for runway 23 on Durban. 
OK .. runway .. 1023 .. Temperature .. OK uh, what, 2 .. OK the MSA is. 
OK would you like Durban 1125. 
1125 pkase. 
And just check your distance, hey, and bear that in mind. 
OK we'll start a descent at 105 nautical miles OK. 
Sorry say that again. 
Start commence descent at 105 miles. 
105 miles OK. 
OK we'll be 6000 ... (speed warning comes on) 
Thanks. Sorry. 
They have revived the patient, he seems OK now. 
Thanks Mike. 
OK carl)' on. 
OK we've got to be. 
OK we're climbing now. 
OK the autopilot is in manual. 
In manual? OK. 
OK. 
r' -
I'll set it back on the height, I'll set it back on the height. There. 
Take it right out and get it down and I think we'll ask him for descent. 
The autopilot is off. 
OK just maintain level 290. 
Durban Springbok 239 we request descent at 105 miles please. 
\\-'hen ready descent level 130. 
\\'hen ready 130 Springbok 239. 
OK when you're ready level 130. I think you can fly the aeroplane manually. 
OK I'll fly the aeroplane. 
I'm going to give. 
Yes. 
OK. 
130 set up. 
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Altitude hold. 
You~ve sti.ll go~ t1:~ust on, OK (to capt.) 
OK thanks. 
OK I'll do the briefing for you on the way dO\\l1. It will make it a little bit easier for you. 
Ob\iously the heat is off now - this guy seems to be revived. But I think we mustn't uh, waste 
any time. We'd like to get on the ground as soon as possible. (pause) OK we need 225. 
225. 
Is our minima. Outer market height, 1296 1296 is set here. 
OK 1296. 
225 on the double bugs 1296 on the single bug. 
1296 1296. 
Mah it 1300. 
1300. 
Hang on, watch your altitude you're climbing. I think we should think about going down. 
Commence descc nt. 
We are at 106 miles. 
OK if you can put one of those bugs at 300 feet there, just one of those double bugs. The other 
two on just above 200. OK Alright as you start your descent, I'm going to give you a little bit of 
a rundown on this plate and runway 23. Don't forget your thrust is on and you're starting your 
descent now. 
OK. 
OK we've cleared down level 130 altitude select. 
OK then uh. 
OK. Now you must think about taking that thrust off as well. 
OK would you like vertical speed? 
Vertical speed please. 
OK what have we got here. We've got about 2 000, 2 700 foot per minute s~o.uld be OK. OK 
our inbound if you'd just like to think about this, our in bound is 236. So we're approaching 
from this angle, 236 is in bound that way, Our beading at the moment is 170, The uh, what's 
it, about 50 degrees to the right. OK we join minimum, Minima is 2000 feet, We hope for radar 
vectors. At the moment we're clear down, level 130, 
OK. 
ILS frequency 1103 outer marker 210 210, Set your side, 235 for the middle market, Outer 
market height 1296, Down to a minimum of 225, Our missed approach is to climb on runway 
beading to 3000 feet tben tum left and return to the NDB, Left over tbe sea, 
Over tbe sea. 
OK would you like to review your go around procedure? 
Yes, go around procedure take maximum thrust, I'll ask for maximum then positive climb, gear 
up then flaps 20, 
Roger OK. OK are you bappy? 
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Yes I"m happy sir. 
rnl off tbe air for a sec-ond. Durban traffic Springbok 239. 
239 go ahead. 
Roger are you aware of the situation we have on board v·;ith a passenger with a heart attack. 
That is affirm, and an ambulance is waiting for you to transport the passenger directly to 
Addington Hospital. 
Right, thank you we have be~n. advised by our cabin crew that a n·urse has said that the 
passenger's condition has illlprm-ed, however, we still would like to regard his condition as 
critical. 
Thank you very much, will continue to do our best. 
Springbok 239, we'll talk to you a little bit later. 
Thank you. 
Skipper. 
Yip. 
I"rn just taking Uh 1316 I think it's their frequency engineering in Durban OK. 
OK 230 at 80 miles maybe a little bit low. Just bear that in mind. 
OK sk.ipper 1316 Happy? 
Ja thank. you. 
OK our speeds 124. 
124 checks. 
164. 
204. 
204 go around thrust 1,50. 
OK 1,50. 
MDA 225 height above terrain 200 feet RVR 800 metres we are CA VOK. The wind is from 
the left 180 at 5 knots. 
OK. 
Visibility is good, there should be no problem at all. 
OK speed 300 please. 
OK you want 300 knots OK 300 knots selected. 
OK the wind is back to zero and we've got 400 ground speed 70 miles 
OK. 
20000 feet. 
OK. 
Ab, we're looking OK. 
Do we have speed restrictions? 
Say again. 
Do we have speed restrictions? 
No, none at all. 
Springbok 239 at 50 MDE cleared 5000 feet ONH 1020. 
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Roger at 50 D\lE clear at 5 000 feet Springbok 239. 
At 50 miles in other words at 11 miles clear to 5 000 feet. 
OK can we do thOe descent approach. 
Yes. 
Descent approach checklist please. Would you like autobrakes? 
1\0 
1\0 autobrake, autobrake off - on. Bugs and EPR set set off. 
., 
OK we've got..j. miles to go and then we're clear down to 5000 feet. Altitude is selected green. 
OK it's ... 
and to maintain 130 to to 50 miles 
mumbles (while Cpt talks) affirm 
OK now don't forget that you're on the I:":S maybe you want to turn off a little bit to the left 
to intercept the ILS. He hasn't given us any vectors yet. 
OK ... 50 miles 
OK we're standing by for 50 miles. 
50 miles down to 
OK 5000 feet 
Durban Springbok 239 leaving 130 dO\m to 5 000 fcet request radar vectors if possible. 
Roger we have your radar identified. Could you make your heading 150 please. 
Turning left turning 150 Springbok 239 (To ATC). 
Heading 150 
Roger 
OK radar vectors I'm going to give you the ILS inbound, 236 selected hvice. 
236. 
The ILS frequency 110 I'll give you just now. We've got the outer marker Delta I\ovember on 
both NDB·s. Identified with Romeo Uniform on standby OK would you like heading. 
Heading please. 
Heading selected. Altitude dmm to 5 000 feet. Heading should be 150. 
150. 
OK what speed would you like? 
OK I'd like 250 please. 
250 OK 250 knots. 
Checks thank you. That's through 10 000. 
OK 100 and the lights are on. OK we've got no pitch mode selected at the moment. Either 
vertical speed or indicated air speed whichever you like. 
OK give me indicated air speed please. 
OK you want indicated air speed. It gives us 260 knots odd. 
How much fuel do we have? 
Transition 1020. 
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... 020 
He_says that \ye are OK for diversion to Bloemfontein or to Johannesburg. OK 5900 feet - now. 
Checks 
Set and cross checked. 
Springbok ..... . 
3500 feet set 
That's affirm give me vertical sJl~ed please. 
OK vertical speed. 
500 feet a minute. 
Descent 500 feet a minute OK do you want to decrease your airspeed as well? 
Affirm. r - ~ 
Thank you clear down to 3 500 feet and you are 29 miles. 
Flaps one please. 
OK I think we're a little bit far out for that. If you don't mind if we just go down a little bit 
lower. Because we've got quite a lot, but long way to go otherwise we're just going to stooge 
around here \\ith flap and really low speed. Just keep on your heading and when we get onto 
15 miles we can start putting on flaps. 
OK. 
OK you're coming up to 700 feet to level off. 
OK. 
250 knots is OK too because you've got, you know you can take flaps at this speed. If you're 
doing 360 knots you could think about slowing dO\vn. He's also taking liSon a nice wide right 
band base. (pause) Altitude select green. 
Thank you. Give me indicated air speed please. 
OK we're going to maintain. We should be altitude select green. We're can only maintain one 
pitch mode Wait until you're on 73's then you can select 2 pitch modes. 
Yes of course. 
Springbok . 
... field in sight. Springbok 239. We're clear to 1 500 foot altitude select. 
I see that. 
Give me indicated air speed. 
Indicated air speed. 
Turn right 180. 
Right 180 Springbok 239. 
180 he wants us on. 
Affirm thank you. 
We're 19 miles 3500 feet. Would you like the ILS. 
Affirm. 
ILS is selected and identified. 
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Thank you. 
Checklist. 
1000 foot to level off and we're 17 miles. 
Checks. 
OK I think you should take the thrust off now, and get down to 500 feet and then 've can start 
running the flaps. We don't want to get too high. 
Yes, OK. 
Can I tell them we have the field in sight and we can do the turn on ourselves? 
] don't have the field in sight - do you? 
Well, it's over there. Are you happy? I'm happy. 
OK if you're happy. 
239 Field in sight. (toATC). 
Call tower on finals 1187. 
1187 and final. Would you like the ILS'? 
ILS Please. 
ILS selected. Nav and glide slope armed. 
OK. 
OK I think we can start thinking about getting flaps out. 
Flaps one please. 
Flaps one selected. And I'll give you. what is it. 20~ 
On one green. 
Flaps 5 please. 
Flaps 5 selected 18~. This should be a nice intercept for the ILS. It gives us about ~5 - 50 degree 
intercept. NDB is coming around nicely. Localiser should be coming alive any second. See the 
needle coming around should be 225 got about 10 degree to go. 
OK. 
We've got 55 green. Ten miles. 
And -
Nav green. 
Nav green. 
I'm going to give you runway heading. 
Runway heading. 
Louis Tower Springbok 239 is turning final runway 23. 
Springbok 239 the wind is calm you are cleared to land. 
Surface wind calm Springbok 239 we are cleared to land. We are cleared to land. 
OK Captain Flaps 10 please. 
Ten selected. 
164 knots. 
It's 164 knots. Glide slope is appearing. 
I see that, thank you. Ten - Ten green 
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Ten - Ten green. 
OK_and gear ~OWI1 please. 
Gear selected down. 
Glide slope is alive 2 dots. 
And flaps 20 please. 
20 selected 1-~-l. 
l-l-L 
Down in green. 
Thank you. 
1 dot - glide slope green - go around anned. 
OK flaps 30 - 25 - please. 
25 Selected - and what speed would you like. 
One - it stays the same doesn"t it. 
Plus 5 perhaps. 
OK. 
129 Kts. 
129 Kts. and Vh ... 
And missed approach altitude is set 
3 000 f1. 
Say again. 
Say again please. 
Flap 30. 
Flap 30 is selected and running - 30 - 30 green and landing checklist please. 
And past the outer marker altitude was checked altimeter and instruments are cross checked. 
Middle marker selected. 
SA 239 passed the outer marker. -to ATC. 
Springbok 239 is cleared to land the v.ind is calm. 
Springbok 239 is cleared to land thank YOll. 
500 ft in the slot. 
Thank YOll. 
And YOll may land straight ahead. 
Landing - thank YOll. 
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After start check list complete. OK and ta.\; clearance please. 
Vh, What is our flight number? 
239. 
Vh, SA239. 
Springbok 239 requesting taxi. (To ATC) . 
. , 
Springbok 239 Taxi holding runway 03. 
OK we're taxi holding runway 03 Springbok 239. 
OK require 10 flaps and we have 10 flaps. 
We haye 10 flaps selected. 
Would you do the control check whenever you're ready please? 
OK uh, control check coming up. OK left aileron up, spoiler dO\\ll, central right aileron up 
left spoiler dov.ll. Elevator full deflection forward, central full deflection back and central. 
Are you ready for the rudder? 
OK whenever you're ready. 
OK left rudder full deflection centralized right rudder full deflection. centralized. Control 
check completed. 
OK thank you will you review the card please - whenever you're ready. 
L;h, the card says \\je've got an EPR of 163 set uh, we've got 162 there. Reset it. 
We'll use reduced. 
OK reduced is 1.+7 isn't it. H 7 set four times and our V 1 is 121 Correction 129. and V rotate 
is at 129 as well. V2 1-+6. Target rotation will be 15 degrees set. 
(Over co-pilot) Set here. 
OK flaps required \Vill 10 flaps set. 
STAB trim is 10'12 units there. 
OK we'll need to set that. (pause) 
STAB trim is set. 
OK. 
That's it. 
Thanks. OK after 100 knots this \Vill be a goal orientated take-off. In the event of a decision 
to stop before VI, 129, I'll simultaneously apply full brakes and close the thrust lever. Raise 
the speed brake manually and full reverse thrust symmetrically on each engine, will you 
please assist? 
Any malfunctions after this time we \Vill continue straight ahead to 5 miles. Contact ATC 
soonest, 15 degree right hand turn November Lima, which is set twice and on the right hand 
side. 
Right. 
Climb to 6 430 feet which is set here and further climb once clear to 7 000 feet. OUf 
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departure clearance is a Rhino one Alpha departure, which is straight ahead. Runway heading 
jO 5.5.D'\1~ A right hand turn climbing to flight level 90. ATe will clear us to flight level 130, 
at 130 we are clear on routc. 
That checks. 
And can we have the before takeoff checklist to the line please? 
OK. 
Oh, yes rill happy with the<d~parture clearance. Go ahead please .. 
Ignition lights all out - check. Takeoff bugs and EPR set. Takeoff briefing completed. 
Yes thank you. 
Springbok 239 you are clear for takeoff. The surface windls· calm, your airborne frequency 
12-l,5 
Clear to takeoff Airborne 12-l,5 Springbok 239. 
OK all the lights please and ad\·ise the cabin crew we are clear take-off. 
OK could you say that again please? 
OK all the lights please and could you advise the cabin cre\v please. 
Cabin crew, prepare for take off. OK cabin crew are alerted. 
OK can we have the before takeoff checklist to the body gear steering please. 
OK before takeoff checklist to the body gear steering please. 
OK before takeoff checklist below the line, says cabin crew. 
Alerted. 
un, landing and strobe lights? 
Vh, strobe lights we']] put them on now. 
Ja. 
Put them on OK. 
We don't need the storm lights. 
Ja. 
Ja, and the runway turnoff too, these two here. 
Runway turnoff lights? Right, ja. 
OK, cabin crew is alerted, landing strobe lights? on? 
On. 
INS transponder. 
INS transponder is set onto standby. OK set on. 
Tbank you, pack valves off, ignition flight start, body gear steering. 
Standby. 
To go and take off clearance to go. 
OK we've got takeoff clearance, we're standing by for take-off clearance. 
We do have takeoff clearance. 
And disarm the body gear please. 
Body gear disarmed. 
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Sorry body gear steering. 
OK disarmed. 
And takeoff clearance? 
Takeoff clearance obtained. 
Before takeoff checklist compkted. 
OK standby for takeoff. 
Standing by. 
Set reduce thrust please. 
Setting. Thrust set. 
SO knots. 
Checked. 
VI Rotate through 15 degrees. 
Thank you. 
Positive climb. 
Gear up please. 
Gear up. 
Indicated airspeed and drift angle. 
Indicated airspeed selected. OK we have no drift. 
Thank you. 
03! selected. 
Climb thrust please. 
Springbok 239, you can continue with 12-l5 and climb level 130. 
12-l5 and climbing flight level 130 Springbok 229. 
Setting climb thrust and it is now set. 
Thank you. 
130 Selected. 
Thank you. 
Checks. 
Johannesburg approach Springbok 229 on 12-l5. 
Springbok 239, Good day we have your radar identified. 
Ah, radar identified Springbok 239. 
Vertical speed please 1 500 feet a minute. Right hand turn, 089 please. 
OK 089 right hand turn. 
And we've got PMS there thank you. Vertical speed please 1500 feet a minute. and flap to 
5 please .. 220 - 204 knots please. 
OK flaps five selected and 204 knots. 
Flaps one please 224. 
Flaps one selected. 
22-l knots please. 
22-l knots. 
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Springbok 239 Climb level 290 and contact area 1267. 
Rigl~t 290.126: Springbok 239. 
290 please. 
290 coming up. 
And flaps up please. 290 knots on the airspeed. and turn me right onto ... 
Flaps up. 
Onto 165 please. 
Turning right 165 .... selected 290 on the ... 
That checks, thank you. 
Vertical speed please 1500 foot a minute. 
Ah. vertical speed, 1 500 feet per minute. 
Johannesburg area control Springbok 239 going through level J·e. 
Roger, got your radar identified, call maintaining flight level 290. 
Identified, call maintaining level 290. 
Indicated air speed please. 
OK indicated air speed selected. 
1l1anks can I have P~IS please. Altitude select... 
Standby. 
You've got throttle in. 
Just standby, just kill that PMS light first, maybe let's try and reset it. 
Oh, OK I didn't see that. That's it.. Not a problem, I'll just fly manually. 
OK it is resetted now. It's cleared. selecting P~fS for you. 
Thank you. 
P~IS - it is off-OK. 
INS and the autothrottle out. 
INS selected. 
Urn where we going? 
OK give me a heading back please, give me indicated airspeed and take the PMS off and 
altitude select 290 please. 
OK indicated airspeed 290 selected. 
OK I'm taking away autopilot. OK Indicated airspeed altitude select November Lima set 
both sides. Rather sorry, Victor Delta. 
Are you going to fly with the PMS. OK right that's alright. 
No, it's alright, we'll fly indicated airspeed. 
OK fine. 
(passenger with heart attack) 
OK is he bad. OK thanks very much. OK wIll go contact A TC please and find our what the 
weather is in Durban and the weather Waterkloof. See if there's any improvement there, 
because we can possibly go back. 
Area Springbok 239. 
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239 go ahead. 
\Ve're ,requesting the weather conditions at Smuts now and at Waterkloof. 
Roger, Jan Sn;'uts is RVR of 200 meters temperature 5.5, Q~H 1020. Nosig. (no significallt 
change) low visibility procedures in operation, Standby for Waterkloof weather. 
Standby. 
Doesn't look so good there hey. \'vDal did he say the R VR was? 
eh. he says RVR of 200 and w'e are ha\ing low visibility conditions now. 
., 
Ja. well 200 meters is CAT 3. so we don't have CAT 3 at Jo'burg so let's see ,,,hat 
Waterkloof says. 
Springbok 239 Waterkloof weather. 
Springbok 239 go ahead. 
Waterkloof is very much the S3me, 300 meters due point unknown, temp still 5 degrees. 
Waterkloof, we've got 300 meters uh. wry much the same. 
la. the same. 
Ja. 
Yes, I think we should continue to Durban. Durban when we left was CAVOK. Won't you 
just ask them to confirm that Durban is CAVOK. And Bloem as well. just so we know wh3t 
the story is. 
Springbok 239. 
Just kill the lights - Standard Q\,H. 
Springbok 239. 
Johannesburg 239. 
239 go ahead. 
Please confirm that the weather in Durban is CA VOK and in Bloemfontein as welL 
Standby we'll get back to you. 
1013 your side. 
And the lights, and cabin signs. 
You can put those on thanks. 
OK after takeoff checklist completed. I think we must get. If the weather's OK we should 
continue to Durban. What do you think? 
Ya, I think so as well, because .... ja. Doesn't make any sense to go back. 
Ja. 
Can't go back to Smuts. OK let's wait and see if the Durban weather if OK, otherwise we 
must go to Bloem. Durban weather's OK would you give them a short ZUR. And then just 
tell them, and ask them to please advise Durban that we've got a problem on board, and that 
we're going to need assistance on the ground. Get a doctor and an ambulance to meet the 
aircraft. And I think also if you can tell ATe. uh, once we decide where we're going to go. 
OK one to go. 
Thanks. And they can tell Durban what's happening so they have the minimum of delays. I 
think we should get there as quickly as possible if this guy's gonna die on us. 
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Alright. Ja we're still standillg by the weather in Durban. 
.Ja we.ll1e(s \~_ajt and see what happens. But in the meantime let's just continue to Durban. 
OK. 
OK I'm going to speed up a little bit. Can we get an .88 cruise please. 
Springbok 239 Johannesburg. 
239, go ahead please. 
Durban is CA VOK, 1020,·:S4rface wind is calm runway 23 in usc and Bloemfontein is 
CAVOK as well. 
Thank you, copy. 
OK so let's. Are you happy to continue to Durban? 
Oh yes, the weather is CAVOK and ... runway 23 and the wind is calm. 
OK. Are you happy? 
Yes thank you skipper yip. 
OK the best that we can do is go as fast as possible and do an .S8 cruise. Stay at 290 so we 
don't get the cabin up to high. 
OK. 
To affect this guy in the back. If you could contact ZUR please and ask ATC also if they 
can talk to the guys in Durban and ask them no delay. 
OK. 
Tell them what the predicament is. Just tell ATC that we've got a sick passenger and we're 
going to continue to Durban. If they could just get things sorted out for us. 
Jo'burg Springbok 239. 
Springbok 239 go ahead. 
We do have a sick passenger on board and would you please inform Durban control that we 
should not have any delays. This passenger is in a very critical position. 
Roger, would you like direct routing to Durban at flight level 290 which is available. 
Yes, we'll take direct routing to Durban and we will stay at level 290. Spllilgbok 239. 
Roger, keep level 290 direct Delta November Victor. And we wm advise Durban. 
Routing direct Delta November Victor. Thank you bye-bye sir. 
OK INS direct to Durban. 
OK. 
Thanks. 
OK ZUR is on no 3. Springbok 239. 
Springbok 239 go ahead. 
Springbok 239 We do have a sick passenger on board who's having a heart attack. We're 
continuing to Durban because of the weather and we request that you ... our people in 
Durban to organize medical people to be on standby by the time that we get there. 
OK we'll do that then, Springbok 239 we'll sort it out. 
Thank you. OK I have advised ZUR. 
OK thanks very much. 
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OK can I have that after takeoff card please. 
~an a!lybo?y think of anything? 
Thank you very much. 
That we haven·t ..... Um, are you happy with what we're doing? 
Oh, yes, rm happy. rm happy \\;t11 that. 
Alright Jets ..... 
Skipper, according to the SIJ f:~ should have enough fuel for the alte.mate to Bloemfontein 
or Jo'burg. 
As soon as we talk, or hand it over to Durban rather, can you get the weather from them :. 
please. 
OK. 
And then tell them, make sure that they know what's happening. 
Right. 
And ask them for radar vectors. With a minimum delay I think. If it's CA YOK I think we 
should try for runway for 23. 
Alright. 
If you wouldn't mind. 
5,5, Vh ... it's nine one. 
Thanks for the landing card. 
Thank you. 
OK he's cheated, he knows what the weather is already. 
OK we have YREF is 12·1. 
OK 12-1-. 
12-1-. 
16-1-. 
16-1-. 
20-1-. 
2·0--1-. 
OK we're going to set up for runway 23. 
Runway 23 - Thanks. 
Minima is 225, outer marker height is 129, 1296, 225, Set here. OK It's 236 inbound. The . 
frequency is 1103 which is the same as 03 left. Initial approach altitude 2000 feet outer 
marker at 1296 feet. Our minimum is 225 feet and our missed approach, our missed approach 
procedure is climb on runway heading to 3000 feet. 
At 3000 we turn left and return to Delta November NDB. If we have to go round 111 call 
go around thrust, go around altitude, flaps 20, positive climb, gear selected up. 
OK right. 
OK. 
Vb, that checks. 
Thanks. 
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OK rYe captured the DME my side and select Durban, says we routing direct. 
Eut Durban Y<.J.ur side 1125. 
OK. 
Springbok 239 Johannesburg area. 
239 go ahead please. 
Springbok 239 Durban advises .us that YOll can expect a visual approach, runway 23 the 
surface wind is calm and they are making you number one for landing. 
OK we're ex-pecting 23 surface wind calm, and thank you. 
OK I"m going to put. We've got, uh ... Grayton, just for interest sake and the outer marker 
Delta November on standby. 
Alright. 
I"m going to go to 1125 my side - OK we're 159 miles. 
Right, OK. 
OK I think we can start our descent at 90 miles. 
Right. 
Where Skipper? \Vhere do you want to start the descent 
90 miles. 
OK. 
Should we be '\\indgat' and say 55? Springbok 239, could you continue with Durban on 
119,9. 
119 uh, 9 Springbok 239 ThankS bye now, 
Springbok 239 Good morning are you maintaining flight level 290? 
We are maintaining 290, and just to confinn tbat you are aware of our request for a direct 
routing since we have a sick passenger on board. 
That is affinn direct Delta November Victor for the time being \vhen you have the field in 
sight, uh you can have a visual approach runway 23. And when ready descent level 130. 
We're expecting vlsual approach runway 23, Call field visual and cleared when ready down 
to 130, 
Springbok 239, 
OK, if you wouldn't mind calling Durban traffic on 1316 and just advlse them, make sure, 
1316. 
That they know that urn our passenger, that we got our sick passenger on board, and that 
hopefully they got the message and that they've got an ambulance and a doctor waiting for 
us. 
Right. 
Thanks. 
Durban traffic Springbok 239. 
Springbok 239 Go ahead. 
We just want to con finn that you are aware of our sick passenger on board and that you have 
organized some medical assistance on standby for us when you land. 
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Roger, we have an ambulance over here. \Ve are aware of the predicament and uh, a doctor 
,-,:ill be waiting with the ambubnce. 
Thank you vel)' much. 
OK just bear in mind that your D:'v!E is on a hold at Jo'burg. 
OK right how to deselect this. 
All you do is just put it on operate and just reseIect 1125. There you go. 
Great. 
You know what we could have done is ask if there wasn't another nurse on board just to 
confirm that it is a heart attack. Maybe this guys just got a bit of sooibrand. heartburn. 
Mm. OK wouldn't you just. 
That's ... 
Just give them a shout and ask the chief how this guy looks in the back. Thanks vel)' much. 
OK. 
Just give them a shout on 1-1, they should be able to ask them to come up and we can have 
a chat to them. make sure this guys - what his condition is. 
OK can I just get to the phone there. 
Just phone him on 1-1. 
Here's the steward. 
OK we just wanted to confirm that perhaps there would be a nurse in the back, maybe to see 
to the sick passenger. 
Well, it really is a heart attack .... 
OK we're setting direct and there'll be an ambulance. 
Thanks. 
Springbok 239. 
Springbok 239, thanks. 
Well, there goes our bonus hey! Any snags your side Skipper, that we need to report? 
Urn ... 
An)1hing your side? 
No there's nothing on my side. 
OK there's only that no. 2 engine EGT indicator. They probably need to fix up set that max 
indicator needle, Skipper, can I select engineering on Number 3, 3 - I'll speak to them sort 
of half-way through the descent. Thanks. 
Sure. 
I think we must also remember they've asked for a wheelchair a little earlier on. now, now, 
when we speak to them later on, ask them for a wheelchair. 
Later on OK. 
Ja. 
I'll do it now. Traffic Springbok 239. 
Springbok 239 go ahead. 
We also need a wheelchair for our flight as well. 
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OK we copied that and we'l! see you on the ground. 
OK thanks. 
Wouldn't you mind having a chat to the steward again and asking him please to make sure 
that they make an announcement to the passengers that they all sit down and wait until they 
clear this guy off. And then everybody can just, so everybody knows they've got a sick 
passenger on board, and then they can disembark after that, if you wouldn't mind. 
OK, Oh, yes please could yo,u just make sure that evel)·body stays on board until the sick 
passenger is taken off first. 
OK. 
Just make an announcement to the passengers to sit dO\m first. Thank you. 
Thank you. ('" - ~ 
OK I'm going to go a little beyond 90 miles because I'm going to 'klap' it on the descent. 
Otherwise we going to be too low. 
OK. 
I'll probably end up by being too high and have to go around. 
Springbok 239 could you ad\ise me when you are going to commence your descent, what 
distance. 
When do you want to commence descent? 
Take it at 80 miles. 
We are now at 86 miles, we']] start our descent at 80 miles, Springbok 239. 
Roger copied. 
OK 80 miles go down. 
OK, OK Springbok 239 commencing descent level 130. 
Roger Springbok 239. 
OK is there anything we haven't done? Are you happy? 
Ja happy set up approach checks. 
Right ''ie can do that when we get to about 140 or so. 
OK. 
Won't you ask hiID for radar vectors please? 
Durban Springbok 239. 
Springbok 239 go ahead. 
Requesting radar vectors. 
Roger 50 miles turn left heading 150 radar vectors. 
At 50 miles we'll turn left beading 150 radar vectors. Springbok 239. OK we'll turn left at 150 
at 50 miles. 
OK skipper we've got enougb fuel for our diversion. 
Thanks. 
And, um, I just want to speak to engineering on No.3 OK 
OK. 
I'm off the air. 
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(Durban engineering) 
O.K now, if~ ~oing as I llOped it would. Let's see if we can help it on. 
Thank you rm finished and engineering will standby with GPU. 
Uh, thank you. 
Please just confirm that transition level there, is it? 
OK I'll confirm just now. OK 50 miles. 
OK left 150 please will you ~~t..me up for runway 23 please. With the. ILS. 
236 OK uh, just a minute. 
OK no problem. 
Ah, 236, OK 236 set there. 
Thank you. 
Transition altitude is 5500 
OK and the level, what's that ah. 
Transition level. OK. ATC will give us. 
OK I just wanted to confiml. Sure thanks. 
Sure, one to go alt SEL green. 
And Springbok 239. Further descent down to 5000 feet QNH 1020. 
Descent 5000 feet 1020 Springbok 239. 
OK rve selected 5000 feet altitude. 
OK. OK descent approach checklist checks. 
Thank you. 
OK. 180 do you want any auto brakes? 
No thank you. 
OK rve got that ..... OK descent approach checklist. 
OK descent approach checklist says auto brakes. 
Off. 
Landing lights. 
Uh, landing lights, we'll just switch them on below 10000 feet. 
You can switch them no now. 
All of them or just inboard 
Inboards? 
Yes, just the inboards. OK ja, OK that's the .... 
Landing lights, OK landing data? 
Landing data bugs and EPR set. Our V Ref is still OK 124. 
124 ja checks. OK radio altimeters. 
Radio altimeters are set. 
Selea!. 
Vb Seleal ub, off. 
Thank you, fuel set for landing. The beats off. Pressurization is set. Annunciator lights and 
circuit breakers. 
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OK check. 
Check~J tl1~ back and descent approach checklist to the line. 
Thank you. (pause) 
Indicated airspeed please. 
Indicated air speed selected. (pause) 
Would you like to fly the aeroplane? 
Oh, well I can fly it if you wi}n~ me to. 
Want to fly it, OK whenever you're ready. Just have a look around. Heading 150 for 
intercepting the ILS. Are you happy? 
Alright I'm happy. 
Alright you've got control. 
Springbok 239 dt.'scent 2500 fet.'t. 
I'll take the radio. Clear down 2500 fed Springbok 239. Clear down to 2500 ft.'et. 
OK. 
\Ve have got 236 selected twice. The I~S is I'm going to sekct your side. 
Alright, thanks and uh, 1020 we're through 
1020 thank you. And the I);S going my side. Springbok 239 has the field in sight. 
Roger Springbok 239. If you could call tower 1187 passing 3000 feet for visual approach 
runway 23. 
Through 3000 feet 1187 Springbok 239. OK we're going quite fast at the moment 22 miles, 
we're doing OK. I think you continue down to 2500 you should be OK. Once you get there 
probably start decelerating a little bit. 
Right. 
Skipper we're standing by for the rest of the list. 
OK. 
Descent approach checklist below the line says altimeters. 
Set and cross checked. 
Un ... checklist. 
500 foot so level off. 
Checks. 
ILS corning alive both sides. 
Thanks. Durban tower Springbok 239, good afternoon. Out of 3000 foot and we're 20 miles 
heading 150. 
Roger - final approach runway 23. 
Final 23, Springbok 239. OK I'm turning right onto 180. 
OK turning 180. 
And the cabin is on the ground skipper, for the 'Oakie'. 
OK thank you. We're clear down to 1500 hundred foot which is down to circuit. I'm going 
to give you a speed of about 250 knots now. OK I'm going to give you ILS 
OK you can select ILS. 
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NAY and glide slope armed. 
-Thanks. . 
Sorry, would you like? 
No tha(s alright. 
OK. And you've got 70D feet to level off 18 miles and you're looking good. ILS is identified. 
1l1ank you. 
We're about 8 degrees off·the localizer so it should be coming in quite soon. And thaCs 
circuit. Altitude select green and maintain 1500 feet. 
That checks. 
1 think you can start running your speed dO\\l1 so we can get the flaps out. 
Alright, yes. 
OK could we select flaps, flap one please. 
One selected and running 20-+. 
OK 20-+ thank you. 
~ - ~ 
I gave you duff gen then, we've got about 8 degrees to go now for the localizer to come in. 
Right. 
We've got 1-1 ,vith the green. Nay green. Runway heading . 
Give me flap five please. 
Flaps. 
18-+. 
IS-I-. Watch your speed, your'flaps not there yet. 
Yes, flap 5, . 
OK flap 5 is running and your speed should be a minimum of 184 knots. OK that looks OK 
nearly 5 flap now. 5-5 green. 
Thank you. OK flap 10 speed 164. 
164 selected - we've got 10 - 10 green. We are clear to land. 
OK flap 20. 
OK 20 flaps selected and running. 144 knots. 20 - 20 green. (pause) Glide slope is alive. 
Checked. 
Thanks. 
Give me gear down please. 
Gear selected down. 1 % dots. 
Thank you. 
DO\m and green, 
OK. 
1 dot. 
OK. Right flaps 25. 
)-D. 
Speed 129 knots. 
129 knots. 
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Thank you. 
25 - 25 gre,en. Can I do the Janding checklist to the flaps. 
Yes landing checklist to the flaps please. 
(Checklist) 
Glide slope is green, go around armed missed approach altitude set. 
Thank you. OK landing flap please. 
Outer marker altitude checJ.;esJ. Altitude instruments c~oss-checked. FJaps 30 - 30 green. 
30 - 30 green my side. Hydraulics normal, landing checklist completed. 
And we are clear to land. 
\Vhat is that surface wind again. 
Calm. 500 feet in the slot. 
1l1ank you. 
100 feet to minima. 
And land straight ahead. 
100 feet 50, 30, 20,100 knots 90 knots, SO knots, 70 knots, 60 knots. 
And I'm giving you body gear. 
Body gear than ks. 
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Copilot. 
You have set up your speeds yet? 
Negative. 
Negative, Negative. Captain right are you ready for the speeds? 
Affimlative 1100 fuel weight. 
1100 fuel weight affirm. 
OK that's fine. 
OK thanks it's Durban 05 intersection Bravo 16 slats 8 flaps, giving us a VITO of 219. V4 1S9. 
89. 
\'3 151. 
V3 15I. 
and V2 139. 
V2 is 139. 
And a V 1 and rot~lIe of 133. 
133. 
30.7 in the window 43 in the box parameters 4 and4 they being obstacle. 
Obstacle OK. 
OK, OK and are you ready to copy engine failure procedures? (to engineer) 
Yes. I'm ready. 
OK engine failure procedure is maintain runway heading, level off at 1100 feet A\.-ISL. 
Set both sides. 
Before accelerating climb to MSA contact ATC as soon as possible. 
OK and MSA out that way, let's say seawards is 2000 and then 4600 down to the South East 
OK. 
OK ja, let's put it on this. 
And as long as we can keep in sight 5 miles. We can maintain circuit altitude._Come back here 
for a visual approach auto 05.25 flap landing. 
OK and got the flex of 104.7 with a max of 110.1 
OK. 
I've written it on the card. 
OK, thank you. 
If we have an engine failure after the turn. 
Sorry Captain. 
Off 0.5. 
Yes. 
OK. 
Bring in the charts. 
OK uh, I think a turn seawards immediately would be a good idea if there's any weather or 
terrain clearance problem. 
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OK. 
Y?u're $etti~g the r:td:tr terr:tin ch:trt. 
Yip. I don't think that's a b:td idea. I see you've got the lo'burg plates out here already. 
I've got lo'burg plates out there Captain. I've got the 05 plates just to take out. 
That's fine. OK could you read the card please. 
Alright the ull card Durban 05 intersection brave 8 fl:tp 16 slats for a weight of 128 tons VITO 
219. 
219. 
V4-189. 
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V3-151. 
51. 
V2-139. 
39. 
V rotate and V 1 both at 133. 
33. 
That's 43 in the box for safe pitch of 13,7. 
Set. 
Th:tnk you. 
Thank you and the trim sheet has been we happy \,1th that? 
J a roger. 
Single, engine gross is 190. 
la. 
Not a problem for immediate 25 flap if required. 
Thank yOll. Alright are we ready? Doors are closed and the trim sheet has been. Hello grollnd. 
May I req lles t start? 
la if you could use that - thanks. 
Goodday Captain, go ahead. 
OK I see you have the COPCO connected - can you give us some air? 
You have full air there Captain. At the moment it's delivering full amount. 
Thank's very much and for YOllr information we'd like to start both engines in the bay. And, 
uh then we'll disconnect both the GPU and the COPCO and uh, push back, Is that OK? 
That's fine with us. We'll keep clear of number 2 engine when you start, 
Right, well just get start clearance and wel1 be back with you shortly 
Standing by. 
Thanks for the start. 
Durban Springbok 500. - (receh'es clearance from control tower) 
Springbok 500. Gear start up in the bay. Thanks. OK 
I just want to call Blossom quickly. 
OK. 
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Copilot. 
Blossom - cabin sterile. Blossom say's the cabin is sterile. 
R~ght tl~anks. 
OK there might be a couple of thunderstorms en route. Just check \\ith us before starting your 
tea and coffee service. Otherwise .... go ahead ... OK clear for start checklist please. 
OK clear for start checklist is INS mode. 
NAV. 
Beacon lights. 
On. 
Window heat. 
On and low. 
Take off data and i\I\IO. 
Checked and set. 
Circuit breakers. 
Checked. 
Fuel pumps. 
ON. 
Air bleed pressure. 
45 PSI. 
Doors and windows. 
Closed. 
Closed and locked. 
Closed and locked my side. Before start checklist completed. 
Thanks. OK ground I'm going to leave the parking brake set. Unless you'd like me to 
disconnect DOW. 
Vb, you can leave the parking brakes set. 
OK the parking brake is set we have not got push back clearance yet. We'd like to start 
engines 1 and 2 now. We're clear No. 1. 
Clear number one. 
Thanks starting No.1 at time 0450 that's 10 minutes early due to the Durban efficiency. 
Thanks very much. 
OK we've read the checklist up to clear to start bye? 
Ja. 
Air bleed pressure we've got still. 
Checked. 
OK. 
So we can do a normal start. 
... start No. 1. 
OK. 
Time 50 for us. 
Staying No. 1. Start valve open. 
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1':2. Would you take that thanks. 
llJank )~ou. 
With this pressure she'll spool up very quickly. 
OK I can hear the COPCO working very hard. 
Nl Turning. 
Thanks. Fifteen, EGT. 
OK it's fourteen seconds. 
You ha\'e a light up. 
Thanks. 
Positive oil pressure. 
Thank you. Nl 40-5. 
Start valve closed. 
5H 
5-13 checks. 
Yip. 
Engine one parameter is normal. Generator on line 
Clear two. 
Clear 1\0. 2. 
Start two start 2 please. 
OK starting No.2 Start valve open. 
Thanks N2. 
Nl turning. 
Thanks 15 EGT. 
You have a light up. 
Thanks N1. 
Positive Oil pressure. 
405. 
Start valve close. 
547. 
547 checks. 
Checks. 
Engine 2 parameters normal. 
Thanks. 
Electrical checks completed. 
Thank you electrical checks completed.OK right. 
OK shall we uh ... 
Let's just disconnect the external. 
Shall we complete this checklist or should we disconnect first? 
OK fine (in between). After first engine start, request removal, OK we're doing both engines 
here. Proceed as per normal engine start, which we did. After engine 1 and 2 start, request 
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Capt. 
removal of extemal pneumatic power. 
Shall I do that 11.9w? OK ground, you can remove the COPCO now, thanks very much. 
Removing the COPCO. 
OK for ex1emal power and electrical. 
Right we'll remove it. 
OK thanks. Alright, let's complete: that checklist then. External power and COPCO removed. 
OK cross bleed valve, it says auto and nornlal. Cross bleed var.e to auto and normal. Engine 
1 and 2 bleed var.·es to auto. Engine 1 and 2 bleed vah'es are in auto position. Proceed as ~or 
normal after start procedures. That's the end of the external pneumatic power checklist. 
Pneumatic power checklist. 
Ex1ernal power external electrical power. 
External engine start \\ith external electrical power. Both engines are started with external 
electrical power, which we had. Proceed as for nornlal engine start procedures. After engine 
1 and 2 engine parameters check. 
Checked. 
Generators 1 and 2 were checked. Engine sorry generators 1 and 2 on. Both on line after being 
checked. Checked gens 1 and 2 off light extinguished. Check ex1ernal power light on 
extinguished, which was correct. Check both transfer 1 and 2 Mrs crossline which they are. 
Request removal of external electrical power. 
Was done. 
Proceed as for normal after eng'ine start procedures. That's the end of the checklist. 
That's great. 
Thanks. 
OK the after start uh, no let's get push back first, hey. OK Ground uh, we're ready for push 
back can I release the park brake? 
Let's get clearance please. 
Clear to release the parking brake. 
Thanks, just standby on the push back. 
Standing by. 
Durban Springbok 500 requesting push back. 
Springbok 500 clear to push back runway 05. 
Thank you push back 05 and intersection Bravo. 
Ground you can push us back to face South for runway 05. 
OK pushing you back. 
Thanks. 
OK push back is complete, will you please park the brake. 
OK the parking brake is set. You can remove the tug towbar and the headset pin, thanks for 
your help. 
See you on the right hand side, enjoy your flight. 
Ta, no guarantees there. 
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Eng. 
Copilot. 
I've got a tug towbar headset and pin and flags. 
Thanks afterS1art checklist please. 
OK after start checkJist please. 
OK after start checklist is. Let me just put on my light. ... pitch trim. 
On. 
Ignition start. 
Start abort. 
Anti ice. 
Closed off reset. 
Fuel levers. 
Locked. 
Electrical power and load shed. 
Checked and set. 
Hyd raulics. 
Checked. 
Brake fans. 
Off. 
AP master switch. 
Off. 
APU bleed and pack valves. 
Closed and auto. 
Ground equipment. 
Removed clear my side. 
Removed clear my side. Checked and after start checklist completed. 
Thanks. I'll kick off jf you can clearance please. 
Alright Captain. Durban Springbok 500 Taxi standing by departure clearance. 
Springbok 500. Clear to taxi to the holding point. Runway 05. You cleared Durban to 
Johannesburg. After takeoff 05 left. Correction maintain runway heading to 3000 feet and turn 
left beading 3-t0. Climb to maintain level 60 and contact approach 119.1 passing 2000 
feet.Springbok 500. (copilot reads back the clearance) 
OK what have we got we've got 340 set 60 and 119 standing by. 
660 set. Thanks cbecks. 
All clear my side. Thanks we need 8 flap you can set it please. 
OK 8 flaps. Selecting and running. OK 8 flaps, 16 stats, Kruger blue you bave. 
Thanks departure cbecks please. 
OK. 
OK you ready you're bappy witb the droop. 
10 droop checks. 
Control checks ailerons to the left, left spoiler, left aileron up, right aileron down zero to the 
right, rigbt spoiler and aileron up. left aileron down on zero. Elevators down, full deflection 
and zero elevators up. full deflection, zero Ready for the rudders? 
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Yes please. 
Le.ft rudder \oI1;)ng in. Full deflection zero right rudder, full deflection - zero right speed and 
attitude is set for runway 05 intersection bravo. 43 in the box. We require 1O-i.7 for the flex. 
I see 10-i.2. 
That's to come. 
Thank you. 
S flaps slats \"ith the Kruger B.llfe. We have 2 1/-i units set. Ground spoiler armed, take off 
con figu ration tested. Your briefing. 
Thanks very much urn just before I start, bear in mind it's obstacle limited. It is VMC go uh, 
terrain, we']] do visual terrain avoidance. 
OK. 
We've discussed the contingency after the after the turn heading towards Jo'burg. We']] just 
tu rn back to the sea. 
Back to the sea Roger Captain. 
OK gentlemen after 100 knots this will be a goal orientated takeoff, however in the event of 
a decision to stop before Vl which is 133 I'll close the thrust levers apply ma:-.imum reverse 
th rust. 
I'll monitor the ground spoilers and the auto brakes. 
Thanks. The ATC procedure is a non-standard urn, off runway 05. Maintain runway heading 
to 3000 feet then tum left heading 3-i0 got it in the course windows for reference. 
Checks Captain. 
Climb and maintain level 60 - and contact approach 1191 passing 2000 feet. That's set standby. 
That checks. 
And no squawk given, we'll use 2000. Engine failure procedure we have reviewed. It \,ill be 
visual back here, 25 flap landing. 
Confirm. 
Thanks Captain. 
Thanks departure check list please to the line. 
Departure checklist. Flight instruments. 
No flags. 
Flaps and stats. 
Sorry Captain, we've just lost the fligbt director again. 
OK thanks. 
H .... Oh no. OK tbanks could we start again please tbanks. 
OK. 
Departure cbecklist fligbt instruments. OK 
No flags. 
Flaps and stats. 
8 flaps 16 flats, \\itb the Kruger Blue. 
Flight controls. 
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Copilot. 
Checked. 
St~lbilizc:r triol. 
2 units nose up set. 
Takeoff data. 
Checked and set. 
Ground spoikrs. 
Armed. 
Take off con fig. 
Tested. 
Fuel is set for takeoff it's to the line. 
Thank you. 
Thanks Ag. won't you tell them we're ready for.. .. 
Ready for departure. 
Ready I mean. 
Durban Springbok 500 ready. 
Springbok 500 you're cleared takeoff runway OS, the wind is OlD at 5 knots. 
Clear takeoff 05 Springbok 500. OK. 
I see nothing on the approach. Ckar takeoff I'm off the brakes. 
OK thanks. 
The departure checks below the line please. 
Thank you. 
We're clear for departure. Cabin crew please take up your seats. 
Thanks, the checklist please. 
Departure checklist below the line is, cabin crew is seated, brake fans off takeoff briefing. 
Complete. 
Pacs going off, probe heats on, lights and ignition on, auto brakes. 
Max. 
Master warning. 
Recall takeoff inhibit. 
Just standing by the pacs closing 
Roger. 
Clear your side. 
Affirm Captain it's clear my side. 
Thanks and my side. 
OK Captain the wind is from the left for the evacuation. 
Thanks OK bear that in mind, 010 very much from the left OK evacuation nose pointing left, 
Thanks. 
The pacs are closed Nl. 
Checked. 
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Tr;JllSponder. 
0:\. 
Um, the departure checklist completed. 
TIlank you. 
Thank you. OK gents standby take off please. 
Standing by. 
Standby. 
Stabilizing. They're stable set flex thrust please. 
Setting flex thrust. 
1\'1 SRS. 
TIlank you. 
Flex thrust set. 
Thanks. 
100 knots. 
Checks. 
VI. Rot;Jte. Positive rate of climb. 
Gear up please. 
OK gear clean. 
Thanks Cruise thrust please. 
OK cruise thrust selecting. 
Setting cruise thrust. 
Selecting 1190l. 
Thanks. 
Cruise thrust is set. 
Thanks. 
Durban approach Springbok 500, airborne 05. 
Springbok 500 good morning you are identified 3 nautical miles North of 
the field proceed as cleared. OK. 
I'll just keep 8 flap until we've completed the turn. 
Roger OK Approaching 3000 feet left beading 340 Captain. 
Thanks check Heading 340 now thanks. 
340 selecting. 
And if you can give us 0 to 3 and ... 
OK. 
That's Warden isn't it. 
Affirm Warden is 3. 
Cross track error. 
A. .. zero 3 roger and 37 Ab, 34 right. 
Ta, thanks VITO please. 
OK VITO selecting VITO you have. 
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Capt. 
Th;1nks Fl,;ps up please. 
Speed c!leck~. 
Selecting and fUnwRy. 
Thanks. 
Springbok 500 on passing ·-!OOO feet you can turn right to Warden and climb 
to and m;1intain level 310. 
Slats up please. 
Speed checks selecting and running. Springbok 500 passing 4000 feet right direct \Vhiskcy 
Delta Victor - Climb level 310 Springbok 500 
And it it's running 300 knots please. 
Roger Captain 310 it is. 
310 I see. 
Roger 300 knots and ifs running and .... 
Thanks a lot. Thal's 4000 feet we can go zero to three please Insert 
OK. 
I~S NA V this side. 
Thank you. 
Zero three. 
Cnstrap them please. 
Thank you. 
OK insert Zero left. 
Select i\AV one please. 
OK NA V selecting. 
NAV green. 
NA V green checks. 
Distance and time there please. 
Thank you. 
OK slats are up OK. 
I just going to cancel SLS selecting lAS. 
Amber. 
And cancelling lAS. 
Pitch Amber coming through 250 set standard. 
1013 my side. 
Set my side. 
Selecting lAS. 
lAS Amber. 
And selecting auto pilot number 1 and selecting lAS again. 
OK and command lAS amber. 
Thank you. 
Airborne time there, have you got it? 
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Airborne time ,vas, uh 92. Sorry what am I saying. 92, 02. 
--Five min utes ago. 
Five zero two OK 10, 2,5 minutes before schedule. 
10,2, so that's ... 
50 So that 0550 five minutes before schedule. 
05 50 is that right. 
Affirm. 
So 750. It's 05 50. 
750 local thanks a lot. That including approach. 
OK for the approach make it about 55. 
OK 55 chocks. 
Chocks OK. 
I"ll talk to the passengers in a minute. 
OK Captain. 
Meantime let's lea\'e November Hotel there and Juliet Sierra standing by looks good 
OK. 
And I'll give you zero to 2 for the FIR boundal)'. IVORI hey, 
OK thanks, and the code is checked, 
Thanks a lot. I just realized I missed that out on the ... in the pretlight panel scan. 
In the pre-flight... OK. 
You know, because of the configuration of the radar Iwent straight from there to there instead 
of going across there. OK I'm just cancelling lAS for a second. 
OK pitch Amber. 
Thanks. 
OK I'm going to select Whiskey Delta Victor my side Captain. 
Ab, yes please I'm selecting lAS my side. 
OK IAS Amber. 
Ta. 
11-l8. 
As soon as we get it in range I'll take it my side and if you could take Heidelberg your side. 
Roger Captain. OK I've got it pointing and ... no coding as yet. 
Thanks. 
It takes a bit of time that coding. 
Ja, no coding as yet. 
Coming up level 100 after take off checklist completed. 
Thank you. 
Thank you 100 checked. 
And your ticket. 
Thank you. 
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OK coding checks Captain needle's pointing. 
Ta. 
Like it your side now? 
You know it"s quite an interesting point this nomlal procedures change uh, someone suggested 
the other day that as I am on I!':"S NAV \',ith uh, \\ith INS selected on my HSI that, that 
should be it is the active radio side and you should be doing the radio monitoring. 
Radio monitoring. 
You know on the route we never do it that way. 
~Im .... 
The pilot flying always uses 11'+8. I think it's probably just a habit we got into on the Durban 
sector. You see what I mean? 
la, no I see. 
Strictly speaking you should sit with it there. 
Ja. 
You·re in charge of radio n;wigation. I"m monitoring 1\"S na\igation. 
I:\S. ja. 
Do you buy that? 
Yes, Captain. 
You know that's something we've got to think about hey for the nO.1 revision. 
Ja. 
Or put it this way sorry, it"s no change to the normal procedures. It's the way we fly the 
Durban section. 
Ja. Well now that, that new normal procedure is on my computer in MsWord 6 it's going to 
be a sinch from now on. 
Ja. 
I"ve just got Bucks on the fourth floor to virtually agree on reformatting the FIT manual which 
is in Ventura Publisher. 1 don't know if you know how thick the FIT manu~l.is. 
No. 
It's like that and it's fine print. 
And is he going to do it? 
Well, he hasn't committed himself yet, but I might just get him to do it and put it into 
MSWord, or Word Perfect. Probably MSWord I guess. OK I'm just going -no I'll wait for 50 
miles and uh, for the hand over and then I'll talk to the pacs. 
OK Captain. 
Have you got a plate for 03 left Johannesburg? 
Right 111 set it to you just now. 
Ta. thanks. 
Shall we, ... shall we make a card for 03 right and hope for a sidestep 03 left? 
Sidesteps, sidesteps OK. 
OK fine. 
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Eng. 
And I'll brief for an ILS 03 right and a visual 03 left. 
That's uh, a Durban chart. 
You know they'i.;e changed these performance manuals, but \ve haven't had any notification 
abou t it. 
Ko, but have they changed them in the aeroplane yet? 
Yes. 
Yes. ja they have. 
r was looking at it yesterday. I can work it out for myself, but it's ah. 
It's very bad you knO\v. 
So the first officer actually asked me what's going on. So I had to explain it to him, but in my 
own interpretations. 
Is there no briefing notice on the files? 
Ko. 
Because they've prepared it and I think the intention was to get a briefing notice out. 
Captain I did see a briefing notice somewhere. 
Was there? 
There actually has and that they were depicting that they were depicting the actual 
intersections on there ... 
OK alright. I haven't seen that I haven't flO\\11 for a few days now. 
OK alright I never picked that up. 
Springbok 500 Early handoff to area. You are now 42 miles. Change to area 119.9 Goodday 
to you. 
OK Springbok 500 distance checks 1199 goodday to you 119,9 uh, set. 
Ta. 
Durban area Springbok 500 119,90. 
Springbok 500 Good morning to you. Ah, continue climb level 310 call 
reaching please. 
Thank you continue climb 310 will call you reaching. Springbok 500. 
OK that's November Hotel should we take Juliet Sierra. 
OK thanks. 
And urn r tell you what, let's take 420 -1-45 anticipating 03 right initially. 
Affirm. OK runway 3 right, the outer marker is 420 the missed beacon ",,;11 be 445. 
OK. 
And 03 left outer marker 220 do you want to put the outer marker initially? 
Ja r think just the outer marker and the missed approach for 3 right and if we go 3 left we'll 
just s",,;ng across. 
OK Captain. 
There's no coding yet on Juliet Alpha. 
Alright. Here the plates. 
Thanks. 
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OK I'm going off the air for a second. 
OK. 
OK Captain no change in the rZldios. 
Thzll1ks very much. 
Should we go climb, gents. 
OK. 
You're ready? 
Thank you. 
OK selecting climb. 
Setting climb thrust. Climb thrust is set. 
I wonder what they'll use today in Jo'burg 267 or 283. If I select one they'll use the other. 
la, you're got about a 50','f chance. It seems to be completely random. Are you finished with 
1216? 
Affirmative thanks. 
ThZlnks 1215 now. Thanks. 
Seem to be cancelling a lot of flights lately. 
Ja. 
Gees ... 
I had a double Durban, it was just the bst two legs I did. Sunday I'm doing a double Durban. 
I don't think they']] cancel Sunday flights. 
And how about Cape TO\\ll -do you find the same thing there? 
Yes, I was supposed to do the other day, in actual fact yesterday. Durban and back Cape Town 
and back and we just did the Durban and back. 
la. 
And the morning before was a total fowl up. With that we did the Flitestar flight. 15 minutes 
before the normal 7 o'clock Durban one. 
la. 
We left at quarter to 7 we were 5 minutes late so we actually took off at 10 to 7. 
la. 
They pushed back and they aborted takeoff with that smoke in the cockpit, passengers and we 
had 31. 
Ooooi... 
Gosh you know so you would think that somebody would think quickly and tell us to come 
back and tell us to pick the paes up. So they organized a lumbo to fly the paes down. 
Oh no. 
No. 
And the crew was night stopping so they paes dO\\tll in the Jumbo with the rest of the 
passengers. 
And that's an expensive exercise. 
But they could have just told us come back. 
la. 
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You know ~\e would have been about a third of the way to Durban, come back landed, picked 
upas m~ny \:·e could have taken, virtually all of them. 
la. 
And uh. 
OCC could have done that. 
Ja. 
I suppose the crew on the ground were too occupied with what they were doing there. 
.< 
Ja. 
Mavbe thev lhou"l11 they'd be able to sort it out quickly or something like that. 
~ " ::J .. 
Ja. 
What did it tum out to be? 
I h,1\·en't heard, found out. la it must be airconditioning. It must lx! hydraulic fluid in the 
airconditioning duct. Remember we had that a few years ago? It was a big problem. What 
they do is they oversef\ice green system and 'rtith the pressure pipe that comes in from the 
pneumatic system. 
la. 
From the, you know the ... 
To pressu rize the tan k? 
la to pressurize the tank because it's over sef\1ced, the fluid gets in there and shatters the 
spring on the non-return valve. And then that fluid goes in and shatters the spring. And they 
took off with pacs on APU. 
OK. 
Because they had so many passengers on board and of course they pumped the fluid. Hydraulic 
fluid ja, and that burns eyes instantaneously. It's quite bad on the eyes. 
Was it quite bad smoke in the cockpit? 
Yes, initially they started feeling their eyes burning and then they got the smoke in the cabin 
as well as the cockpit so they aborted. I don't know what speed they aborted at. 
And they said that they apparently hadn't reached 100 knots yet. 
Is it? 
Ja they were lucky they were still at low speed. 
Ja, but look it's into Smuts hey. So you can take a bit of licence ,,{ith a 100 knots there if 
there's bad smoke in the cockpit. 
It was Iud.), it didn't happen in the air. Cause that thing burns quiet badly in the eyes. Critical 
time. 
Ja. 
If it atomizes you know it probably looks like smoke but in actual fact, it's atomized hydraulic 
fluid itself. It's not as if it's a gas. It's not vaporized. 
No. 
And that why it burns, hey. 
How much authority do the guys in traffic have to authorize that sort of a change, and corne 
back and use another aircraft? 
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I wouldn't know. 
I think .they.have the authority ja, OCc. I think they ha\"t~ the authority. 
--
Gonna upset the 31 passengers, but uh, so what. 
Ja. 
They're 2-t9 on the other side. 
I mean they control the movements on a day-to-day basis because I remember when we were 
in Durban and we had two Ai!buses \\ith very low loads and we requested that they be taken 
", . 
on one, and the other aircraft just stays for later departure. Um, there was a lot of trying to 
phone around and couldn't get along and couldn't get through and time was going and 
even tually we just le ft. 
Ja. 
That is, the guys in Durb3n didn't have any authority. 
But the traffic has a lot of authority because if they want to combine a flight, or there's 
passengers coming in from a flight after you, and they want to put them on board they can 
actually just hold you back. 
Ya they do it. 
Oh yes right they do it. 
The captain can only, once the doors are closed take control. 
Ja. 
Ja. 
Because before the doors are closed, I've seen it happen before, where the captain's got upset 
and traffic said ''I'm just keeping the flight open I've got passengers for you", 
Ja. 
Ja. 
So it's not worth getting too involved. 
No, but even after the doors are closed I think the company can quite happily say to the guy, 
"look we need you to tum back, please tum back, and uh, as long as t~~ safety of the 
aeroplane is not impaired I think. 
I think it's fair. 
It's fair ja, You know it's not as if the company's involved in a diversion decision or an 
operational problem where safety is involved. 
I, I don't know one of the things I'm just thinking about in terms of suggestion, like in the 
States, we used to do this a lot_ V(hen you found that the flights were pretty much empty, what 
they would actually do is say is they would ask if the gentlemen, you know if you don't mind 
taking a later flight, and those of you who really need to get out there they'll you know, make 
arrangements and they'll just pay them a RIOO, $100 each and just gjve them each a voucher 
like that, and I mean that's nothing to what you'll spend in operating the aircraft half empty. 
Urn, and we used to do that, we used to get out into the States early in the morning, land 
there early and you spent that whole day just being either bumped off a flight, because now 
the next flight is full, so they give you a $100. 
As a rebate passenger or full paying? 
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Full paying passengers. But we did it, and that way when the aircraft was operating it was 
operating \vith the right sort of loads. 
Keep getting b-umped, you get about $500 a day. 
Easy, easy. 
1\0, I must say I do find the Americans are far more, ah, better equipped to react to market 
conditions. 
Market conditions affirm mm. But I think you know I personally don't b.elieve passengers really 
.~ . 
get that. If only the business passengers who had got a commitment that and stuff that would 
really mind, I don't know. 
Urn. Ja it's a flight like this where they get a bit touchy you know, if they are five minutes late 
in lo'burg, they get a bit touchy, they are onto their cell. pllones. 
Those cellular phones are a nuisance in Hong Kong. I suppose they'll become a nuisance here, 
I actually took the \\ife and kids to a restaurant the other night, just the Spur you know, just 
for a quick Sunday supper and there was a guy sitting next to us with his cellular phone talking 
into it and that they've actually banned it in a lot of Hong Kong restaurants because you'll 
have about 15 20 people all yapping at the top of their voices. 
Ja it's quite ridiculous. 
Doing business at mid-night. 
It's quite ridiculous. 
Point 78. 
Thanks cancelling lAS. 
Pitch up bar. 
Sit 289 here. 
It, one to go. 
One to go. 
One to go. It looks like we might just be experiencing this turbulence of the weather forecast 
\"ith the squall lines. 
Ja I see there are a couple of isolated storms around, you might just have to go around a 
couple in fact lets go left over here selecting heading. I'm going left a few of degrees and 
going VOR LOC mode and cross track error here. OK 
OK Roger. 
You've got WDV that side. (Beacon for JUlvigation) 
WDVaffirm. 
That's fine. 
And ALTSELL green. 
Thanks selecting Speed SEL. 
Thank you. 
Speed SEL we have. 
289. 
Thank for cruise mode. 
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OK. 
Thank. 
Cruise i see: tITank you. 
Springbok 500 maintaining level 310. 
Springbok 500 thank you maintain 310 and the FIR next. 
~Iight as well take Smuts this side. 
Roger and FIR being at about 125 miles. 125 miles affirm. 
Alt I see. I'm just going for a~jtjick leak, chat to the hostie at the back. 
You've got it. 
OK I've got it Captain thanks. 
We are 9 left. 
9 left thanks. 
lo'burg is very much what the forecast says. METARS here. 
OK I've copied it. 
OK Thanks. 
The metar there. 
OK the metar we had .... we the 400 metaL 
]a that's right. 
OK I've got that. 
That's the wind at 020 5 knots. 
Affirm good vis. scattered 2000 is 1020. 
That checks. 
That's I reckon 03. 
In heading select. 
Heading select cross track error is checked. 
Right. 
Let's advise them, Durban Springbok 500. OK 500 we just turned slightly left for weather 
avoidance 10 degrees left level 310. 
Thank you weather avoidance as necessary Springbok 500 
Thank you Springbok 500. OK let's look on the weather radar on norm. 
Unfortunately these don't display here. 
OK. 
Ja. 
I'm hopeful it .... this joint, airline, that they are talking about, works out. 
Which one is this? 
You know, you have heard about the briefing about this, that SAA was looking to getting into 
a joint venture with Ugandan Airline and Tanzanian Airlines and making a joint African 
Airline. 
Hell. haven't heard that. Where did you read that? 
I first saw it in the newspaper, in fact I first heard about it in Durban when the guys were 
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talking about it. then that same day I read about it in the newspaper. 
Oll, I missed it. 
And OK we are"coming up to the boundary WDV. Springbok 500 checked the bounclal)'level 
310. 
OK Springbok 500 change to Johannesburg on IR 8.3. 
Thank you Jo'burg 283 good day. 
OK Standby for c1eara~ce. 
Thank you. 
What was that? - a bang? 
Lightening. 
Um. 
Lightning. just like ... ja. we are getting an over frequency on our AC busses, we are going to 
have a problem with our generators, there we go. 
Generator OK. 
OK you've got it. 
OK I've got it. 
I'm just checking thrust on the motor OK we have 2 engines. It's dual generators failure. 
0:1 and EGT we have. 
Yes, you confirm that? 
Dual generator failure recall item I've got no instruments I'm on standby. 
You've got standby instruments. 
Recall items - it's continuous re-light - it's on. OK checklist. 
Dual generator checklist. 
Confirm - we have 2 engines. 
We'll do that in a second - you happy? 
OK thanks. 
I think continue on this beading. Can we go back to that WDV - you've got n?!hing that side? 
WDV and notbing else on my side. 
Try and contact ATC and see what they say. Try and get radar vectors to Heidelberg initially. 
proceed to Johannesburg. It's a longer runway we can talk about it in a second. Maintain 310 
and back to Heidelberg. OK 
Wildo Captain. Johannesburg Springbok 500. Captain you want to squawk emergency'? 
No I don't think so. 
OK Thanks. 
Is tbere no response from Johannesburg? 
No response from Jobannesburg. 111 try again. Johannesburg Springbok 500 1283. Sbould we 
go back to Durban because we bad last comm with them? Captain. 
That's a good idea. 
If you like let's talk to them quickly. 
Durban Springbok 500 119.9. 
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l\;othing? 
Won't you check circuit breakers quickly for VHF. 
Circuit breakers. Thanks. 
OK you just fly this machine OK. 
OK . 
It's not easy flying on this instrument. 31 000. It looks like we've had damage - watch speed, 
watch your speed there. 
.,:; . 
Speed walch your speed there. 
Speed get your thrust up. 
OK I'm getting the thrust up. 
We've got 20 Nl here indication. 
OK. 
OK let's laugh off the communication for the moment. Just get the thrust up. 
OK thanks. 
I see we have got 1\ l. 
N! failure. 
Indication failure in fact it looks like we are fbming out. 
Both engines are out EGTs have gone down, Captain. 
OK let's go down, we've got gra\ity feed. Is that right? 
Affimlative Captain. 
OK let's go dmm to 25 000 feet initially. 
25 thanks Captain. 
And get the speed up. 
Right. 
Speed up as soon as possible - no the engines are .... 
The engines are flaming out we've got EGTs below 350. we flaming out. 
OK let's get RATS then. 
RATS put in. 
Let's do that dual generator. In fact they confirm they have flamed out, let's just check tbat. 
No response. 
No response. 
No response at this stage. 
OK. Let's get 250 knots. 
250 knots Captain. 
There's no .... tbe bug is not moving 250. 
OK. 
I'm going to squawk 77 hundred. 
OK. 
That's preferable over communication failure I think. OK you've got squawking 77 OK? 
77 Affirm Captain. 
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OK W<llch these engines, these engines are spooling up again. Oh, that's fine. 
There they come. 
Got 250 knots.--
OK. 
Can we go down to level 260? 
Lefs go to the dual engine fililure checklist first and then we go to the engine generator 
failure. OK 250 knots, maintain 250 knots and Je\'el 250. 
250 now thanks we'll go dO\vn to 250. 
Thanks let's go both engine flame out. 
OK they are stabilizing slowly, but surely. 
Captain, we need to go 260, we're going even level directioll5: 3hall I make it 260? 
Ja ~60's fine, as long as th<lt speed stays at 250. Just watch these engines hey. 
OK. 
\\"hy have we got ah .... you see they haven't actually come up yet. 
)\;0. 
)\;othings come up yet. 
Alright. 
The EGTs are up. 
So it is spooling. 
OK both engine flame out checklist please. 
OK both engine flame out checklist. Ignition continuous re-light both A and B.RAT on. 
RATS are on. 
Throttles idle. 
Just confirm you have ah .... 
Negative 250 knots. 
You've got hydraulic pressure there. 
Negative 250 knots I'm going dO\vn to 240. 
OK that's fine. 
Throttles idle. 
Grid MORE U, we can go right, we can go lower let's go to 22 
22 thanks. 
22000 OK 
Thank you. 
Throttles. 
To idle. 
Are we are you happy that they aren't spooling up normally. Should we do that OK go 
throttles idle. 
Throttles idling idled. 
Fuel supply check we have on grayhy feed at the moment. IA and ZA would be gravity 
feeding. 
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OK. 
OK at ~he t~me of the dual generator failure we had 13800 fuel in tanks. 
OK. 
That was frozen from then on. 
Alright. 
OK. 
At thafs a .... 0530. 
.~ 
Ja. 
OK go ahead. 
Fuel supply check we've done that. Optimum speed 250. 
250 ,knots. 
250 knots let's try and maintain 250. We're coming up a 1000 to go. Let's go down to 20. Are 
you happy with 20? 
OK 20. 
OK the lower we can get the better hey. 20 000. Yes please. 
Communications VHF 1 and ATC 1. 
OK we've tried I think there's damage there. uh. 
Ja we don't seem ... it seems we lost ... 
ATC, ATC, ATC 1. OK. 
OK we've lost cams by the look of it. If neither engine starts within 45 seconds. Vh, let's just 
uh. Well they are at idle and the EGTs are right. Let's just see if they don't spool up. Just 
take them off idle. 
Try, try, try them. It should spool up now. 
There's something else wrong here. What is going on? 
OK that's two to go. 
2 to go thanks. 
OK they're not spooling up. 
They're hanging there. 
Shall we go lower? 
Yes. 
Let's go down to grid MORA 14. 
14. 
14 000. 
Thank you. Confinn the beacons are not working, are they working? 
Ja, nothing's working, I tell you what let's go back to .. , 
340. 
340. 
In fact 350 because we went left due to weather. 
OK thanks. 
The bugs aren't working either, hey? 
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OK it says if neither engine starts ,vithin 45 seconds. Fuel levers. 
Standby. they're .. spooling up. Just confirm this. 
Make further adjustments. 
They are spooling up 1. 
There they go. 
OK let's just try and get some thrust now. 
Affirm we're getting it. _ . 
OK just watch out for overspeed, watch for overspeed, overspeed. 
Overspeed. 
h. 
OK I'll tell you what Ah, this is not there .... 
There are no selection. 
There're no selections. Should we go for 105 initially hey. 
Thank you. 
105 and then use that as a limit until we can get a limit. 
Thank you. 
Shall we maintain 20 ODD? 
Roger. 
OK 20 000 settling. 
And we've just got a master warning system fault light coming up now. 
Ja that's just electrics. 
A whole bunch of things. We'll come to that shortly. 20 000 and that heading. 348 uh 350. 
350 got the ... need to turn slightly left. 
If you could stabilize on 20000 and that heading 1'I1 see if I can get a radio aid shortly. Let's 
complete that checklist and then we'll go back to the electrical checklist. 
OK if engine recovered. 
OK they've both recovered. Are you happy about that? 
la. Ah systems. 
Nl, EGT, and we don't know about the rest of... have you got some indications in the back 
there? 
Ah, there'll be none here that's all dead. 
OK That's fine. 
So we've got both engines back. So this is basically the end of the both engine flame out 
checklist. We've got to do the dual generator checklist. 
Dual generator, let's go. 
Loss of both engine generators. Ignition continuous re-light, A and B it is continuous. Transfer 
1 and 2 off. Transfer 1 and 2 off. Generator 1 and 2 off. Reset, then on 1 and 2. 
Yip. 
I'll just keep trying lo'burg again Captain. 
Yes please if you would well consider HF just now as well. 
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Johannesburg, Johannesburg Springbok 500 I'm getting codings now on the beacons. 
Ah, I"v.e got a_.coding on yes rYe got a coding on Juliet Alpha, hey. 
Thank you Juliet Alpha is On number.. .. ? 
On number one standby let llIe see if I can take ... 
1':umber 1 is going to trip again Captain it's oyer frequency. There she goes. OK dual 
generator failure. With no recovery. 
You work on that for a secoEd.. 
Johannesburg, Johannesburg Springbok 500. 
I'm gonna take 1167 on this side and see if I can get some coding on this side. 
OK Captain. 
OK. Johannesburg, Johannesburg Springbok 500. OK. There's no contact we'll try on HF 
shortly uh, let's try. 
OK. 
On \VHF 2 as well, I don't think we're going to have any possibility there. 1283 uh, I tell you 
what let's try 12-17 uh 5 OK 1245 selected on 1 you can do that. 
OK thank you 1245. 
And in fact it's selected on 2 as we 11. 
Johannesburg radar. Johannesburg radar Springbok 500 on 12-15. 
How are you going? 1':0 dice there? 
1':0 dice Captain. 
I'll be "ith you in a sec. I just want to navigate quickly. I've got a needle to the right for Hotel 
Golf Victor let's go to the right. 
That's about? 
That's about 020. 
020 OK that's displacement about 30 degrees. 
OK we can bring the speed back to 250 knots just for comfort here. 
Thank you. 
And let's enter the hold. 
That's in about 10 seconds. 
At Hotel Golf Victor. 
Thanks. 
Lost communications procedures. If you can just think about that in the meantime. 
Right Captain. 
We haven't been given a star yet. (Standard Arrival Route) 
Negative. 
There was no star on the flight plan. 
Affirm. 
Shall we follow the general lost communication procedures? In other words go to Juliet Sierra 
OK. 
We go via Hotel Golf Victor to Juliet Sierra to enter the bold. Enter the hold at Juliet Sierra 
at this level. 
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Affirm 200 Capt:lin. 
Hopefully tl1ey"ll be getting something else on this transponder and they ciln see at what 
altitude we're at. 
Roger Captain. 
Do you agree \\ith that as a general principle? 
OK um. 
In other words you bypass thlt l.ost communication procedures on the star. 
Lost communication procedures of hold over hotel golf Victor, we']] route overhead I Iotel Golf 
Victor. Juliet Sierra, into the hold at Juliet Sierra at flight level 200. 
OK you've got? 
And reaching level 200 now. 
OK 2000 that's fine. And there's the hold at Juliet Sierra. It's a right hand pattern. 031 
inbound. You happy about thae 
OK l"m happy about that? 
At 20 000 and remember the speed's uh we're looking at what 2·W knots? 
2-l0 knots affirm. 
l"11 set 2-l0 later on. You can fly that OK. You happy? 
I'm happy with that Captain thank you .. 
Let's complete the dual generator checklist then. 
OK we got as far as generator 1 and 2 off reset then on. 
Right. 
But they both over frequency and they're damaged so we can't get the.mback. 
OK, lightning has taken GCU's out or something like that. OK. 
If no generator recovered, caution. Avoid throttle, rapid throttle movement and negative load 
factors. 
You get tbat? 
Roger Captain. OK No tbrottle movement. Thanks OK. 
Land as soon as possible. 
Right look, Jo'burg is closest, we've got no D~IE here but we'll tell our distance by passage 
over Hotel Golf Victor. I'm a little bit worried about this uh, we should have my RMI is out 
OK. 
OK. But the needle. 
The needle says inbound 020. 
OK. 
I would say that we're heading that way. Do you follow this do you follow this? Just check me 
on this here. 
I see standby is one ja. 
OK the needle is pointing on the R.\fI to 025. We're heading 025 we should be going right 
overhead. Do you see what I mean tbis, tbis RMI is gNing duff gen over here. 
Yes. 
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It's [other confusing do you agree with me? 
~ffirl1l. and. it said the needles will be pointing in the right direction. 
But the but the ... 
With the magnetic ja, but even through the compass doesn't move, so we should be going at 
020 we should pass overhead. 
OK just check for movement of the head of that needle. 
OK thanks Captain. 
Are you happy with flying it like this? 
I'm happy with flying it like this? OK. 
Alright. 
Alright avoid .... conditions we don't have. 
OK we've past those stomlS now. 
Communications VHF, ATC, we still have problems. 
OK and we've tried on two and we can perhaps try on VHF. Ha\'e you tried on VHF? 
~o I haven't tried HF, 
If you ho\C a chance just try on that OK. 
r..fax speed 275 mach 78. 
OK 275 we're maintaining 250 we'll come back to 2-10 in the hold. 
Use rudder \yith care above 165 knots. 
Affirm. 
OK we're in the 10-10 speed mode in other words we've lost protection. 
You've got that? You've got full rudder travel. 
I've got that thanks Captain. 
Avoid large elevator inputs, for some reason. You've lost your feel. Max flight level 250, 
OK we're 200. 
200. 
That's what hurt us originally. 
Or MGAja, 
OK. 
Tank lA and 2A shut off valves check in line 1A and 2A shut off valves are in line. Tank 1 and 
2 shut off valves. 
Johannesburg, Johannesburg Springbok 500 on 8933. 
Yes, go ahead. 
If quantity below 500 kilos, close we still have more than 500. 
OK we're going to have to check out to see whether we have accurate gauge indications or not. 
I suspect not. 
No they're frozen. 
OK alright. 
Battery on. The battery is in the on position all 3 batteries. Buzz equipment list 21 check. 
. ... well do that now. Let's just note beyond 42 minutes, OK 29 witb APU not applicable bey. 
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Beyond 42 minutes total loss of electrical power may occur. And of course nose wheel steering 
is-in·op, whiSh we know about because we dOll't have the nomlal DC BUS. 
It's worth for that reason flying faster into Johannesburg because we might h;we a time 
problem there. 
Yes. 
l'\imo. 
Yes. Sorry Captain about -I2.)ujnutes. 
We have a problem as far as speed here. It says here max speed 275 left go to 275 at least. In 
fact let's go to 275. 
Roger. 
\Ve don't want a full electrical power failure on this aeroplane. ~ 
OK can we h;lSe a way point change OIl the 10:S. 1 see the 1:-:S is still giving us some track. 
Je\, there's a batter), light over here, 1 don't... it's a good point Heidelberg is nUlllher -I .. hey, 
OK number -I. 
Heidelberg, I had it, is number -I affiml. 
:t'-:'umber -I there we are, that's excellent n,nigation. Let's tl)' that, just go right here. 
Roger. 
8 left, go right a few degrees. 
OK Captain. 
Make it about 030 see if that changes, Let's just check here distance to 4, 17 miles. This is 
looking good. We've got 17 miles to Heidelberg. That could be right, we've got f5 minutes of 
battery on that Ii':S so we've got some na\igation information at this stage. Cross check. Are 
you happy? 
OK thanks Captain. 
OK that's on track right now. 
On track. 
OK it's about 03. 029. I'll leave it with distance time. Just maintain that heaging distance time 
15 miles to go and I'll leave it, we can tum. 
It's just gone now. 
OK that fine. 
That was fine. 
15 miles. 
We're on heading. 
I will set up 220 we're going to do an approach onto 03 left OK 220 and 202 OK let's just 
check that minimum equipment list please. 
OK can you just put 275 on that standby ja. 
OK just putting that up. 
OK, OK, minimum equipment list. 
OK that's the end of the loss of both engine generators check list. 
Can I go slightly non standard and ask you to make a list of what we've lost over bere, 
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so that you can brief us. 
This OIle, we.ju_~tread and do. 
Ja. 
This bus equipment one. We don't have to make a Jist of this. 
OK. Alright OK before we do this we just need to do a bit of navigation over here. 
OK Captain we should be passing shortly over Golf Alpha Victor. 
Hotel Golf Victor., . 
Hotel Golf Victor. 
Yes. 
Um, this think nomlally stays on at about 350 so I'm gonna tum it slightly 10 seconds to the 
~- ~ 
left, that should give us about 360 just about and try and intercept the localizer for that urn. 
OK. 
OK. 
OK but I think we're going to go over Hotel Golf Victor direct to Juliet Sierra in order to 
enter the hold over Juliet Sierra. 
Direct to Juliet Sierra, OK not a problem. 
We start our approach ETA plus 10 minutes to ETA plus 40 minutes. Are you happy with 
that? Do you agree \\ith that? 
OK. 
In fact at this stage, because of a low, low speed we can start the approach straight away. You 
buy that? 
Straight away OK. 
Urn, let me just see if I can get Hotel Golf Victor again here. The needle is moving on this 
RMI OK it's 35 to Hotel Golf Victor. 
OK. 
So that indication is looking good - you agree \\ith me? Yes Captain OK 
OK this is hang of confusing hey? OK. 
Ja just remember we've lost all compass. 
OK. 
Ja, that's fine, Hotel Golf Victor is coding, I just want to check the coding on Juliet Sierra. No 
coding, ADF's have gone. 
Thank you. So we can't go to Juliet Sierra. 
So we can't go to Juliet Sierra. 
So we want to pick up. 
If we've got the VOR's then let's try and pick the VOR ROM 1152. 
Absolutely, absolutely. 
VOR number 1 you should have. 
OK let's. 
OK. 
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VOR number 2 is lost. 
OK thanks. 
I'll take that and then as soon as I've done that uh, that's beautiful coding checks, I'll go 031 
intercept the '" localizer. I think it's probably best. Intercept the localizer for Juliet Sierra 
Victor. 
Thanks Captain Affirm. 
Um what does this say? 
Just watch the speed at 275. 
275 I've got a heading flag here. You can't even trust this, hey. We want a heading of 350 now. 
Thank you. 
350 that's, that's why we're not intercepting. 
OK thanks. 
Let's make it about 3-10 set make a positive intercept do you agree \,ith that? 
Alright Captain. 
OK 3-10. 
.. w. 
And uh, you're using the standby .. That's looking good, OK let's go 
OK we've lost, platform. All platforms lost. 
Yes. 
Compass all lost apart from standby. 
All lost OK standby. 
VOR 1LS number 2 lost so we should be using 1. 
OK we're using one we have coding on 1 that's all we've got. 
OK ADF total 1055. 
Both lost. 
Air data computer No.1 but of course we've lost the uh, urn gee \,iz how come? 
No, we have ATC 1 that's fine we have ATC 1. 
OK we have deadright confirmed. Flaps and slats we've lost indication. So we bave to go back 
and check the sections. 
OK alright. 
We'll the first few selections anyway. 
Yes. 
Rudder travel pitch fuel we're total 1055 We know about that. 
Yes. 
Rudder travel and ... 
You can switch tbem off right now. Let's set up ah. 
Can I just request, one request, Holding pattern Juliet Sierra Victor, do you bave any plan 
with that? 
Vb, Juliet Sierra Victor that's a good one, let's use the same one. 
OK the same one right band patterns Juliet Sierra Victor. Thank you. 
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O·r l'... 
P~tch tr.im lQst,.}ve know about that. 
Yip. 
They both out we know about that. 
Yip. 
Auto pilot flight directors both l?st. 
Yes.. . 
Yaw damper - both lost. 
Yes. 
Auto throttle systems lost. 
Yes. 
ADC No.2 is lost we should have [\0. 1 we still haven·! got comms. 
That checks. 
Captain I'm ha\·ing the field in sight, looks like the field in sight there. 
Great OK intercept the localizer and uh do a hold. We can go outbound on JSV perhaps just 
one. 
OK. 
And we·]] have to do a screaming descent from 20 000 down to 8 000 and try and do it. Try 
and get on the ground as quiCkly as possible after that. There is an element of urgency here. 
OK lets go. 
VHF number 2 lost. 
Yes. OK brake pressure indication is lost. Yes. 
We still have green though. 
Yes. 
No problem with hydraulics. 
You have normal hydraulic indications though that might be duff there. 
That's duff frozen. 
That's fine. Let's bring the speed back. 
Thanks 250. 
250 in fact 2-l0 OK just use that as a reference Lefs go. 
Nose wheel steering loss. 
Yes. 
So well have to stop on the runway. 
You got the field in sight. 
Yes just coming. 
OK Localizer alive, go for it. 
OK Nose wheel steering lost. 
Yes. 
And we got no comms to get them. 
Yes. 
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Ignition A lost and have A and B. 
We have A and B selected. OK. 
Tanks lA lost OK the pumps lost but we have lost all of them in any case. 
Perfect. Yes we still on gravity fcel we want to avoid sharp a .... 
And of course the pressure system to auto depress is lost that is the ground aux is lost. 
OK we are going to do quite a ~igh descent now do you ... is there anything we can do about 
that? 
Vh, ja well fortunately, because we are coming into Jo'burg at 51/2 there is no real problem for 
that. 
Capt. Alright. 
(Captain speaks to passengers.) 
Capt. OK the indications are wl)' good on this HSI now for JSV. 
Copilot. OK I see that. 
Capt. And as soon as you get beacon passage with the flaps just turn outbound. 
Copilot. Tum outbound OK. 
Capt. OK alright that completes that. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
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Capt. 
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!\fin equip checklist completed. 
Did we get right to the bottom of the dual generator failure checklist? 
Yes. 
We read the time advisory on the batteries. 
It just covers one generator recovered. 
OK right. 
Yes. 
Shall we work out speeds for the landing? 
Yes. 
Speeds descent and approach checklist and then we land, Then there are no speed corrections 
for this. 
Negative. 
On this landing, hell it's very confusing flying without a bug hey. 
Ja. No I actually find. Standby I'm using the one on the standby. 
That's perfect alright. Shall we bring the speed back? 
OK shall I bring it back to 2-W now? 
OK back to 220 initially. 
OK thank you. 
OK. 
220 on the standby please. 
220 yes that's fine and have you got what are you working on? 
12-l tons hey. 
OK that sounds good having burnt you are working on burning about 5V2 tons 12-l. 
Ja. 
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Let's go for it just let's read that anyway. 
OK it's Johannesburg 03 right 25 flaps 25 slats for a weight of 124 tons VITO is 215. 
215. 
215 thanks. 
V4 186. 
186. 
186. 
V3 149. 
V3 149. 
149. 
Bug at 132. 
32. 
32 thank you. 
And rYe got 7 1 for Durban here but of course we going to. 
We coming in here. 
In Jo'burg. 
Alright you happy to start the approach almost immediately now. 
Immediately Captain OK fine. 
OK because we are ETA plus 10 at least now. OK beacon passage. 
OK. 
Let's turn right outbound onto a heading of uh.211 descent approach checklist please. 
Coming up I can't do anything about the lighting that's emergency lighting on. 
OK and I think we can start descent as well please. 
OK. 
Let's go dO""ll to 8000 feet. 
Roger. 
Thrust right off 8000 ft QNH 1020 set. 
1020. 
Your side for what it's worth. 
Yes. 
I've got goexi altitude indications here. 
Thank you. 
My G flag has gone hey - I mean my ADI has gone so it's totally visual situation except for this 
instrument. OK descent approach please. 
OK. 
OK are we going to set up the go around on the Nl manually? 
Yip. 
It's 112. 
112. 
Five. 
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And we'll clean up let's clean up the panel first and then \ve can get it away 112 give. 
O.K. 
OK. Right I've got 12 tons of fuel which m:lkes reasonable sense - actually no. 
Five. 
12 tons eighty - yes that's about right that's about right so perhaps we c:ln trust th:lt. 122 tons 
for landing we are working on? 
12 .. L 
..:, . 
12 .. \ that"s fine ja. OK recall rYe got a m:lster warning system fault, let's not worry about that 
in other words this panel is probably useless. 
OK. 
Ja. 
Electrics. 
\Ve know about the generators. 
OK probe. 
Probes we've lost. 
Whole bunch. \Ve're CAVOK. We don't have to worry about them. 
Window heat we've lost. 
Ja ads number 1. 
Kumber 2 yes. 
Flag instruments - the whole panel. Platfornl. 
We've lost all. 
All pitch trim. 
Pitch trim we have lost as well as your damper. 
It's manual pitch trim hey. 
Ja. 
You are flying it on manual pitch trim. 
OK I'm flying manual pitch trim. 
OK your damper that will stay off, that's off, that's off. We've got nothing on this aeroplane. 
OK descent approach checklist is runway .... turn off lights. 
OK can I fly it and you can interact with now. 
Right thanks you've got control Captain? Just give it another 10 seconds and you should be 
on the outbound heading. 
OK if you could complete the descent approach checklist please. 
OK thanks descent approach checklist coming. You're already done the recall. 
Yes we've done that. 
That you're done OK thanks. Let's carry on v.ith those, straight out Captain. 
OK straight out, are you happy that that's the heading hey? 
OK I'll just give you a correction just now. 
OK thanks. 
I did a time turn should we should be coming. 
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OK runway turnoff lights selected on, Logo lights on, Cabin signs? 
On. 
Landing data? 
OK is checked and set. 
Radio altimeters not applicable. 
OK not applicable. 
N 1 limit computer we've set up. 
-.:. -
We've set up the go around manually. 
Thanks, Master warning. 
OK it was recalled and we've cancelled the lights and unnecessal)'. 
Circuit breakers are checked fuel is set for landing. That's.-tanl uh, gravity feed. Tank to 
engine. 
OK. 
Press u riza tion is set. 
Radio nay instruments. That's Juliet Sierra set once tv.ice that's all we've got foT. .. 
OK. 
Indications. 
Could I just interrupt for a second. Should we select 8 flap uh 16 Slats please? I'm below 250 
knots here. 
OK below 250. 
Confirm here. 
Checks selecting. 
Just set it does pitch. 
Yes ah. 
With the pitch field off it's ja OK does pitch .... ja. 
OK I'm just worried. I'll go back and have a look now. 
OK if you would please ... that's fine and V4 Go V4 selecting. 
V4 selecting. 186. 
186. 
And on here as well please. 
Right set. 
OK altimeters. 
OK set 1020 set cross checked twice. 
Please select the gear down so we can go down a bit quicker. 
OK checks selecting. 
OK there's no indications at the back, because we'ye lost the power there. That's the descent 
approach checklist completed. I'm ... 
Great. 
I'm just going back to check the uh, ... 
J tell you what let's make a flap selection and then we can uh ... 
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Do\\ lJ 3 greens. 
Then we can check that as well. 
OK. 
OK selecting 8 flaps. 
And your arms by any change live there. 
i\egative captain. 
Right it would be OK I"ll be .... ith you in a sec I just want to get the speed break back OK 8 
flilp please. 
Selecting. 
And a pitch change coming here. 
Ja definitely a pitch change there that's fine. 
I'm just going back. 
You might as well wait for 15 if you're happy \\ith that. 
]a then at least we know we're safe. 
OK 15 flap now please. 
Speed checks selecting OK I'll give you V3. 
V3 plus 10 Geez there's a pitch change if you could check that please. 
I'm just going back quickly. 
V3 plus 10 you have, Captain. 
OK thanks. 
Gear dO\\11 3 greens. 
We've been outbound for about 3 minutes now. 
OK. 
Perhaps another minute, we'll tum inbound along final approach. 
OK along final approach right Captain. 
We got 031 and Juliet Sierra Victor this side. 
OK I'm just going to set it up here 031 and 031 set and Juliet Sierra Victor iSl:hecked set and 
identified. 
Thanks we've got a pneumatic on the master warning 5 that's new I don't know if uh ... 
We've lost pressure there, as you open the motors it kicks in again. 
OK. 
OK. 
Right what do you feel about a turn in now 12 OOO? 
OK Captain OK go for the turn. 
Do you reckon? OK turn me on a heading of 350. 
350. 
Give us a shout when you see the field please. 
Alright Captain .,.,ill call. 
OK we've got no air pressure from the motors so I've just opened the RAM air inlet. 
OK 
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This VRO indication worries me here a little bit here it's indicating OlD. 
010 OK that.'s ... that's down so we should be looking for about 350 it's 30 degrees intercept 
well or are you going to give slightly wider intercept. 
No that's actually that's fine about 3 what did we say 3.J 350. 
Runway coming in sight Captain. 
Cabin pressure shall I keep turning? 
Keep turning. 
OK that's fine what is the story there? 
i\!aintain, maintain, maintain that heading now Captain. 
OK that's fine. 
Say again. 
r' -
We lost the pacs there and I opened the RA\! air inlet and of course the cabin's just come 
up 92 that's why we coming up to 10 000. 
2000 feet to go Captain. 
Thank you I'm standing by for your call to turn in bound. I can't see the airfield. 
OK. 
And the flaps Oh sorry 168 we have at the back. 
16.8 or IS? 
1650 correction ja. 
OK I'm waiting for your call to turn in. 
OK standby Captain. 
Vb in fact give us the ILS that's a good idea. 
OK lets try that 1103. 
And we can check the coding there as well. 
I'll check it. 
And descent approach is completed, hey? 
Descent approach affirm is completed. 
And the coding checks your side. 
Thanks. 
No brake pressure indication here so I'm just going to do normal braking here. It's a long 
runway, it should be no problem. 
Ja and we do have green pressure. 
Thanks how's the? ... 
Captain I'd say start turning about 10 degrees more. 
OK. 
And 700 feet to go, hey. 
Right. Hold that heading now Captain. 
OK let's check these engines just to make sure we've got some thrust here.OK looks good. 
OK you got the runway in sight? 
Ja I've got the runway in sight thanks then .. , 
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500 feet 8000. 
Thank you Yh.'. coding check on the ILS. 
OK. 
Confinn. 
Checks. 
Thanks OK are you happy that ~n:r)'thing's done, the landing gears down? 
Gears down. . . 
And just if we could do the landing checklist just up to flaps please. 
OK landing checklist up to flaps. 
Landing checklist says anti·skid is 8 release. Altimeters. 
Altimeters set and cross checked. 
Landing gear. 
Is down 3 green? 
OK we have none at the back because of the electrical problem. Auto brakes. 
Auto brake Captain do you want an)'? 
1'0. thanks no I don't think so, how's the turning? 
OK you can start turning in now. Have you got it in sight? 
I've got it no\v thanks. 
Ground spoilers. 
Groundspoilers are armed. 
That's to the line. 
Thank you. 
Alright we're going stop on the runway hey? 
Yes. 
Just keep a look out for traffic that's the big thing. I think they're keeping everything clear. I 
don't see anything but we are lost communications. 
Roger for what it's worth. 
It's interesting. We haven't even had time to check on the . .if yet 
OK I did try on HF on 8933 and no recomms. 
OK great thanks very much I've got a glide slope flag here, oh hang on I'll tell you what this 
is probably working here the HSI is probably working. 
just keep your eyes open for traffic. 
Will do. 
And we don't know what the wind is on the ground I assume that it is from the North. 
Roger. 
The forecast was 020 at 5. 
Even the seat drive doesn't work. 
Nothing works. 
Ja so the pitch feel is very strange hey? 
Glide slope is corning in there Captain. 
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Thank you. 
And we can.go visual. 
And speed to V3 please. 
V3 selecting. 
And on that bug as well please. 
H9 and ... 
Just want a speed check on my.AS] my AS! says 155 156 
OK 156 and we've got 156 your speed checks. 
Thank you OK you're standing by 25 flap. 
Roger. 
Intact. 
Coming up the slope now Captain. 
In fact 25 flap now please. 
Speed checks. 
If you could go back quickly we've got a gear warning. 
Gear warning. 
Confirm gear is dmm? 
Gear is down this indication is 3 greens here Captain. 
ok there was nothing on the checklist to ask us to disable GWPs. 
~o. 
~o. 
OK just cancel that. 
OK. 
It's not cancellable hey? 
How did you cancel that? 
I cancel on the ... 
Master. 
Master. 
OK could you check on the flap setting please? 
OK \'till do. 
OK check your speed slightly below. 
Thanks. 
You want the bug now Captain. 
Yes please. 
Any corrections? 
Ah yes plus 5 is fine. 
OK give you 137 
Just in case of a wind change hey 137 thanks I'm going below slope hey? 
Right Captain. 
I mean I'll correct for it now it's not intentional. 
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Captain you have 25 flaps. 
Great you'reh~ppy? 
Yes. 
I'll just talk to the cabin. 
Alright you're bappy? 
I'm happy Captain. Do you want. me to tell them? 
I spoke to the passengers, I doo'-J think there's a problem. I told them Tjust warned them that 
we'll stop on the runway OK. 
OK Captain. 
If we have to go around I'll just do a left visual but at this stage go around is not a good idea. 
r - ~ 
Time-wise we must have about 10 minutes to go before a total electrical failure. Do you agree 
\"ilh that? 
Affirm. 
Ja there's not much time left there's 28 about 
15 minutes, 15 minutes OK well perhaps one circuit one quick circuit It's a vel] different 
aeroplane hey without pitch feel and no stab trim. 
I won't be able to give you vel] good height calls at all. 
]a OK ja thanks OK visual call outs. 
OK ,isual call outs coming up 500 feet in the slot. 
Thank you. 
100 feet. 50 feet. OK. 
OK 80 knots 60. 
OK let's check for there is definitely no nose wheel steering. We've been using aerodynamic 
control. I'm stopping right here. 
OK Captain. 
They']] have to use 3 right. Right gents I just want to get a little bit clear of 3..J. here, get clear 
of 3..J., they can use 3..J. and 03 right. 
Well flown there Captain. 
Thanks, thanks for the help gents. That was quite an interesting exercise. 
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OK -you have WIl!rol? 
I have control 
It's your aeroplane, and what are we? Springbok OK 239. Ground Springbok 239 request taxi. 
Springbok 239 taxi holding runways 03 right 
Holding runway 03 right confiml . 
My apologies, runway 03 left.<. 
Runway 03 left, Springbok 239. OK clear my side 
Clear my side 
OK 
OK Brakes off. 
OK I'm going to switch this off for us. 
Thanks Captain. 
And just tell me if you're happy \\;th the background lighting. Is that OK? 
Ja it's fine Captain Oh, that's fine. Can I have flap too please Captain 10. Thank you 
Selected. 
And the before takeoff checklist please. 
Okiedoks, I'm just standby on the flaps 
Standby 
While the flaps are running if you would like to re\;ew the departure so long. 
Alright Captain, the .... the departure Captain, is uh Rhino 2 Alpha departure. 
OK, let's start \',ith the ah, engine failure - The engine failure procedure .RTO in other words. 
The RTO procedure says this \.ill be a goal orientated takeoff. From 100 knots, this \viII be a 
goal orientated takeoff, in the event of a decision to stop before VI, which is 129 knots will 
apply full brakes and close thrust levers. Disengage auto throttle and raise speed brake manually 
and apply full reverse thrust on symmetrical engines. If you could please help me there. 
Alright. 
Thanks. 
OK, noise abatement. 
Noise abatement is ... 
OK I'll help you there. 
Thanks Captain. 
Noise abatement states that at 7000 feet we'll ask for climb thrust and then continue at V2 plus 
10 until 8500 feet, we'll ask for climb thrust and then continue at V2 plus 10 until 8500 feet and 
then accelerate and clean up the aeroplane. 
Affirm Captain. 
OK, Rhino to Alpha. 
Rhino to Alpha says eh, off runway 03 left, 1800 climb straight ahead to 5.5 DME on Juliet 
Sierra Victor which we've got set twice. And then turn right direct to November Lima NDB 
which we've got set twice as well. And to climb to uh, flight level 90, which we've got on the 
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window. 
Checked 
And further climb \\ill be under radar control. 
OK - OK, 90 clear flight level 130 and at level 130 we'll set courses for flight pliln. OK have you 
got 10') 10 on the green light. Ready for controls to the left, left aileron and spoiler up, right 
aileron down, neutral, to the right, r1ght aileron, spoiler up,left aileron d 0\\11 , neutral, stick back, 
elevators up full deflection, neutral, stick forward, elevators down, full deflection. And neutral. 
Rudders to the left. 
Your rudders Captain. 
OK keep your feet on the rudders, so you can feel that you get full deflection. 
~. -
OK 
OK, that's full left and zero and to the right full right and zero. And can you comfortably reach 
the full ..... 
Yes. Captain. 
Control check completed, speed for runway 031efl, 129 1-16 186 and a safe pitch of 15 degrees, 
that's about there, flaps 10 required, 10 we have. 
Affirmative. 
.... time is zilch and we're looking at 21/-1 units, s\\itch set light is out and thanks for the before 
takeoff checklist. Please check. 
(engineer - checklist). That is alive. 
?"o flex 
1 0 10 green ligh 1. Checked. 2 1/-1 miles and 3/-1 set ligh t ou t. Checked in the .fron 1. .... Than k you 
sir. 
Cabin crew one minute to take off, to your stations please. Ground Springbok 239 approaching 
the first hold ready for departure. 
Springbok 239 to ... 118,1 please. (Frequency change) 
118,1 Springbok 239. Ta. Good morning, this is Springbok 239, ready for departure 3 left. 
Springbok 239 line up and wait. 
Line up and wait. Springbok 239. Confirm tbe departure frequencies. 
It's going to be 12-15. 
1245 Thank you. 
I've got .... this side Captain. 
OK thanks. OK we're clear to line up and wait. I see the final approach clear. 
Clear my side. 
And well do this and tbat. 
Just to confirm, Captain, tbis is tbe taxi-way? Sorry. 
Jip, J a you just follow tbe wbite line. 
Thanks 
OK, tbat's tbat, that's tbat. 
Alright. 
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OK, before takeoff checklist up to body gear steering please. Alerted on set. 
I'm son)' CaptaLn, 
Go ahead - continue (checklist continues) OK standing by takeoff clearance. When you tum it. 
Yes Sir. 
l"1I tell you when, about now, start, bringing it to the left, slowly but slowly and then quicker 
quicker, OK turn it more and mor~ now bit quicker bit faster in the turn. Keep on turning, keep 
on turning, move your hand right across now. OK now, no, no just db it slowly move it right 
across, now slowly bring the wheel back to the neutral very slo\',·I),. Till you get onto the centre 
line, just do it slowly gently. 
OK 
~ 
And then you turn it to the right. Springbok 239 is ready for departure. 
Springbok 239 the surface wind is 130 and 3 knots. The visibility is decreasing and you are 
cleared for takeoff. 
Clear for takeoff thank you. Springbok 239 
OK um. 
OK urn can I just ask you, OK disarming body gear steering. snag the simulator visual please ..... 
OK disarmed, obtained (engineer checklist). 
Obtained . 
Thank you 
Thanks. Standby for takeoff. 
Standing by. 
OK. Thanks and reduce thrust please. Thank you. 
80 knots. 
Thank you. Cross checked 
VI rotate 15 degrees. 
Thank you. 
Positive climb 
Gear up please Captain 
Gear up. 
And, indicated airspeed and 
Indicated air speed ..... 
Thanks. 
I don't know if that bang was anything significant urn, anything that could break temps maybe. 
Urn ...... .. 
checks .... and we're looJdng for .... to turn .... to level, 80 you can start levelling off and this 
radar. This is Springbok 239 approaching 9000 correction 90. 
Springbok 239 Climb level 130. 
We're cleared level 130. 
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130. 
Springbok. 239 .. 
SOT!)·, I"ve got one, thank you. OK and tum me right please to new level. 
.... 95 abou t and 10 13. (setting standard altimeters) 
1013. 
And we can accelerate anytime yo~ like. 
OK thanks, right OK and give q;Je, ... OK can 1 start \\ith the flap Captain? 
OK should we give you vertical speed? 
Vertical speed and 1500 feet please Captain. 
1500 right. Coming up 1000 feet to level off. 
Thank you. 
.... green. 
Springbok 239 clear level 290 and go 128,3. 
Level 290, 128.3, Springbok 239. 
And at flight level 130 we can set course as per flight plan. 
OK fine sir. 
So go direct to ... on Alpha. 
Aha hm .. 
OK. so I"1I give you Ii\S mode, thank you. 
Thanks Captain. 
And you can just follow your whatshisname. 
OK, give me 1500 feet Captain on your vertical count speed please. 
OK. vertical speed once again 1200 feet. 
Thanks Captain 
It jumped out, because it captured just now, it captured the altitude. OK you can just follow that 
pitch bar, that's it. 
OK. 
And I'll just reinsert for us. 
And flap 1 please Captain. 
Flaps 5. 
On my gosh flap 5. And speed 2.2. 
206. 5-5 and the green light 
Thanks Captain, just wait for the speed. Flap 1 Captain. 
Flap 1 selected. 
And speed 226 sir, 
226. Flaps are running 
Thanks. 
Area Springbok 239 passing level 162, good morning. 
Morning to you radar identified. 
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Springbok 239. Nav green. lCU with Alts are armed. 
Thanks. a.nd fl~p up please Captain. 
OK flaps up. 
and speed ahh .... 
297 
297 yes thanks. 
OK 297. Flaps up and the lights,a:e out. And if you're happy you can unstrap them. 
Ah, sorry. 
You can unstrap the pacs. 
Oh, ja please. 
On the weather or anything, off. 
And uh, and after takeoff checklist... .. Thanks. 
Thank you. Springbok lo'burg Good morning. This is Springbok 239 airborne at ah, 15 and we'll 
be in Durban on schedule at uh 1015. Thank you very much. 
Springbok 239 and uh, goodday to you. Bye now. 
Captain, may I use the autopilot please sir? 
Sure thing, OK. OK we're still climbing up .... on 
OK now, first thing you want to do is go to PMS 
P~1S yes 
Or sorry, indicate it first P~fS that's it. OK altitude selectors off and now for the auto throttle. 
Off yes. 
That's it 
Thanks Captain. 
Right, well done. 
Urn .... Alpha 
Victor Delta. (engineer speaks) 
OK let's have a look at the weight here quickly. OK 200 
206 
Can you see it there, otherwise I might bave it bere ub. 
292. 
12-l, 125, 125, 165, 205. 
Thanks Captain. 
(Engineer speaks) 
330,330,205 
Urn, airborne about. 
19, 0919 for airborne to 933, 937, 953 
ub,uh,ub 
8 minutes. Yo! 
(Heart attack) 
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Thank you. OK he's /Jot well. And we don't have a doctor on board or a nurse, or any medical 
staff? OK.coulQy~u find out the latest weather in Jo'burg please. 
In Johannesburg, OK 
So you'll just speak to Jo'burg and um, in fact let me do that. Gents I don't know how you feel 
but it seems like we've got a problem here, there's no medical person on board. And we must 
get this guy on the ground asap. So if the we:tther allows it we go back to Smuts, othem'ise the 
quickest is probably going to be ahigh speed cruise to Durban. If there's anything you can think 
of in the meantime. Give it some thought. 
OK 
I'll just call ATC.Johannesburg area this is Springbok 239. We might have a problem and there 
,-- ~ 
is a possihility of returning to your field can we have your actual latest weather conditions, plus 
any significant trend please. 
Standby please. Springbok 239 ready to copy 
Go ahead. 
Roger the surface wind 1-10/5 knots. Visibility between 2 and 300 meters. Zero vertical visibility. 
The Q;'<;H is 1029 and nosig. (no significant change) This weather seems to be coming in waves, 
and in and out between 2 and 300 feet visibility. 
2 and 300 meters, thank you. OK we need for CAT we can't do CAT 3. We, it's 300 meters, 
it's 2 and 300 meters it's below CAT 2. \Ve can't go to Waterkloof. Urn, can you confirm that 
conditions at Waterkloof are roughly the same please. 
That is affirm. 
OK from our present position we would like a direct track to the Delta November Victor, and 
if you could also when you speak to Durban ask them for priority clearance into Durbs. And 
If also possible we'd like the latest weather for Durbs if you could supply us \',ith that. 
Roger, approved 
Urn .... maybe Bloemfontein. How is Bloemfontein Captain in terms of time-wise, are we not 
closer to Bloemfontein from here. 
Vb, we can quickly stick in let me see, you can put in Bloemfontein on the NA V aid, urn go to 
No. 97 and just put in Bloemfontein. 
Coordinates. 
Coordinates and frequency then we can have a look at that. 
OK fine Captain. 
And confirm we are cleared direct to the Delta November Victor. 
Direct Delta November Victor and we have the weather. It is CAVOK there,visibility 10 Km 
plus. 
Any runway news? 
All, the surface wind is 1-105 knots, any runway you like. 
Great, thanks very much and we'd like to put runway 23 on request then. 
Roger copy could you confirm the problem? 
Yes, we have a passenger that's uh particularly ill, and needing very very urgent medical 
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attention. 
Roger are. you .happy with level 290? 
290's fine and jf it's possible for you to just assist us in requesting Durban for an ambulance, or 
even a helicopter to be on standby please. 
Roger standby 
Is it not on the ..... ? 
l\ot on mine Captain. rm jusLgQing to get it from. 
Bloemfontein 
Bloemfontein, OK rYe got it here Captain. 
(Engineer) 
r 
Man I do, I actually think Bloemfontein at this point is probably going to be roughly .... 
OK rye got the coordinates. It's South 2S 
OK let"s, what's the frequency? 1 P? 
OK the frequency is 11-+1 Captain. 
1Pl. Insert Oh. 1-+0 insert South. 
OK South is 2906 
06 
And East is 261 
Is that 29060 or 2906 
29060 Captain. 
Right. 
And East is 26181 
6181 
and 1 
1, OK. 2618 OK. let's try again, East? 26181. 
Yes Captain. 
OK, IS5 OK and Durban at this stage, 98, Durban is 11250 and South, if you could get Durban's 
coordinates. In fact here we are 29582,29582 East uh, 30571,30571. 195. It's about 10 miles 
difference. Most of the paes are going there and uh, I think that's probably our best bet. 
(To engineer) Yea OK let's go for a manual cruise point 84. 
OK. Alright, I've inserted manual cruise mach point 8.4, so that we can get there as quickly as 
possible. 
OK Captain 
You can work out your descent. We're gonna .... I'm gonna request a high speed descent with 
no speed restrictions, with a straight in ILS runway 23, so we'll end up on a right base no doubt. 
OK Captain. I have got the new headings for ... 
Thanks, and let's just see, Durban is 1 point no AJpha 150 we'll insert direct 2-4 AJpha insert. 
And it's not a big heading change I don't think. Springbok 239, Victor Delta, climb level 290. 
Thank you very much. You're clear direct to Delta November Victor flight level 290 high speed 
all the way. Vb at Durban there will be a helicopter from the airforce waiting to take the 
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passenger to Addington hospital. They're expecting you, priority landing. 
Tha-nk you verylJ)l1ch Springbok 239. 
OK Captain .. _ ... .102 miles sir. 
102 miles. 
Yes, from Delta November Victor. 
OK let's give you Delta November. Vic, your side it should be a 179 miles. And l"JI take it on 
my side 1125. I put in a mach poInt 855 cruise. 
55 cruise 
\Vhat do you want to do now? 
Sir I must put in_ 
1\0, no it's already there. I say rve put it in. 
OK sor1)'. 
OK. so if you want to, you can just stick in your descent. 
OK. ah. 
Or do you want to do a manual descent? 
rd like to do a manual, ja rd like to fly it manually. 
:'.Ianual 
:-'lanually Captain please sir. 
1\0 problem, 102 miles for the descent. 
Affirmative Sir 
29000 feet. Have you got it, OKin fact it won't be there 1199. 
(singing) 
Let's speak to the chaps on VHF. I'm just off VHF 1 for the moment. 
OK Sir, OK I'll just listen out. 
Durban area, this is Springbok 239 good morning. 
Springbok 239 go ahead. 
.... the Jo'burg control standing by your latest surface data please. 
OK the surface v.ind in Durban is 140 at less than 5 knots. CAVOl<, the temperature 18, Ql\i'H 
1020. 
Copies 1405 in that case runway 23 please and QNH 1020 and confirm nosig. 
Nosig. 
OK I'm back on air, the weather in Durban is fine. 
Ja. 
It's CAVOl<, we can plan on runway 23 temperature 18 degrees and the QNH 1020. Thanks 
Captain. 
Runway 02 and the inbound .... outbound .... 
(to cabin) OK I'm just off the air again. 
OK. 
Durban traffic this is Springbok 239, good morning. 
239 Go ahead. Passenger on board the flight, urn, we would like to deplane him first and as 
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quickly as possible, there is a military helicopter, I woulu aSSUJlle it's a Puma, waiting to take this 
person to Addi"ngtoh hospital, could you please assist us with a stretcher to have it ready as soon 
as possible and to board the aeroplane first of all in fact if you could standby a second I can tell 
you where this person is sitting. 
OK will do. 
OK, they tell me he's sitting in economy class or whatever. OK this passenger is sitting in 40 
Bravo economy class. We are going' to keep all the other passengers seated until you can deplane 
this passenger, so you come on board as the doors open, with your stretcher. 
OK Captain, we']] get that all organized. 
Thank you. 
OK, Captain we're ready sir, um, I'l1 gi\'e you the chart. 
OK. 
OK it's Durban, Louis Botha runway 23 Captain and the frequency is 110.3 sir. 
OK. 
....... The initial approach altitude is 2000 feet Captain, and we'll intercept the localizer at 2000 
feet and ... the uh, frequency is Delta November 310, which is the outer marker and descent now 
to a height of 225 feet. 
OK 225. 
And then I see the outer marker crossing altitude is um, 1296. 
Yes, 1296. 
OK, so one bug at uh, 296. 
Single bug at 296. 
OK, OK where the hell is that? 96 Oh. 
OKjust move the bottom bug to 296 and leave the other single bug on 225 no 296. There's 200 
feet, so just before 300. 
OK sorry sony sorry sorry 200. 
That's it OK And do you have another bug? That's it next to the other one, that's it. 
OK thank you Captain. 
Springbok 239 we'll continue with Durban 119,1 
119,1 for Durban now thank you bye bye. Durban good morning again. This is Springbok 239 
Delta November Victor level 290 descending 20 miles. 
Roger Springbok 239 descent level 130. 
Oops. Level 130 thank you Springbok 239. OK well get level 130 on the window. 130 set. 
Thank you Captain. OK so we intercept now .... 25 feet sir. 
Checked set. 
And the missed approach checklist says. plan Bravo heading for 3000 feet then turn left and 
return to Delta November or as directed by ATC. OK. 
OK. 
And in the event of a urn ... Captain ... and select the go around thrust levers. 
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Go levers first, go levers first. 
yes -
Go levers first, go around thrust. 
Go around thrust and flap actiye. And we require flap 
Positive climb, gear up. 
Sorry positive climb and gear up tDanks Copilot.There's evel)1hing Captain. 
OK fine we require we hopefulty· J,\ill not have to divert. Fuel required "for Bloemfontein 11.1, 
Smuts 118, and uh, at this stage I'm sure that we'll just take that away for a moment. 16 So \\e're 
actually fat on fuel. - To engineer - 12 tons back to Joey's thank you OK. So we can hang 
around for 15 minutes if necessary OK 12.5 is the VRE. 
125 
165 and 205 
Yes, Sir. 
115 is the go-around EPR \vhich is to come. 22..':; is set 2 times and we said it's for runway 23. 
100 percent and any time you're ready you can .... It's going to be a high speak descent, so I 
think maybe what we can do is let's go down at 90 miles. 
90 iI.!iles. 
We']] see how it goes are you happy withthat? 
rm happy with that yes sir. 
That's it and this is my plate 
And if ... ve have a .... Captain at Delta November, ..,ve']] be at direc!... .. 
Great stuff, thank you. Direct entry at 5000 feet. It says here if you reaqthe' small print here. 
Initial altitude 5000 or higher MSA 
OK, OK 
There you go. 
I see that, ja. And the MSA for that area is now 5100 feet sir. 
Champion, thank you. OK let's just hear how this oak is doing. 
Right Captain, you're calling? 
Yes please how's our passenger doing? ... (blah, blah,blah). I'm just off the air again, we actually 
need 70, 60 percent hey? (refers to engines.) 
Ja, about 25000 feet. 
In fact we've already got 320, so that's it, we can pull the power off. OK you can just follow 
the pitch bar. Get the dot behind the cross, 130 we have ALT, AO indicated air speed, OK I'm 
just going to speak to the passengers quickly. 
Fine, Captain. 
Ladies and gentlemen ........ OK, how are we doing, 22.66 looking good. You want to when you 
look at your height we're descending down to 2000 feet so whatever you read there subtract 2000 
from it, multiply it by 3 plus 10 miles, and if that's what the DME reads, that means we are fine. 
So 2000 minus 2 is 18 times 3 is 54, 18 X 3 is 54 plus 10 is 64. 50 at 10 000 we should at least 
be at 64. We are at 64. So we're looking good. 
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Captain rve got Delta l'.'ovember indicating and also coding. 
Th:lnks very much, I actunlly checked it a bit earlier. Thank you vcry much. I will get up 235 
for us on both sides which is the middle mnrker and the outer market selected. 
Can you gr.·e me 50 left please Captain, sir 
5 degrees Ie ft. 
Can I select direct Delta 1\ovember. 
At this stage we are cleared diteetl), Delta 1\O\'ember Victor. 
Delta 1\ovember Victor OK 
So when we get a bit closer he'll probably tum us left and then ... 18 less 2 is 15 plus 10. 
plus 10.55 
plus 10.55. we're now nt 58 we're looking good for the deceleration as well. 
Springbok 239, at 50 miles descent 5000 feet Q:\H 1020 
50 miles 5000 feet on 1020 for Springbok 239. Right at 50 miles, we're clear 5000 on Q:--:H 10 10, 
correction 1020. 
And Springbok 239 confirm we are under radar control. 
From 50 miles you'll be under radar control. 
Thank you. 
Thanks Captain. OK I can I have .... 500 feet. 
1\ot yet, let's wait for 50 miles. 
OK 
What I can do is I'll give you the inbound curse so that you can get an idea of '" 
Thanks. 
of where we are 236 and 236. 800 to level off, there's 50 miles coming up and 5000 feet. And 
I'll give you indicated airspeed in moment. There we go indicated air speed ALT SEL 50001020. 
And is there any thing else I can do for you? While we're approaching the field? 
Urn, just descent approach checklist please Captain. 
Thank you descent approach. That's that, thanks descent approach please OK 
(engineer checklist.) 
Do you want some auto brake or are you happy? 
urn, medium please. 
You want medium OK 
Yes, thanks. 
Alright, medium autobrake, inboards on, bugs EPR's set or EPR's to come, thank you .. set., 
Selcal is off ... checked and has been cross checked bugs set OK standing by on that. Thanks 8700 
feet now. 
OK, I've just OK thanks I've just ... 
On the high side? You think so 8000 minus 2 is 6 x 4 is 18. 
18 
plus 10 is 28 
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And we are at 38L So we are actuillly far, we're low! Do you see that, 50. 
The hindsight. 
1\0, we are actually low, we are Iowan the profile we should have been for this distance, a little 
bit higher - Watch, what happens is we're actually lower than we should be. 
Thaes right but what I'm saying ..... 
Oh, is that what you say.' .. 
Oh, OK our rate of descent is too high. 
Yes thaes right. 
ACC green now, what we can do is keep the speed up. 
Keep the speed up. 
Ja for about 5 miles or so and then start decelerating 800 feet. 
Springbok 239 from Durban, could you advise if you'd like to go VMC we have no report of 
other traffic in the area. 
OK we're happy with the Victor Mike Charlie descent Springbok 239 
OK descent circuit altitude and uh, passing 3000 feet if you could call tower 11S.7 
Roger when passing circuit 18,7 when passing 3000 feet thank you Springbok 239. OK we 
cleared 3000 feet, you've got ALT select. And I'll give you 3000 initially 
OK thanks Captain 
300 knots for the time being should be good. 
Thanks Captain 
And um .... we'll just maintain 3000 till about 15 miles and then we'll go down. 
Alright. 
When we get to about 15 miles I'll give you ILS your side with DMB hold. The man said we 
cleared for a visual descent, so I'm going to tum you left, onto a heading of about 150. 150. To 
take us just outside the visual marker 1-+5 ALT cell green. 
OK thanks, do you want me to maintain 500 knots, Captain until about... 
la, in fact I'm going to .'lind us dO\\1l to 2000 feet vvith ALT SEL. And I'll just give you ... 1000 
to level off. 
Thanks Captain 
Louis tower, this is Springbok 239 morning, passing 3000 for circuit 23 miles. 
Springbok 239. call finals, the surface \\;nd is almost calm. 
Finals thanks, Springbok 239. And AL T cell green 500 to level off. (beeper) OJ( don't worry. OK 
we'll maintain this until about 15 miles, and then you can decelerate. I'm going to turn you a 
little bit further left about so, so we don't cramp ourselves. When you get to 15 miles you can 
close power completely. 
Aye Captain. 
And we'll maintain 2000 feet. OK coming up 15 can I give you U.s your side. 
ILS 
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OK, 1103 Take ILS on my side. And we can complete descent approach please. 
( checklist) 
Power now Captain 
OK you can go to uh, B fly ... computer on your side and then they are set fly ... computer B 
that it? 
OK. 
OK you can take power right 6<ff·maintain 2000 feet. Thanks I think ... and I will give you 206 
knots. And at 10 miles I"ll give you 1560 feet in the window. 
Thanks. OK can I have flap 1. 
Flap 1 selected. 
And speed 186 sir. 
OK flaps 1 206 is your speed. Flaps are fUnning. OK it \\ill be flaps 5, 186. OK flaps 1 you have. 
Thanks Captain. 
OK, 1500 feet, in the \\indow, and we can go d0\V11 if you like and I"ll give you indicated 
airspeed and AL T SEL. 
Captain, can I ask you a question - what is the .... speed. 
You can, ja, if you want to you can. It's not a problem 200 fl to level. 
Thanks Captain. 
rm going to tum you right a little to cut the comer. 
OK. 
:t\ow at 170. And we have been cleared for the approach so can I give you ILS. 
ILS. 
ILS you got 
Thanks 
Flaps 5 
And flap 5, and speed 185. 
185, 186. OK 
Ja apparently he's holding on. Check speed a little more power. Flaps 5-5 "ith the green light. 
Give me flap 10 
10 selected. 
And 166. 
166. 10 10 green light. 
Thanks Captain. I think I might have turned you a bit quick if necessary 111 give you vertical 
speed and we11 just follow the glide slope. 
OK 
NAY green 
Give me runway beading please Captain. 
Clear to land. 
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OK NA V lights are green, go around anned. 
Thank you. -
Can I give you missed approach altitude? 
Missed approach altitude please. 
3000 set. 
And ... 
Check speed. I'JI give you flap~ 20. 
Flaps 20. 
Speed ",ill be good. Just leave the power where it is, just leave the power I-t6. 
And gear down Captain. 
22 in the green light gears down. Landing checklist down to ... please OK now you can reduce 
power slowly. (Checklist). Flaps 25 
Flaps 25 please Captain. 
It's armed - thank you. 25 25 you got? 
Thanks flaps uh 30 Captain. 
Flaps 30 and speed about 131, that's plus 5. 
Thanks Captain. It's 30 30 the green light. Thank youjust relax, just relax. Now slowly get it up 
that's it now just leave the power see what the speed does, then do something. That's it now 
you're doing fine. OK that was minima and we're clear to land. 
Thanks, Captain. 
90 knots 80 knots 70 - 60 and we'll take the second right. OK you can come out of reverse. OK 
standing by for 20 knots. 
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Alright after start please. 
OK after start checklist, say .... 
Said there's a bit of anti ice on plt'ase 
Is that what they said? 
mumbles - alright. 
1l1ank you. 
OK after start 
Anti ice. 
On. 
Zero. 
Electrical. 
We have no lights, essential nonnal. 
.... .valve switches 
Checked open. 
Hydraulics . 
Auto and nomlal. 
Doors. 
All closed. 
Ground equipment. 
Clear. 
Clear my side, after start checklist complete. 
OK and you can hand that over to Bob.1. 
Thank you. 
OK the lights off. 
OK. 
Let's just have a bit more light on this. How do you like the lights? 
Vb, it's fine thanks. 
OK? 
Yes. 
Alright, you have control. 
OK, tbank you. I've got control. 
Springbok 239 taxi. 
Springbok 239 taxi bolding runway 03. 
Holding 03 Springbok 239. OK on the line. Lights OK. Bill. 
Thank you that's fine tbanks. 
10 flap please. 
10 flap 10 selected. 
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OK can I give you my briefing so long Captain? 
OK 
From a hundred knots this \,ill be a goal orientated take off. In the event of a decision to stop 
before VI, which is 129, one hundred and 29 knots r \\ill apply full brakes, disengage throttle close 
thrust levers, raise the speed brakes manually, apply reverse thrust on symmetrical engines and the 
engineer help me there. 
Full reverse thrust. 
Full reverse thrust on symmetrical enginers, OK the engine ... in the flight path is climb straight 
ahead, on heading 5 D:\lE right hand turn climbing to 6 -100 feet uh, 430 feet heading t 1\'O\'ember 
Lima, climb. Will be 6380 further climb \\ill be under radio control and contact ATC as soon as 
~ - ~ 
possible. 
OK will do. 
The takeoff briefing says takeoff will be on nlllway 03 left, uh. we ha\'e VI 129 V rotated. 129 is 
V2 1-16 knots. 
I'll deal \\ith that, just give me the departure brie fing. 
Vh, departure SAD says ifs uh we're going to be ding 1\'0. 2 Alpha departure, we're going to climb 
straight ahead to Ja Smuts 55 D:\IE where we're going to be turning right. 
la. 
5.5 D:\IE ..... ? crossing 8000 feet that shouldn't be a problem. 
Ja. 
And at flight level 90 we'll set course as per flight plan. 
OK. We'll just set it to 90 there hey? 
Yes 90 set. 
It's only at, we'll go to 90 climb to 130 and \vhen we get to 130 thats when we can tum right OK? 
That's right OK. 
Right, OK and can I go in with ?? Ready Bob? 
Thank you. 
To the left, left aileron spoiler up right aileron down and zero to the right right aileron spoiler up 
left aileron down zero fOlwards. 2 indices and zero back 2 indices - feels very light and zero and 
the rudders, going to the left alright? 
Alright. 
OK 2 indices, full left and zero and going to the right, 2 indices all right, and zero 1-18, OK because 
the packs are still on 1-18, 
Ja. 
1-18 check four times the speed 129, 129, 1-16, 186 226. 
226 
10 flaps required 10, 10 green light and we've got 2 and 3/4 unit set, switch set, light out. Read 
the before take off checklist please. 
Thank you. The before take off flight and instruments. 
Alive. 
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Copilot. 
Flaps. 
10_10 gr.een ~o light. 
All greens, light controls. 
Checked. 
Stabilizer trim 
2 3!-l set $'"itch set light out. 
Thank you, the galley power)s. on, the APU is off, fuel is set to takeoff with the heat ofr 
airconditioning and air pressurization, set and auto and that's it, lights. 
Checked. 
Checked at the back. Take off data. 
Reviewed. 
Take off briefing. 
That's completed. 
Thank you that's to the line 
Thanks. I take it the cabin crew are seated. 
Springbok 239 tower 118,1 
118,1 Smuts tower Springbok 239, good afternoon, we're approaching the hold. 
Roger Springbok 239, the surface wind is 130, less than 5 knots, visibility at the end of the runway 
is down to 300 metres. You are clear to takeoff and your airborne frequency is 12-115. 
Roger 12-1.5 airborne clear for takeoff, and could you give us the midzone on the rollout as well 
please. 
Uh, the midzone is round about uh, the reading is actually 550 metres and "the end 300 metres. 
Thank you Springbok 239. OK so we can go to that 300 meter is alright. 
Yes. 
At Johannesburg and uh, get down to, to about 200 at Jo'burg, can I take it dO\\1J to the line? Can 
I take it down to the line. OK we'll do all this put the radar on the transponder. Can you .... to the 
body gear please Bob? 
Cabin Crew. 
Alerted. 
Landing and strobe lights 
They're on. 
INS transponder. 
Set. 
The pac valves are all off, ignition, fligbt start, we're standing by body gear, takeoff clearance. 
OK and we have tbe takeoff clearance bey, tbat has been obtained. 
Obtained. 
Obtained, thank you standing by body gear. 
Standing by body gear. 
Alright, we can see it looks alrigbt it's clear 
Yes, What we can see. 
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Springbok 239 could we just have the runway lights up please on max. 
Win do .. 
OK we're going to use this, I'll put EPR on the meantime, do you just want to get back onto the 
centre line and we'lI go from there. 
OK we can disarm the body gear. 
OK body gear disarnled. 
Body gear disarmed, that's before. takeoff checks completed. 
OK let's go clear for take off. 
OK standby for take off. 
Thank you. 
Little bit further up, just get the back of the thrust levers up to about here. 
OK. 
There we go OK. 
1.1. 
Set reduce thrust. 
OK here comes. 
Auto throttle in. 
EPR. 
Thank you. 
Wind is slightly from your right. 
Thank you. 
80 knots throttle bold. 
Checked. 
Thank you and reduce thrust set. 
Thank you. 
VI rotate 50 degrees. What does it look like. 
Gear up please. 
Gear up. Indicated air speed alright? 
Indicated air speed, tbank you. 
OK, one left drift, I'll put in one right. Springbok 239 Good afternoon. 
Good afternoon to you. Springbok 239 climb level 130. 
130 
130 
and Engineer. 130 set, tbanks. 
Climb tbrust? 
OK climb tbrust please. 
Thank you. 
And the gear is clean. Sorry Bob, for crossing you. Uh, can't smoke it's a domestic flight. 
Ja. 
You can cause it's a 239 number. 
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OK vertical speed. 
One_ mile .to gC? hey. 
One mile to go vertical speed 1200 pleose. 
1200 you say, OK that's what you've got. 
Climb thrust set. 
Level 90 stondard 1013. 
013. 
And that's five and a half miles. 
Turn me right please heading 0 .... 
Right. OK speed's alright. 
And, flap 5 please. 
Flap 5 206 OK then 5.5 green. 
And flap, please. 
Just gonna and what I just wanna do I just want to pitch you up a bit here, OK so that it doesn't 
run away. Selected and you want 226 there hey. 
226 Urn. 
310 ]'11 sort that out just now. Still running. 
Still running thank you. 
Little bit right there onto i'iovember Lima, just keep the speed dOWTJ there. I'm going to give you 
indicated air apeed. Alright, so that it doesn't runaway because othemise the flaps are going to 
get damaged. 1.1 green. 
Flaps up please. 
Flaps up please. 
OK and we'll stick in here 250 initially until the leading edges are away. 
OK. 
Flaps up no lights. And now we can go through the 298 knots here bey. 
298 yes, 298. 
And I'll give you vertical speed. There she's gone ALT select. 
Springbok 239 climb level 290 and area 1283. 
Climb level 290 and 1283 cbeers. OK it's now 290. I'll sort it out for you in a second, it's ALT 
select is armed, and would you like, say vertical speed and a bit bey. 
Vertical speed. yes. 
(Talks wbile tbe otbers are talking) 
About 1500 for the meantime. We're through 130, we can turn right and I'll give you direct to 1 
Alpha. Just see whether that looks good. Is that right? Can I give you INS mode? 
INS Thank you. 
OK. INS we have. That will be probably round about 180, well looks about 160 somewhere around 
there. 
OK Standing by landing ligbts and seat belts. 
Looks alright out here. 
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Thank you after take off checklist completed. 
Thilnks .. 
Thank you. 
Alright what time were we airborne. 
About 3 minutes ago. 
3 minutes ago 26. 
16 ja. 
Whenever you're ready we can go to P.\!S. 
We can go to P.\lS now. 
OK P~!S P.\!S ALT select's off and auto throttle in. 
Thank you. 
Service is poor. 
Vel)' poor, I think they've all died at the back. 
OK that's 322 and from there we're going to go to Nowmber Hotel, 225 ... enjoy the flying there. 
Thank you. 
(Heart attack passenger briefing.) 
Capt. OK is he, is his condition stable now or uh .... OK alright, uh, just hang on one second, let's have 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Copilot. 
Capt. 
Eng. 
Capt. 
ATC. 
Capt. 
ATC 
Capt. 
ATC 
a look see did you hear that~ 
Yes, uh. 
Right, stick the autopilot in for a start. so that we can all think about this. The guy is about to die, 
we don't have any real no .. we have no real medical... apart from a nurse. 
Ja. 
Can I speak to that nurse please? OK well I would like to have a word \\;th her, if she can 
possibly spare a moment. In any case in the meantime we're going to t1)' to get to the nearest 
place, OK but I need to speak to her. Looks like we're stuck \\;th that. 
Ja, from our side the pressurization's going to be the same, so there's no effect on his health on 
that side. 
I'd like to review the weather, get Jo'burg's weather. 
Ja, just keep flying there, we're heading for 290 which is nearly 2 miles away. 
290. 
Let me just ask them what the weather's like. 
Thank you. 
Urn, let's just get to 1283 here. Jo'burg area Springbok 239 good afternoon. 
Afternoon Springbok 239 good afternoon, go ahead. 
We have uh, an ill passenger on board and it would appear we need to return to Johannesburg. 
Could you give us the latest weather please. 
Roger RVR is deteriorated right dO .... ll to 200 metres, the temperature 5 due point 5 QNH 1029. 
How visibility procedures in force. 
OK can you give us uh, ask the people if we need trend on that weather please. 
Roger it seems to be deteriorating at the moment. 
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OK thank you, and if you could give us Bloemfontein weather please, uh, in the meantime. 
Roger standby. 
OK guys listen up, it says here it's 200 metres and deteriorating DOW, the aeroplane's fine, if the 
airfield was a bit more capable, I would be quite tempted to have a go at that. I don't know what 
you think about it, but Johannesburg is not it's only a CAT 2 ILS. 
ILS. 
And if ifs getting worse we don't.have the lighting for. .. 
Sure I second that. 
So I don't think Jo'burg is a good option at this time. 
We'll see wh:Jt is Bloemfontein's weather and um ... 
~. -
Bloemfontein's about the close ... where else is close by ... Waterkloof? 
\\'aterkloof. Waterkloof will be also 
1 to go. Johannesburg Springbok 2.39 while you're about will you get Waterkloofs weather please. 
Roger the uh, about 10 minutes ago we got Waterkloof and it was uh, also fog. bound. 
OK we need better details than that please. 
Could you give us an actual on Waterkloof on the hotline? 
OK standby. 
Sounds like we're committed. either Durban or Bloemfontein. 
I'm going to put Brava Lima on air, I think it's 3180 check on that. We're going more or less in 
the right direction so let's stay \,ith that for a little while until we've made up our minds here. 
And both are good medical facilities, so ... 
Absolutely ja. 
Ja. 
Springbok 239 Johannesburg. 
Go ahead. Uh Durban is CA YOK, Bloemfontein CA YOK, Waterkloof, they've got about 400 
metres visibility. 
OK 400 and uh, no ceiling I guess. 
Negative, unreadable. 
Looks like we're going to have to keep on our way here and I'll let you know our intentions 
shortly. 
OK I just want to see, we've got the DME otherwise we've got tbe PMS. 
Skipper, at this stage we haven't got the Durban and Bloemfontein's weather did we? 
Ja we did. 
Did we? Clear, OK thank you. 
It's just a matter of which one is closest. I'm just going to stick it in here, ub, I'm going to put 
Durban just can you just stick in. I'll read to you Bloemfontein. 
Ja OK 
Is South 29060 
29606. 
And east 26181. 
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26181. 
OK stick. that. one in there 200 miles OK and now let's go uh. doesn't matter let's go to the ne;..' 
99 to \vhere is Bloemfontein. Look at that hey. Just page it back and let's put Durban in, that i 
Durban. 
That is Durban. 
Let me just check that the co·ords are right. South 2958-l. 
Vh, negative I've got here 290, 
Just stick these in .. , South 29583. 
295. 
583. 
583. 
East 305070. 
305070. 
50. 
OK sorry 570. 
East 30570 
East 570. 
OK and that's 226 miles. It's a toss up. 
OK. 
What was the other one? 
On board manager. 
Let's have a look at it now. 
I just want you to keep us informed please what's happening? 
OK \vhat I'm going to do is I'm just going to talk to Springbok Jo'burg and ask them which has 
got the better facilities, uh, \\lith the most convenient facilities. Closest to the airport. 
Ambulance ja. 
Alright, just give them a try. Just listen out please, OK, I'll be \\lith you in a_ s.ec. 
Sorry. 
13025 hey. You just keep an eye on the aeroplane, we're going in the right direction so we can 
keep our options open in the meantime Springbok 239 13025. 
Springbok 239 Go ahead. 
Roger we have a problem here on board, we uh, have a passenger who appears is uh, critically ill. 
Jo'burg is out. Durban and Bloem are about equidistant. Could you just get onto our local people 
and see which has the facilities that would be available, we'd be on the ground in either place in 
about 25 minutes. Can they have them on the spot and call back to us. It would appear to me that 
as everybody else is going to durban we may as well head there because there's no difference in 
the distacne. But uh, we'd like to know that there is medical assistance available. It would appear 
that this might be a heart attack. 
Roger standby captain, we'll get back to you. 
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OK thinking a bit further about that... Durbs ... if we go to Bloem, it's the same distance, there's 
no difference .. Vh, if we go to Durban then all the other folks also they get to where they want to 
go. 
la makes sense. 
There's only 10 miles difference in it. 
And Addington hospital is not tha~ far away. 
Addington is probably the close.;;t.hey? 
I'm not sure but I would say it's close ja. 
Addington is closest. 
25 minutes to get there, the ambulance \,ill be there in any case. 
la. 
The thing we must do is ... 
Flat it. 
Flat out on the ... just wind it to cruise. 
So we're going 
~Ianualand go point 88. OK it's in knots there, you can just go 300 and 350 knots - alright 350 ja, 
350 will be good at this level in any case. 
OK 350. 
Doesn't want to take it OK just just... 
Doesn't want to take it. 
lust go to uh, just take it off. 
Springbok 239 ops. 
Go ahead. 
239 Durban and Bloemfontein will have helicopters standing by to transport the passenger straight 
to hospital. 
OK, we're going to go to Durban because tbe distance is the same and we'd like to have them at 
the aircraft if we could even cut out the taxing if possible if they could get them onto the end of 
the runway. 
OK we'll get the ambulance at the end of the runway, and tbe helicopter on standby. 
Thank you tbank you I'm with you. (to Copilot). Alright so let's have a look, let's summarize what 
the bell we've done bere. lo'burg is out. 
Ja. 
Bloemfontein is about tbe same. 
Same distance as Durban. 
Durban is tbe same, the weatber is tbe same. Everybody can get to wbere tbey want to go if we go 
to Durban. And this guy's cbances are just as good. bey. 
Yes, excellent. 
Happy witb tbat? 
And tbe passengers will be bappy as well. 
OK anybody got any better ideas? 
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No that sounds good to Dle, it's just that nurse hasn't come back to us at all. 
1"11 tell you when.)o descent, we're going to go absolutely on the ... alright. Let me just put it in 
here. 
( .... to nurse). 
1"11 be with you in one second. 
mumbles. 
Taking us off P\!S here. That shQuld take us at point 8.8 which will be on the clackers alright? 
Hello flossie? (speaks to nurse) (copilot & engineer converse). 
l\ow let's see. \Ve're going to Durbs so we want 1125 here. Springbok 239. 
Go ahead 239. 
Roger we do have this emergency. We'd like to declare an emergency. \Ve'd like direct clearance 
and radar vectors. for 23 at Durban. 
Roger, you're cleared direct Delta Kovember Victor. Would you like to maintain level 290? 
Affirm level 290. OK keep this fast, keep the TAS up. 
We'll advise Durban to be ready for you. 
OK thank you. 
VA 125 
Thank you 12.5. 
Thank you. 
65 205. 
And did we get the temperature and that ... I. 
I'll get it for you now, in fact the ATS is on now. 
Is it thank you I've got them on. 
If the ATS's just winds up there, it will give it to us now. \Vhat about ]0 'burg guy's. I can't see that 
it's a good option. 
No, if we didn't get in we'd delay time and tbis is an emergency. 
]a definately. 
Well we're not going to get in \.itb that weather. But even to bust that you know we could go for 
it in an emergency but I think we would be putting everyone else at risk. 
]a sure, you know we don't know what the systems going to do. 
And it won't be that much quicker, it's going to take us 15,20 minutes to get there in any case, 
Alright, decision made, let's go with it. We will live with it. whatever. Durban alright? 
OK. 
Now we're cleared direct Delta November Victor, which is number 4 Alpha. 
4 Alpha. 
Put it in there. We're going flat out, we're going to descent also flat out. 
mumbles. 
Remember, the aeroplane is going to descent very fast, so. 
Durban - surface ""ind is 130 .... 
OK got that Bob? ... I'll give you a hand through it but you keep flying. 
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OK. 
Because. uh, ~hat gives me a bit of time to mess around here and. what we·re going to descenc 
right all the ... so from 29000 we nomlally need about 87 miles. 
87 miles. 
We're going to descend, we're going to keep it on until we get to 50 miles. 
50 miles. 
And we're going to go down apsolutely flat out and we']] pick up the speed brake, alright. 
". . 
OK. We must keep the speed up all the way. 
OK. 1"11 tell you when to run the flaps and everything OK? 
OK Captain, thanks 
Keep it in very tight. Ha\"e you got a moment there Bob? 
Thank you. 1"m with you. 
Alright here it is, let's have a quick briefing on this. Durban ILS runway 23. 4 ~!arch 9~ is the date 
of the plate. 
Yes. 
1103 at 25 feet is the airfield elevation. It's going to be in vectors 5100 feet initially. I'll radar chart 
and I'll monitor it. Urn in for a right hand. 
A right hand. 
Turn to the ILS 236 inbound and the ... 2000 feet. The outer marker at 1296 feet. 
1296. 
1296 feet and a minima of 225. 
1296. 
225. And 800 metres vjsibility, but it's CAVOK, so it shouldn't be a problem. 
Shouldn't be a problem. 
Alright do you just want to review the go around there please. 
OK the go around is going to be go around trust, disengage auto throttle, urn, go around thrust, 
flaps, positive thrust. 
Go around attitude. 
Go around attitude. 
That's it. 
OK. F1aps to 20. 
Right. 
Positive climb gear up. 
OK. 
And, we'll clean up as soon as possible, contact ATe, uh, the must approach procedures to climb 
onto runway heading to 3000 feet which we'll set up. 
OK. 
And urn then turn left and return to Delta November, as directed. 
We've got Delta November these, the other one we can put is Romeo Uniform here. 
Romeo Uniform yes. 
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23.5'1 
Let's get hold of this bunch here ting, ting. 
(Speaks to cabin crew.) 
What did you make it? \\'hat was it? 
Altitude is 5000. 
Oh, make it 6.500. 
150 225 is set and 1290 something 
1296 
96 thanks. How are we doing. 136 miles to go. Gee, it's taking a long time isn't it. 
Ja. 
Air Springbok 239 can we go over to Durban please? 
Roger Durban's waiting for you. 
What frequency? 
199 please. 
Thank you. Squawk 77 put it on please. 
27T? 
1\0 7700. Durban Springbok 239. 
Springbok 239 Good afternoon, go ahead we have that you have an emergency, you have priority 
no. 1 Durban conditions are CAVOK. The surface wind is almost calm runway 23 is yours. 
Roger, thanks we'd appreciate that ... vectors it \,ill probably be for a short ILS up to 23. 
Roger copy. 
Hell I can see the sea, so we must be getting close. 
Yes, close. 
OK the same 2 altitudes initially from 87 no that's East London, not going to help us much, how 
about Durban - 82 initially. 
OK. 
OK within 50 miles 6000 and then dO\m to 5 and 40 miles. I'll master this as we descend and we'll 
take it from there alright? 
OK that's fine. 
\\-'by's it slowing dO\vn? Here it comes again. OK. Is there anything else that we can think of? As 
I understand it... we can't do anything more. 
No. 
We have ground crew standing by don't we? 
Yeah, we'll bave everybody. 
Ja that's fine. 
Let's ask Durban traffic what's going on there. 
J a, if the helicopter's there, what the hell. 
Durban traffic Springbok 239 
Springbok 239 go ahead. 
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Roger we're a hundred miles out and we'll be on tbe ground in 15 minutes, can you give us the 
status of what's happening on tbe ground there? 
Captain, everyone's waiting for you at the moment, there's a helicopter and an ambulance standing 
by right at the end of the runway now. 
OK we'll need some stairs there as well so that we don't have to blow the shute, we can get this 
person off in as short a time as p0ssible. 
Roger the engineers have takeh the stairs out towards the end of the runway. 
OK 
Hell, they're on the ball today hey. 
Durban? 
Ja. 
Lost the test.... OK still need another 50 miks. We seem to be going bloody slowly. It's the wind 
block. that's why ... tail wind 61-l ground speed, we haven't had that all the way. I can tell you that 
much. 
)\;0 I don't think so. 
It's a new inclusion. OK that means .... 50 will still be alright, we'll just slow it down, run the flaps, 
l<1st minute. 
Alright. 
85 or 90 you would like to start the descent? 
About 50. 
50? 
OK we go down vel)' fast, '"ith the speed brake up. 
Vel)' fast ja. 
Ja. 
And up here we T AS of 530 as soon as we start descent it's going to drop off. That's not really 
true, the TAS \'rill stay up, but ub, closer we can go in \'rith tbat using the ,,,ind there 600 knots, 
600 ground speed, we'll use it as long as we can and then we'll just pull the pTug. 
So disengage the speed brakes, to apply descent at a maximum. 
Yip. 
Springbok 239 Durban when ready descent 1130. 
When ready descend 1130 Springbok 239, 130 
130 in the window. 
OK and I suggest you put it into ALT Cell, take the auto throttle we can leave the auto throttle 
in. 
OK. 
Just put speed in there. 
OK. 
That'll keep the speed where it is and then when we're ready. we just go. 
Got indicated air speed. 
OK once we want to go down Dot yet. 
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Not yet, ja. 
An~ the~ of course we can only llse vertical speed with auto throttle speed. 
Can't use it no. 
Indicated air speed wont work together \\ith it. I'll put this on ALT hold just to keep the flight 
direct right OK? 
OK. 
In the meantime we're all set up? That's good. In fact the easiest way is just to leave it in PMS 
.,:, r 
there, it's got 3-15 knots in there. 
Ja. 
Ja. 
We'll just disengage it when we get dO\\l1, we'll put it back inra Y.\!S. 
P\fS 
20 miles. 
20 miles. 
It feels a lifetime for us, imagine how it feels for that guy hey? 
For that guy - you're right Bob. I was just thinking the same thing. Tempted for that return to 
Jo'burg but urn too dicey. TIle best thing to do "ill be to home into the ADF. I"ll ask him for 
clearance. Cause that will give us a right hand base. 
Ja. 
Shortest distance right hand base. 
Springbok 239 .... 
To ATe..... OK you're ready for it? (to Copilot). 
Yes. 
Just go back to PMS there. PMS and engage it that's it. OK throttle hold, and speed. 
OK can I disengage, 
No leave it, leave it there, shouldn't come back. PMS 5000 why are we not going dO\vn? Select. 
Descend. Descend manually. 
It's on PMS. 
Throttle hold. OKjust close them manually just pull them closed. We can leave it, using PMS, OK, 
and you can pick up the speed brake now. There you can see Durban. there's the, the harbour, 
So that's where, just about where we're aiming right now is dead right - you got it? 
OK that's fine. 
OK. 
How's the cabin Bob? 
Yes, I only have 2 and a half thousand to go. 
I'll just up that speed a bit, because now tbat we 360 doesn't want to doesn't like it. 
OK, he said 1020 now 2500 feet now 
Checks. 
OK we're not going anywhere witb this tbing. I'm just going to set it up for you. autopilt's still 
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engaged. Vertical speed, rn put in as much as we can. ALT select is armed, anned right. 
Anned, checke·d. --
And auto throttle just flick that - it's OK there it goes. And we'll try and descend right on the 
checkers here. 30 miles to go 2..1 miles, we're looking OK 5000 feet. OK now we w:mt to ... but go 
for the ADF's alright. (to ATe .. ) 
I'm taking out J:\S captain. 
Yip Ok heading mode onto theADF's and we'll set up 236 up here OK? 
OK. 
236 that's for the right turn. 
Seems we're going down like a brick here Bob, I'm just going tD·do all this. 
Yes. 
OK. 
Seatbelts. 
And the bugs are set at 125. 
125. 
165,205. 
205. 
We've got 225 and 1296. So to go around there please will. This is set on heading that one was 
there ans ... 48, we've actually catching up so fast we might have even started too early, we can just, 
rlllet you know to take the speed brake away in a minute. OK descend approach. please. 
OK descend approach auto brakes. 
Uh, let's have them on OK. 
Yes. 
We'll take it medium. 
Medium is fIne. 
Landing lights. 
ON. 
Landing data. 
... set. 
Radio altimeters 
They are set. 
SELCOR 
Off. 
OK the fuel is set for landing with the heat off. 
OK, and I think you can start taking the speed brake away now. Keep the speed up you can always. 
pick it up again once .... 
Yes. 
We don't want to we want to try and keep that speed up as long as possible. 
As long as possible, that's fine. 
Pressurization is set and ... lights and circuit breakers here been checked. 
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Checked. 
Checked' my side-.. 
OK that's through 10 000 feet. 
OK lefs 
Alright leave it there. I'll just slow you down just a touch here, OK'? 
OK 
Just till it stops, and then I'll go back to indicated air speed. 
OK 
Altimeters set and 
We've got 1020 set and cross checked and the ... set 7800 slo>y.th.at down. 
(To ATC) ... 
That noise must stop. 
OK it's not that serious, it's just the needle. 
Radio nav instruments. 
They are, we've got the ILS I'm just going to put it on here 1103. and your side, got the D'\IE hold 
on. That's indicated air speed there. Alright 17 miles, alright, now we're going to have to pull the 
speed brake again so that we can slow the aeroplane down so that we can run the flaps OK? 
We've got 2000 feet to go. And I'll go back to vertical speed and level it off alright. See that 16 
miles on base there - we're going to have to slow it down quite ... 
1000 feet. 
1000 feet. 
Thank you one to go. That's the way ALT select is green. 
ALT Cell. 
Wind our speed back 15 miles. You want to take a little bit to the right here so that we head 
towards those ADFs. 
OK we're clear to 2000. 
800 feet to go - computer switches. 
They are set. 
Thank you descend approach checks completed. 
1187 OK, just remember the old speed brake. How are we doing? 12 miles. Start coming away with 
the speed brake and just let it slow down. 
2000 
2000 feet let's just make sure she levels off here. There she goes. 
OK want to tI)' it manually? 
Yip. disengaging. 
Let's just take this away because all the way away alright? 
Thank you. 
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You've got enough room here, and rm just heading you. we'll just head towards those ADFs that's 
fine 8 miles looks good. don't descend any ... 
1500 feet. 
As you see the airfield over there? I can't seem to just head straight over there. OKjust head for 
those beacons that will give you a nice final appro<lch. 
.,:. . 
OK you can start running your fl<lp now. 
OK Flap one please. 
Alright fl<lp 1 selected. 
Speed 210, 206. 
206, you got. 
It"s 1,1 green. 
Can't see this over here. OK you can stay at 1700 feet th<lt's OK. 
OK 
That's fine, I'll give you ALT hold just keep it where it is. 
OK flap 5 please. 
Flap 5 selected. 
186. 
And 186 is coming on see the glide slope you must start descending now. 
Glide slope. 
rll give you vertical speed, till we can see the airfield. See you can get the runway light there OK 
whenever you can. 
Runway lights. 
You can turn straight onto it, just follow the glide slope dO\'ill. OK 
OK. 
I'll give you about 800 feet a minute that should keep you on until we get to the localizer. We've 
got an ILS mode here. 
Thank you. 
I'll just run the flaps, you keep flying those bars alright? NA V glide slope nav green glide slope 
green. I'm giving you 10 flaps. 170 160 ... 
10 flaps selected 10,10 green. 
Just wind the bank in so you go on the centre line. Keep her going down. Ok 10,10 green flaps 20 
selected, 1..J6. Just keep an eye on there, you're looking dead right.Speed will come off slowly. 
Turn onto the heading bank in the meantime. That's fine. Now start rolling out and ease the 
rudder descent a little bit there, you're going down a little bit too fast. Gears down and the green 
light and descent 5. Read us landing checklist please Bob. 
(Checklist). 
OK., a little bit of thrust the speed is dropping off quite fast there. Just fly those bars and you're 
in the pink dead right OK 25 flap OK and I'm taking the flap all the way through to 30 and you're 
going to have to trim it now up a little bit, as it comes off here, allow the speed to drop off to the 
left. It looks great. 
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Yes. 
30, 30 green. 
All greens, hydraulics are normal the landing checks completed. 
OK here we go we're now at 300 feet. Remember you must look at the far ... They must go red, 
white, white, so we're a little bit low. Speeds a little bit high. OK keep it descending not too fast 
on the descent. 
100 feet 50. 
.~ -.. 
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